

RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. THE TURKISH FACTOR OF THE AZERBAIJANIAN NATIONHOOD // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Turkey, independence, nationhood, Azerbaijanian-Turkish relations.

Ruslan Suleimanov,

Postgraduate Student, Faculty of Global Policy,
Lomonosov Moscow State University

Abstract: The author considers a role of the Turkish factor in establishing of the Azerbaijani nationhood. It is described the history of contacts of Azerbaijanians and Turks, since 9-12 centuries and up to our time. Particular attention is paid to a role of the Ottoman Empire in formation, and then destruction of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) and also to relationship between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Turkey these days.

In 2018 in Azerbaijan there were celebrated several age-long anniversaries of events which in a varying degree are important today for consciousness of the Azerbaijanian people and also for modern Azerbaijanian nationhood in general. Among all memorable dates of 1918 a specific place was occupied by declaration of independence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) (May 28) and access of the Caucasian Islamic army into Baku (further – "Islamic army") headed by the Turkish commander Nuri pasha (September 15-17).

If the first symbolizes succession of the Azerbaijanian nationhood from existed for 23 months (till April 28, 1920) ADR to the present Azerbaijan Republic (AR) formed owing to the collapse of the USSR, so the memory of the second event is aimed at showing that feasible role which was played by Turkey (then still the Ottoman Empire) in establishing of the first democratic state in the Muslim East.

At a military parade on September 15, 2018 in the center of Baku there was also the president of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan who, addressing high-level officials and the military of both states, noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey – “two fraternal countries” which have “one history, one culture, one language and one religion.” According to him, liberation of Baku by troops of “Islamic army” 100 years ago as nothing else “symbolizes brotherhood, friendship, unity and solidarity” of two nations. “The fact is that joy for Azerbaijan is also our joy; pride [for Azerbaijan] is and our pride; grief, agitation, a problem [for Azerbaijan] is also our problem,” – the Turkish leader summarized.

The president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev in his speech also emphasized inviolacy of fraternal ties between two nations. “We were together 100 years ago, and today we are together,” – he told.

Both Erdogan, and Aliyev in their speeches traditionally noted the considerable success got by two countries in recent years in military, political, economic, cultural and other spheres. Both leaders also reminded that Turkey was the first state which recognized independence of Azerbaijan in 1991.

In this article we will consider, on what such proximity of two states is historically contingent. Whether throughout history the Azerbaijanian-Turkish relations were always at such a high level? And the most important – why to the leaders of the Transcaucasian republic it is so important the memory of a role of Turkey in establishing of modern independent Azerbaijan?

Thorny way to unity

As it is known till 1918 history did not know the Azerbaijanian state as it is. We mean the state in which at the official level Azerbaijanians would be declared as a titular nation. In this context it will be helpful to remind that establishing the principle of the nation states in the world political system began to take place only approximately from the middle of the XVII century, i.e. after the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648).

Throughout all history until creation of ADR Azerbaijanians were a component of whichever states or the protostate entities, in many of which there was even no marked titular nation.

In a national historiography there is no consensus about ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijanian people. In the Soviet years, especially after the end of the World War II, there was the concept of median origin of the Azerbaijanian ethnos according to which its ethnogenesis derived on the territory of the Iranian speaking Median kingdom (the predecessor of Persia and modern Iran) existing in the VII-VI centuries BCE which can even be designated as the first Azerbaijanian state. The main argument of this concept comes down to the fact that considerable part of the territory of this state entity was on lands of modern Southern Azerbaijan.

Later in Soviet Azerbaijan, and then and in AR there was popular a concept about purely Turkic origin of the Azerbaijani ethnos. According to this idea, it is wrong to consider Media as the Azerbaijanian state as its language cannot be referred to Turkic language family.

According to E.R. Ismailov, both concepts are very vulnerable. First, the idea of search of origins of Azerbaijanian, though in disappeared, but obviously not Turkic, in itself looks quite absurd. Secondly, the non-Turkic language which reached us in documentary records it is unlikely that it was the language of all tribes inhabiting Media.

More or less clearly it is possible to speak about the first relationship between predecessors of modern Turks and Azerbaijanians from the date of increase of a Turkic element in the Middle East. Process of a turkification of the region was actually summarized by penetration of Oghuz tribes into it in the XI-XII centuries. A number of Azerbaijanian historians are convinced that the Turkic element was very much in evidence in the territory of modern Azerbaijan even long before penetration of the Oghuz. In particular, Z.M. Buniatov claimed that "it is wrong to consider Turkic people a strange element in Azerbaijan as then

it is necessary to close eyes to presence of very big and influential Turkic associations in the early going."

The relations between the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijanians inhabiting various states in the territory of modern Northern Azerbaijan and Southern Azerbaijan (the State of Shirvanshahs, the State of Ildegizids (Atabeks), the State of Karakoyunlu, the State of Akkoyunlu, etc.) in the period of the late Middle Ages and at the beginning of Modern times were quite difficult, often even hostile. Inhabiting the states competing among themselves predecessors of modern Turks and Azerbaijanians were divided in terms of ideology, culture, language and even religion.

The apogee of this dissociation of two nations can be considered opposition of the Ottoman Empire and the State of Safavids (1501 – the middle of the XVIII century). There was a permanent fight for spheres of influence in the region between two countries with small pauses.

Echoes of that opposition are heard and today. In particular, in popular (including in Russia) the Turkish historical series "The Magnificent Century" Safavid governors, in particular the shah Takhmasib I (1514–1576), are presented quite coward and weak against the background of sultan of the Ottoman Empire Suleyman I (1494–1566). In this regard a number of Azerbaijanian historians tear into similar interpretation of the Azerbaijanian-Turkish relationship during that historical era. In particular, the director of Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan Republic Ya.M. Makhmudov considers "The Magnificent Century" "a big insult concerning both Turkish and Azerbaijanian history."

At the same time, besides numerous resource and turf wars, by surviving documental records, we can give evidence of trade and economic relations between Turks and Azerbaijanians which, however, were also very complicated. Approximately at the end of the XV century with development in Europe of the early capitalist relations demand for raw silk sharply increased (in particular, at the Venetian silk-weaving enterprises) which at that moment was

abundantly got in the State of Akkoyunlu (1468–1501). Meanwhile the policy of the sultan of the Ottoman Empire Mekhmed II (1432–1481) was so as to that the raw silk delivered from the East to the European countries was processed in Turkey so that in such a manner the Ottoman Empire actually became the key exporter of these goods popular with European consumers. Today similar practice is used by Turkey concerning energy resources. For example, for many years Ankara buys natural gas from Baku on the most favorable terms for itself and at the prices below the market (approximately for 30%) that, thus, allows Turkey to remain one of the key suppliers of hydrocarbons for the European consumer.

In the XVI century active rapprochement of the Safavid Empire with Russia began. Both states looked for allies for opposition of the Ottoman Empire which was at zenith of its potency at that time. Confessional distinctions were not an obstacle for Moscow and Isfahan in opposition to the general enemy. Nevertheless friendship between two states escalated into no more than strengthening of trade and economic ties – they didn't succeed to create the full-fledged military alliance.

After collapse of the Safavid Empire in the first half of the XVII century on its fragments several feudal states (khanates) were formed. After exhaustible internal wars by the end of the eighteenth century in Iran the dynasty of Qajars led by Aga Mohammad khan became stronger (1742–1797). It defeated other applicants for a shah throne and managed to bring the most part of Iran under his umbrella including territories of modern Northern Azerbaijan and Southern Azerbaijan.

During the same period the policy of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus becomes more active. During Peter I (1672–1725) era when Russia began to develop actively its own flotilla and to win the status of the sea power, not least of all turned its attention to the Caspian Sea.

With accession of Northern Azerbaijan at the beginning of the XIX century Russia began to attract actively Azerbaijanians in

those wars which it waged then. In particular, as T. Svetokhovsky notes, the empire used Sunni and Shiite contradictions thanks to which Azerbaijanians were attracted for confrontation to Turkey (at least, in the Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829) and in the Crimean war (1853-1856)) and also for suppression of the anti-Russian movement falling on in Dagestan.

Accession to the Russian Empire also promoted formation of Azerbaijanian intellectuals which in the second half of the XIX century were engaged in search of consciousness. This process was in many respects stimulated by distribution of Pan-Turkism in the empire, one of pioneers of which was the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914). In the Terdzhyumen newspaper ("Translator") published since 1883 in Bakhchisarai he expounded unity of all Turks of the Russian Empire. The first step towards unity of all Turks, according to Gasprinsky, must have been creation of one literary language eligible for all Turks – from the Balkans to China. According to him the Istanbul dialect of Turkish could become such language, i.e. official language of the Ottoman Empire in which, actually, and Terdzhyumen was published.

In Azerbaijan similar attempts of osmanization generally came under criticism for artificiality. In particular, the Keshkyul magazine for the first time differentiated the concepts of nationality and the local religious community designated during that period by one word "Miletus." The edition offered the concept "Azerbaijanian Turki" designating people living on both sides of the Russian-Iranian border.

In Turkey citizens of Russian descent had a great influence on intellectual life, – generally Tatars and Azerbaijanians – which headed the movement of promotion of Pan Turkism. In particular, the Azerbaijanian Ali-bey Guseynzade (1864-1940) formulated the slogan "Turkization, Islamization, Europeanization" which was subsequently modified by the Turkish thinker and one of ideologists of a Pan Turkism Ziya Gyokalp (1876-1924). In Azerbaijan these three words will become a basis of a tricolored flag of the independent republic.

Thus, by the beginning of the XX century gradual approach of Azerbaijanians and Turks on the basis of the ideas of Pan-Turkism took place, creation of a single Turkic nation with common language on Turan's space immense territory from the Anatolian peninsula to China. In some degree in Azerbaijan the party of nationalist orientation Musavat became the spokesman of these ideas headed by Mamed Emin Rasolzade (1884-1955) who was meant to be one of the founders of the first independent Azerbaijanian state.

Turkey's role in establishment and then destruction of the Azerbaijanian Democratic Republic

Since first days of its emergence (on May 28, 1918) bridge building with the Ottoman Empire was one of the key problems of ADR. Formation of the Turkish-Azerbaijani military-political alliance lasting from May to November, 1918 was legalized on June 4 by the Treaty of peace and friendship. In the fourth article of this agreement it was emphasized that in case of evaluation of security threat the authorities of the Ottoman Empire engage "to help the government of the Azerbaijan Republic by means of armed power".

Significantly that Turkey did not ratify this document officially and until the end of September did not extent recognition to Azerbaijan as an independent state. According to T. Svetokhovsky, "Turks regarded Eastern Transcaucasia as a part of appeared Turanian empire where, besides, the North Caucasus, a northern part of Persia and Turkestan were to be included."

Anyway at the end of May, 1918 in Ganja courtesy of the Turkish officers it was formed "The Islamic army" which was formed by parts of two Turkish divisions - the 5th Caucasian and 15th Chanakhgalinsky and also "The special Azerbaijanian corps" entered was created. The number of the Turkish contingent as a result was about 15 thousand bayonets and sabers, the Azerbaijanian parts - about 5 thousand. As a result of warfare during the summer - an early autumn of 1918 Azerbaijanian-Ottoman army succeeded in retaking all territory of Azerbaijan.

Liberation of Baku on September 15–17 which was at that time under the reign of the government of Centrocaspian Dictatorship supported by the block of social democrats, the right Socialists Revolutionaries and the right Dasnaks became the culmination of those events.

Despite the progress on the Caucasian front line, position of the Ottoman army and its allies on other directions was catastrophic: in sequence positions in Palestine, Syria, in the Balkans were lost. As a result already on October 30 Turkey actually had to recognize its defeat in World War I, as it was documented in the Armistice of Mudros, one of articles of which voiced the following, powers of the Entente take under its control railway service in Transcaucasia and occupy Baku, and Turkey is obliged to withdraw the troops therefrom.

Humiliating defeat in World War I and the acute socio-political crisis in general which overwhelmed Turkey during that period demanded from its authorities to look for allies. The Soviet Russia was actually the only country with which strategic ambitions of the Kemalist Turkey coincided with.

Independent Azerbaijan which since its first days of existence was surrounded by the whole circle of enemies became a small coin for Moscow and Ankara pursuing vested interests in the region. As R.S. Mustafa-Zadeh notes, “having failed “to export” world revolution to the West, Bolsheviki counted on extension of influence to the East, first of all to Turkey and Iran.” The role of Azerbaijan was considered not only as a corridor capable to connect Turkey and Russia, but also as a source of raw materials for support of further Bolshevization of Turkey. “The solidarity of purpose in consolidation of their regional positions and mutual interest in support of each other led to the fact that in Azerbaijan both Moscow, and Angora (nowadays Ankara) started talking in one “geopolitical language” and didn’t feel the need of “the Azerbaijanian translators” any more,” – R.S. Mustafa-Zadeh emphasizes.

On the opening day of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) which took place on April 23, 1920 (5 days before elimination of ADR) in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) demanded "admission of the Soviet troops to the borders of Turkey for their defense against English attacks" from Baku.

Several days later – on April 26 – M. Kemal appealing to the Soviet government, apart from the suggestion to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Russia, promised "to force the Azerbaijan Republic to enter a number of Soviet states."

It was beneficial for Bolsheviks that a considerable part of the Turkish officers which was in Azerbaijan was a priori ready for change of the power in this young republic. According to T. Svetokhovsky, "the Turkish officers looked forward to shift of power in Baku, because emergence of the Soviet Azerbaijan would draw together Lenin Russia with Islamic Turkey. The prevalence of such moods among the officer corps accelerated psychological dislocation of soldier's ranks."

By April 27 troops of the XI Army of Bolsheviks almost without delay passed through all the territory of Azerbaijan from the North to the South and almost wholly occupied the capital of ADR – Baku. On the night of April 27th to 28th the parliament of ADR under the chairmanship of M.E. Rasulzade made the decision to transfer of authority to Bolsheviks. Final occupation of Baku and all Azerbaijan was completed by May – the beginning of June, 1920, though in some districts resistance zones remained all the year 1920.

Speaking about the contradictory character of the Turkish-Azerbaijanian union, T. Svetokhovsky emphasizes that "Pan-Turkism as ideology, significantly promoted growth of national consciousness, and Azerbaijanians all the more realized their affiliation with Turkic people however the pro-Turkish orientation was hardly congruent with ambitions (authorities of ADR - author's note) to manage the country independently."

In 1919 M.E. Rasulzade famous for his affection for Turkey, addressing the Azerbaijani parliament, told: "We knew that our

people have some habits – distinct style of life, and Turks – other. And if Constantinople wanted to run Baku, then Baku would turn against Constantinople.”

“One nation-two states”

It is quite problematic to speak about the Azerbaijani-Turkish contacts during the existence of the USSR as they directly depended on the relations between Moscow and Ankara. As it was already mentioned, these relations, especially after World War II, were utterly uneasy. Close contacts between the Republic of Turkey and the Azerbaijani SSR actually were missing.

The collapse of the USSR and independence induced authorities of Azerbaijan, as well as other newly-formed republics, to appeal to the past for the purpose of designing of own identity, as if carrying on those traditions of nationhood which were set up almost 100 years ago.

The leader of National Front of Azerbaijan (NFA), the second president of the republic Abulfaz Aliyev (1938–2000) better known as Elchibey who came to power in June, 1992 was one of the brightest exponent of the ideas of new Azerbaijanian nationhood and identity of the Azerbaijani people. He considered Azerbaijanians to be Turks, and Azerbaijani – a dialect of Anatolian Turkish. He pointed the finger at I.V. Stalin (1878–1953) for change of the language name.

As noted by Z.M. Ali Zadeh, during one-year ruling of NFA Turkey, being the first country, which recognized independence of Azerbaijan, “gradually began to open up the place of “the elder brother” voluntarily left by Russia.”

The pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijan, though less unconcealed, was continued also by Heydar Aliyev (1923–2003) who came to power in 1993 and to whom it is attributed a formula of relationship of Baku and Ankara live up to now – “One nation – two states.” Azerbaijan, in particular, placed reliance in military aid from Turkey in bringing about resolution to the Nagorny

Karabakh conflict that, however, did not occur. Nevertheless the Azerbaijani leaders continued strengthening trade and economic, military and other relations with Sunni Turkey, but not, say, with Shiite Iran where today about 30 million of ethnic Azerbaijanians live. According to R. Motik, disreputation of Iran in Azerbaijan is driven by, at least, the following three factors: heritage of anti-Iranian propaganda in Soviet times, friendship of Tehran with Yerevan and also unattractiveness of the Iranian model of state building based on religious doctrines.

Despite the unity shown by the leaders of two countries, many contradictions on a number of foreign policy issues remain between Baku and Ankara. So, Azerbaijan does not recognize independence of Kosovo, standing with Serbia while Turkey was one of the first countries which backed Kosovo Albanians. In 2003 Baku supported military intervention of the U.S. in Iraq and even allocated military forces while Ankara refused Washington even admission of troops through its territory. Because of unsettled Nagorny Karabakh problem Azerbaijan does not recognize independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

As R.N. Musabekov writes, signing in October, 2009 of so-called Zurich protocols on normalization of the relation between Turkey and Armenia became "the real pressure test of the Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership." Baku interpreted this event extremely negatively and threatened Ankara to review conditions on energy supplies. For short period so-called "war of flags" began between two countries when at first in Turkish Bursa on October 14 during the football match between Turkish and Armenian national teams it was forbidden to carry Azerbaijani flags to the stadium, and then on October 21 in Baku the Turkish ensigns were hoisted down that led to mutual exchange of notes between foreign services of two countries. As a result, it was able to cancel out the short conflict, and Ankara refused rapprochement with Yerevan.

Thus, after several centuries of rivalry and hostility only by the end of XIX – the beginning of the XXth centuries gradual

rapprochement of the Azerbaijani and Turkish people against spread of the ideas of Pan-Turkizm which overtook then the Ottoman Empire and some Muslim people of the Russian Empire. The Turkish factor was due in no small part to establishing of the Azerbaijani nationhood as in 1918, and in the 1990s. Meanwhile interest of Turks in elimination of ADR in 1920, unwillingness of Turkey to be involved in a full-scale war on the side of Azerbaijan in war for Karabakh in 1991–1993, the situation around the Zurich protocols of 2009, non-recognition of TRSK by Azerbaijan, existence of other disagreements on international issues between Baku and Ankara show, that both parties first of all are guided by own interests and existing foreign policy condition, but not an aspiration to correspond always and in all ways to the above-mentioned principle “One nation – two states.”

ELENA DMITRIEVA. IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN KAZAKHSTAN AND IMAGE OF KAZAKHSTAN IN RUSSIA: AS WE SEE EACH OTHER // *The review was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Russia, Kazakhstan, factors of formation of social perceptions, historical-cultural context, stereotypes, integration, image of country.

Elena Dmitrieva,
Senior Research Associate,
INION RAS

Introduction: The study of problems concerning the perception of an image of one or another country becomes ever more important in the modern world. The security of countries, their welfare and place on a political or economic map of the world largely depend on the development of their relations between themselves, and especially relations with neighboring