

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2019.02.012. TAISIYA RABUSH. MUSLIM STATES AND THE REGIONAL VIOLENT CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN (1979-1989): MOTIVATION BEHIND INVOLVEMENT // *"Islamovedeniye," Mahachkala, 2018, Vol. 9, № 2, P. 58–68.*

Keywords: Afghan war, the Mujahedeen, protection of Islam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran.

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The author considers the motives for the participation of some states of the Middle East in assisting Afghan anti-government armed groups in the course of the Afghan military conflict with the direct participation of Soviet troops, also known as the "Afghan war" (1979–1989). Particular attention is paid to the reasons for involvement of such states as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt in the Afghan armed conflict (on the side of the mujahideen).

When analyzing the motives for involving Saudi Arabia in a regional military conflict in Afghanistan, the author of the article believes that the main role was played by the religious factor. First, the Saudis claimed leadership (at least "moral") throughout the Islamic world, and the struggle of Afghan anti-government groups

with the official government of Kabul (and with Soviet troops later) was declared a jihad even before the act of entering a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan.

Since the 1970s, the revival Islamic trends have been traced in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudis declared their commitment to the common cause of protecting Muslims and spreading Islam, helping the cause of Afghan "jihad" financially. The second reason is the intention to receive military support from the United States, considering Saudi Arabia as one of the closest allies in the Gulf and Middle East region after the fall of the Shah regime in Iran; Of course, the joint "cause" of the military and financial support of the Afghan mujahideen rallied the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

The third reason was quite widespread phenomenon of "Arab Afghans," passing from the mid-1980s. Training camps were created specifically for Arabs in Pakistan, and a number of people from the Near and Middle East took an active part in the Afghan "jihad," having undergone preliminary military training. Thus, the priority task for Saudi Arabia in maintaining jihad in Afghanistan was to strengthen its image as a state – a defender of Islam and contribute to strengthening the position of this religion and protecting co-religionists. The varied assistance provided by Saudi Arabia to Afghan insurgents throughout the Afghan armed conflict with the participation of the Soviet troops was aimed precisely at this.

Financial and military assistance from Pakistan to the Afghan mujahidin was provided to a small extent. Its role in the Afghan armed conflict was different: there were numerous training camps for insurgents on the ground (mainly along the perimeter of the Afghan-Pakistan border), and it also accepted the bulk of the Afghan refugees. In addition, it was on the territory of Pakistan, the diverse military assistance coming from the United States, the states of Western Europe, the countries of the Near and Middle East, was stored and distributed among the groups of rebels.

Unlike the motives of Saudi Arabia, the religious factor in assisting the Afghan mujahedeen was secondary to Pakistan.

The author of the article shows the main motives for the government of Pakistan in assisting the Afghan anti-government groups. First, an important aspect in this matter is the national aspect. A large part of the population of both Pakistan and Afghanistan is a single people - Pashtuns, and the question of the border between these countries (the so-called "Durand Line") remains unresolved since the very beginning of Pakistan's existence as an independent state and is a constant stumbling block in interstate Afghan-Pakistani relations. Pakistan intended to favorably influence the resolution of the national and border issues with the support of the Afghan mujahedeen. Pakistan's second motive was the same as Saudi Arabia - that is, the Pakistani government was counting on an increase in military, military-technical, and financial assistance from the United States. Thus, the researcher concludes, the protection of Islam and co-religionists was by no means the leading motive of Pakistan in the process of assisting the Afghan anti-government groups in spite of the officially used slogans on the protection of Islam. Important were, firstly, the desire to resolve the national and "border" issues in its favor; and secondly, the desire to receive military and financial assistance from the United States, positioning itself as a "front-line state" and a barrier to Soviet communist aggression.

The author examines the role of Iran in the regional armed conflict in Afghanistan. One of the primary foreign policy tasks of Iran after the Islamic revolution in 1979 was the spread of Islam and the promotion of the ideas of the Islamic revolution in other Muslim countries. It can be argued that the motive for the protection of Islam and the spread of the ideas of the Islamic revolution was the main one in the decision of the leadership of Iran on indirect participation in the Afghan armed conflict 1979-1989. However, Iran's capabilities in this matter were limited - firstly, due to the fact that the official ideology of Islamic Iran is the Shiite branch of Islam, which is not widely spread in Afghanistan; and secondly, due to the fact that Iran was involved in a long and

bloody war with Iraq in 1980, participation in which required it to exert maximum effort.

Speaking about the role of Egypt in the Afghan regional armed conflict, the author notes that since 1980 the Egyptian leadership provided military assistance to the Afghan insurgents (mainly through the supply of weapons), which lasted until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, the Islamization of Egypt began and its inclination was marked towards the countries of the West and the Arab countries of the Near and Middle East with simultaneous distancing from the USSR. According to the researcher, the motives of the Egyptian leadership regarding the decision to indirectly participate in the Afghan armed conflict on the side of the Afghan mujahedeen were similar to the motives of the Pakistani leadership. The main factor for Egypt in this matter was the expectation of receiving comprehensive American assistance and rapprochement with the West, which Egypt was able to achieve in the end.

Taisiya Rabush concludes that the motives for the protection of Islam and the struggle against the "infidels" were not decisive in the decision-making process of rendering assistance to the Afghan insurgents by the governments of these states. The religious factor was most significant in this issue for Saudi Arabia and Iran (although Iran's ability to provide assistance to Afghan insurgents was limited), while completely different motives played a key role for Pakistan and Egypt (rapprochement with the West and receiving military aid from it, and ethnic and territorial factors were also important for Pakistan).

The situation in Afghanistan, the author concludes, is still far from a peaceful settlement, and neighboring Islamic states are still interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, using a radical version of Islam to destabilize the political situation in that country. But, nevertheless, it is the Islamic factor that is actively promoted and used as one of the reasons for outside interference. Thus, the main motive may be not only religious (the protection of Islam and Muslims, the spread of the Muslim religion), but also

other, often quite far from religion, motives in the process of involving Muslim states in regional armed conflicts in neighboring countries.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.02.013. ABOLFAZL DELAVARI. LESSONS OF HISTORY: RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN. (On the Need for a Transition to Multivector and Symmetrical Relations) // *"Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ekonomicheskoy i kul'turnoy oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii 19 oktyabrya 2016."* Moscow, FSBEI HE MSLU, 2017, P. 37–43.

Keywords: Russia, Iran, multi-vector relations, symmetrical relations, expansionist policy, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, strategic cooperation.

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As the researcher notes, the relations between Russia and Iran were often unidirectional, asymmetric and had a tactical character for a long period. In the first decades of the 19th century, the two countries fought wars that ended with the transition of a large part of Iran to Russia, as a result of which Russia received political and legal privileges and economic concessions. Over the next 180 years, relations between Iran and Russia have never been strong enough. However, in some periods the ties were strengthened and there were temporary alliances between the governments of the two countries.