

does not know Chinese – contradictions between migrants from China and local population are strengthened.

As for migrants from other countries, generally from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it is hardly possible to call them “foreign culture.” Many of them have relatives on both sides of the border, are well familiar with customs and culture of the neighboring country, use Russian actively for international communication. Besides, as surveys show in Uzbek-speaking villages of Tajikistan, more than 52% of respondents consider important marriage with representatives of their ethnic community, however for 36% this factor is important, but not obligatory.

Moreover, it stands out that circumstance that the authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan do not give due consideration to migration policy including because as it was already noted above, Tajikistan is now and, most likely, will remain in the near future the state – the donor of migration. The attention of the authorities of the RT is generally concentrated on arrangement of the Tajik emigrants.

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The interest of the American diplomacy in Tajikistan (RT), Dmitry Popov emphasizes, is traditionally caused by two major factors. The first one is proximity to Afghanistan (RA). The

republic has the most extended border among the Post-Soviet states with it – 1344 km, and Tajiks make the second largest ethnic group in the RA. The second one – the allied relations with Russia. In this regard the analysis of the U.S. strategy for Dushanbe is obviously important both in the context of geopolitical opposition with Moscow, and in terms of evolution of the American policy in the Middle East.

In the history of cooperation of the U.S. and Tajikistan the researcher emphasizes three main periods. The first of them fell on the 1991–2001s. For the first time the countries got along with each other, but civil war in the RT troubled their relations for several years. The second period was between 2001–2014 and was connected with military intervention of the U.S. in Afghanistan. At this time interaction of Washington and Dushanbe reached culmination and concentrated first of all around security issues. After withdrawal of the main part of American contingent from the RA in 2014 it was initiated the current stage of development of their relations which is characterized by gradual reduction of bilateral programs both in intensity, and in subject. During the period from 2010 to 2016 on an initiative of Washington annual bilateral consultations were held. There was discussed implementation of specific projects of cooperation at the level of the ministries and departments. Since November, 2015. The State Department additionally started multilateral dialogue of “C5+ 1” in which all states of CA and the U.S. take part.

As amended in the National Security Strategy of the U.S. published in December, 2017, Tajikistan as well as other countries of CA, separately it is not mentioned. The doctrine documents main goals of the White House in relation to the whole region. The American government intends to encourage economic integration of Central and Southern Asia. It follows from the doctrine that the American diplomats consider cooperation with the states of CA particularly in the context of preservation of long-term presence in Afghanistan. In its turn, in the Concept of foreign policy of the RT accepted in January, 2015, Dushanbe confirms readiness to

develop the multidimensional relations with the U.S. on a mutually beneficial basis. At the same time in the list of regional priorities Tajikistan puts the U.S. only on the sixth place - after Russia, the states of the CIS, China, Afghanistan and Iran.

Addressing to the topic of "soft power," the author notes that the U.S. finances activity of branching network of public, information and humanitarian organizations in Tajikistan. Formally they are aimed at developing democracy and market economy, but in practice often interfere in internal processes and advance foreign - policy initiatives of Washington. These structures actively work in the republic since the beginning of the 1990s when it was reached the Collaborating agreement in the furtherance of rendering the humanitarian and technical and economic aid between the U.S. and the RT.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is engaged in administration of a bulk of projects. Since 2001 in the RT there is the "democratic commission" at the American Embassy distributing small grants. Remotely there is the National Endowment for Democracy co-financed from the federal budget of the U.S.

The main recipients of the American grants are transnational western NPOs and media. In Tajikistan there are: active Soros Foundation, radio "Svoboda," Aga Khan Foundation, Institute of war and peace, Eurasia Foundation, Internews and some other. In total 3 thousand non-profit organizations are registered in the RT.

However, the U.S. couldn't create the strong westernized movement in the RT. After a series of "color revolutions" in the former Soviet Union the RT applies tougher legislation on NPO and gradually extends control over this sphere from the state. The possibility of work of a number of well-known foreign structures, including Freedom House, National democratic Institute and Peace Corps is limited in the country. According to D. Popov, in the short term the trend of weakening of the U.S. role in "democratization" of Tajikistan, most likely, will remain.

Considering economic relations of both countries, the author notes that Tajikistan is of no concern for the U.S. as the trade and investment partner. Goods turnover in 2017 fell to the lowest mark since 2000 – 17.9 million dollars. Difficult investment climate, low profitability and rivalry with Chinese companies alienate the Western business. Instead of this the American side prefers to involve other instruments, in particular credits and grants. Generally they are distributed through the international financial institutions with dominating role of the West. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provide funds under obligations of carrying out of liberal transformations in Dushanbe. Allocations are stood out from the budget of the U.S. for a number of programs, the largest of which – Economic Support Fund. These means are intended to improve the international image of the White House and aimed at advance of foreign policy interests of the U.S. From the beginning of work of D. Trump administration expenses on the Tajik direction are cut down, but it goes slowly, than in other Central Asian countries.

The listed instruments are used by the U.S. for counteraction to contacts with Russia, preservation of its influence in the region as a part of “global leadership.” Need to decrease economic dependence of CA on Russia is directly enshrined in the budgetary documents of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. First of all on this rout it prevents Tajikistan from joining the Eurasian Economic Union. In various ways Washington “torpedoes” the project since 2010 when there was a question of accession of RT to “the customs troika” of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. At the beginning of 2013 the western consultants achieved accession of Tajikistan to the WTO on conditions which complicate possible membership of the republic in the EEU. Along with that, in 2011 the U.S. put forward the alternative integration project – the concept of the New Silk Way (NSW). It is based on the idea of merger of Central and Southern Asia into single economic macroregion.

The main interaction of the U.S. and Tajikistan is based on security issues. Overriding interest of Washington in this area

support of operations of the western coalition in Afghanistan, drug control, non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction and preparation according to the standards of NATO of separate divisions of high – degree alert. The U.S. Department of Defense considers the republic as the potential platform for deployment of own military facilities. In February, 2009 Tajikistan joined the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) – the system of transportation corridors for supply of U.S. Armed Forces group in Afghanistan through the states lying to the north from the battleground. Participation in the NDN promised to the country transit fees, and members of the CSTO did not object to it. Nevertheless in fact the Tajik part of the NDN was not popular. In the long term, the author considers, the need for the NDN can increase against the background of the new approach promised by D. Trump in Afghanistan and increase of pressure upon Islamabad.

The second in order of importance point on the bilateral agenda in the sphere of security there is counteraction to drug trafficking. In total the U.S. allocated more than 200 million dollars for the war on drugs in Tajikistan by 2017. In terms of volume of such support the republic is in the lead among all states of CA. However, with a focus on traffic of opiates, i.e. on the consequences of the problem the American side indulges its reasons – to expansion of drug crops in Afghanistan, the researcher emphasizes.

Other direction to which the U.S. pays special attention is connected with equipping and preparation of the separate militarized divisions according to standards of NATO. In Tajikistan Americans take interest in two formations – to the peace-keeping battalion and the National Guard of the RT. The peace-keeping battalion of Tajikistan is created with financial support of the U.S. in 2010. Today the American government rendered about 8 million dollars for its development. The National Guard of the RT is a military reserve force of direct- action of the head of state. Programs of interaction with the Tajik military

became a part of broad initiatives of the Pentagon in the states of the former USSR and pursue quite bottom-line aims. First, the White House is keen to engage sponsored peacekeeping forces in foreign operations under the auspices of NATO. Secondly, peacemaking is used as covering action for distribution of military activity of the North Atlantic Alliance on the states of the CSTO. Thirdly, exchange of experience through special detachment allows obtaining information on defensive capability of allies of Russia and serves preparations of own special troops for actions abroad.

Thus, D. Popov concludes, the analysis of the American-Tajik relations shows that at the current stage the republic is not among the main foreign policy priorities of the U.S. in the post-Soviet space. However, it does not mean that Tajikistan is completely out of the Central Asian strategy of the U.S. Keeping it in the focus of attention of the American foreign policy will be the aspiration of Washington to maintain access to Afghanistan and to constrain development of geopolitical competitors such as Moscow and Beijing. It is not drawn a line in the question of possible membership of the RT in the Eurasian Economic Union.

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ELENA DMITRIEVA. POLITICAL ELITE OF TURKMENISTAN. POST-SOVIET PERIOD // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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Abstract: The review examines specific features of the formation of Turkmenistan's political elite in the post-Soviet