

on production of fertilizers -urea, nitrate of ammonium and threefold superphosphate emitted compounds of sal ammoniac and nitrogen. Situation was aggravated with intrusion into the atmosphere of large amounts of carbon monoxide during work of boiler houses, motor vehicle emission, mass of small workshops, etc. Besides the plant on production of phosphoric fertilizers in Homs delivered into a disposal area 900 thousand tons of a dry phosphite a year. This waste pour off near the city, poisoning water of el-Asya, lake Kattyna and underground sources. In the country there were used highly toxic insecticides which were transferred by air at an immense distances, infecting the territory and causing numerous diseases including cancer.

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RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. MAIN ACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE ARMY VS MFA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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*Keywords: Turkey, army, Foreign Ministry, President, foreign policy.*

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*Abstract.* the author examines the role and place of the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in formation of Turkey's

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foreign policy in the second half of XX – early XXI centuries. Special attention is paid to the period of rule of the Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The article emphasizes that in the recent years, both the army and the Turkish Foreign Ministry were actually pushed into the background, and the administration of the President of the country came to the forefront in the matters of foreign policy of the Republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army are traditionally considered to be the determining institutions in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy. In different periods of the history of the Republic of Turkey, the initiative passed from one side to the other.

During the Second World War and in the postwar period, especially after Turkey's admittance to NATO (1952), the dominant role was played by the army. "At that time the military stood guard over the achievements of the Republic and, paradoxically it may seem, ensured the democratic development of Turkey," said the Turkish retired general Yasar Buyukanit.

After the coup of 1960 and the growing influence of public opinion over the policy the dominant role passed over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: increased cooperation between Ankara and the countries of the West demanded involvement of civilians, diplomats, and public figures. "In the 1960–1970s, the army was mainly focused on internal security issues," the historian Gokhan Kocher emphasizes.

The second half of the 1970s was marked by escalation of social conflicts in the Republic, wave of political terror, leapfrog of offices in the government became the norm. "Many economic and social factors of the second half of the 1970s showed the urgent need for a radical revision of the national strategy," N.G. Kireev notes. And this revision, as 20 years ago, was undertaken by the military, who organized a military coup and formed the National Security Council (NSC) on September 12, 1980.

It is important to point out that, as many Turkish historians note, the army has never sought to oppose the Foreign Ministry or any other state institution. "The army as one of the pillars of the state from the first days of the Republic and as one of the most conservative institutions in the country has always only sought to protect the achievements of Kemalism, it <...> was meticulously performing its duty," – G. Kocher confirms.

The influence of the military slightly subsided with the beginning of liberal economic reforms of the late 1980s – early 1990s under the leadership of the Prime Minister (1983–1989), and then the President (1989–1993) of Turkey Turgut Ozal (1927–1993), who spoke, in particular, for a peaceful resolution of the escalated conflict between the Central authorities and the leaders of Turkish Kurdistan.

However, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan coming to power in 2002, the traditionally influential role of the generals began to fall even more rapidly.

First of all, the legal autonomy of the army, which had earlier been beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts, was abolished. Secondly, dismissal from service was burdened by numerous bureaucratic procedures and was removed from the competence of the army leadership. Besides, any dismissed person had an opportunity to appeal to court with the claim against the administration. Thus, the army lost the right to "self-cleaning."

Due to the reforms, the NSC, the main body of political influence of the military elite, became "more civilian" by its regulations. As a result of the administrative reform of January – July 2003, the mandatory requirement that the Secretary General of the National Security Council were an active General of the army was abolished: in October 2004, the first civilian Secretary General was appointed, and since then the National Security Council has been headed exclusively by civilians. Besides, the regularity of meetings of the NSC was changed: as from then they were held every two months, rather than monthly, as before,

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which obviously complicated the use of the Council as a tool of pressure on decision-making by the civil government.

It was under the AKP that the military elite and the army as a whole became the object of public criticism. The image of the army, once highly respected and trusted in society, was gradually discredited. The media began to regularly publish materials about the outrage and irresponsible behavior of the army personnel. Plans to destabilize the country and to overthrow the government were also reported.

The Kemalist elite suffered the final defeat in confrontation with the AKP in 2016, when on July 15 a group of soldiers and officers of the armed forces of the Republic attempted a coup, which killed 250 people, not counting the coupists, and more than 2 thousand people were injured.

According to Pinar Tremblay, a Turkish political scientist, the events of July 2016 “allowed Erdogan to use the influence of clerics in his (as well as his party) confrontation with the Kemalist elite.” Numerous arrests of representatives of the military elite have led to the fact that today the Turkish army in many positions is even short of personnel.

And as a result of amendments to the Constitution, approved at the national referendum of April 16, 2017, the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces – once a very influential figure in the country – is now appointed by the President and is subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The State Oversight Committee, which is subordinate to the President of the country, now has the authority to inspect the army.

From now on, the decisions on participation or non-participation of the Turkish Armed Forces in certain operations abroad, as noted by a number of Turkish political scientists, are taken by the civil, political leadership, without actually relying on the opinion of the military elites, “turned into obedient executors of the will of Erdogan and his entourage.”

A distinctive feature of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in its turn, is its disengagement from the domestic political struggle.

"[The Foreign Ministry] has always stood aside from any political processes in the country, has not been subjected to pressure from certain influential groups," G. Kocher notes. To confirm this, it may be mentioned that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic have been in the position longer than any other Ministers of the country – an average of about 30 months.

Since the time of the Ottoman Empire, the Foreign Ministry, along with the army, played an important role in the foreign policy of the Turkish state. "The military has always felt close to diplomats and experienced the need for them in achieving their own goals (meaning coups d'état, after which a new government was established in the Republic, and it was necessary to establish contacts with the outside world – author's note), – said B. Oran. – The latter needed the former in times of difficult contacts with the outside world, especially with the West."

Diplomats played a special role from the first day of founding of the Republic of Turkey in the sense that Ankara, under the leadership of Atatürk, sought to integrate as quickly as possible into the Western world, which, in particular, contributed to diplomatic contacts. "A diplomat's word became decisive after long discussions between conservative Islamists and Republicans about the fate of Turkey and its relations with the West," Sh. Chalysh notes in this regard.

However, this balance was disturbed at the time of coups d'état in the Republic, perpetrated by the military elite, as mentioned above. The Foreign Ministry, like other ministries, was forced to obey the will of the generals, but directly in the process of negotiations with foreign partners, "it were diplomats who dictated their rules of the game to the military," historian Semih Günver points out.

With the AKP's coming to power, both the army and the Foreign Ministry begin to lose the former levers of influence over formation of Turkey's foreign policy – the center of gravity is gradually shifting towards the presidential administration.

The 45th article of the latest version of the Regulation on the Administration of the President of Turkey emphasizes that

one of its functions is “to coordinate the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies in determining the foreign policy of the Republic.”

In fact, as, the newspaper “Yeni Shafak” noted in July 2018, the administration of the President of Turkey “today plays not just a coordinating role in relation to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but has already become their curator, which quite recently has been the function of the head of the government and its staff.”

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OLGA BIBIKOVA . REORGANIZATION IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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*Abstract.* There were changes in succession order in Saudi Arabia. In spite of existing tradition of transition of power by seniority from one brother to another one, the last king already appointed his son the royal prince.

The most conservative Muslim state – Saudi Arabia – came into time of change. The matter is that contrary to the established