

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2019.04.001. MADINA ALIGADZHIEVA. CLAN AND ETHNIC BLURRING OF THE POLITICAL ELITE OF DAGHESTAN // *"Vlast," Moscow, 2019, Vol. 27, № 1, P. 24–28.*

Keywords: Daghestan, political elite, clans, erosion, research.

Madina Aligadzhieva,

Applicant,

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy
and Public Administration (RANEPA)

The clan structure of government existing in many regions of the country, according to the researcher, deprives the national elite of the possibility of creative activity in the interests of the state. Numerous attempts to eradicate it in Daghestan were unsuccessful: it kept reviving again. Great hopes in this area were pinned on Ramzan Abdulatipov, from whom, given his lack of commitment to any clans, they expected the erosion of ethnic clanship in the Republic of Daghestan.

The studies conducted by the author in 2013 showed that the clan principle prevails over all other criteria for joining the political elite. So, to the question of the poll conducted in 2013 in the Republic of Daghestan: "What are the main principles of joining the political elite characteristic of the Republic of Daghestan?" the largest number of respondents noted the clan principle (76.9%), 19.2% indicated family and kinship, and only 15.5% chose the

answer “through their own efforts.” A similar poll was carried out in 2015. To the question: “To whom, in your opinion, does the current power in the republic really belong?,” the following answers were received: to the first leader of the republic – 18.60%, various clans – 15.80%, the corrupt part apparatus – 14.10%, financially secure people, entrepreneurs, businessmen – 7.90%, mafia groups, criminal structures – 3.30%, political parties, social movements – 2.20%.

A comparative analysis of two sociological studies conducted by the author in 2013 and 2015 (with the rise of Ramzan Abdulatipov to power and in the previous period) shows that the situation in the republic has stabilized. However, there is no reason to talk about the complete erosion of the clan system. If at the first sociological study “Expectations of Dagestanis” to the question: “Who owns the power in the republic?,” people chose the answer to the “clan structure,” now they choose the answer to the “head of the region.”

The study of 2017 (end of the rule of Ramzan Abdulatipov) proves the gradual erosion of clanship in the republic. To the question: “To whom, in your opinion, does the current power in the republic really belong?” – the following answers were received: “to the head of the republic” – 13.6%; “The corrupt part of the apparatus” – 7.3%; “Mafia groups, criminal structures” – 5.1%; “Various clans” – 4.2%; “Political parties, social movements” – 1%; “Other” – 1%. Thus, the author notes that the significance of the clan principle in percentage terms from 2015 to 2017 decreased from 15.8% to 4.2%.

This study revealed the role of leadership and personalistic components in the evolution of the elite layer, in which respondents identified the head of the republic Ramzan Abdulatipov. Nevertheless, the main criteria for joining the political elite in the Republic of Dagestan remain such factors as wealth, connections, the desire to rule, and clanship. According to the results of the study of 2017, to the question: “On the opinion of the residents of Dagestan, what primarily motivates the leaders of

the republic in their activities"? the following answers were received: "Desire to become rich" - 21%; "Desire to get power" - 11.6%; "Achieve privileges and honors" - 3.3%; "Desire to make a career" - 4.6%; "Desire to honestly serve the people" - 0.8%; "Other" - 0.8%. The results of the polls confirm that the main and principle goal of power holders is the desire to enrich themselves at the expense of the state, pursuing personal interests.

According to the author, the most common type of corruption in the republic is endogenous corruption, in which budgetary organizations and officials participate. This is a carefully developed system of laundering budget money, which over the past two decades has gained incredible proportions. Against the background of a generally low standard of living, corrupt groups accumulate enormous wealth. Contacts related to budgetary relations between the center and the republic are based on "kickbacks" of the shadow economy, which are beneficial for a narrow layer in the ruling elites. The system of "kickbacks", which flourished in the 1990s and continues to exist today, has become the norm, and it can be found in almost all areas of activity of the republican leadership. To the question: "If you think that the efficiency of the republican leaders is not high enough, then indicate the reasons for this," the answers were received: "corruption of officials" - 26.5%; "incompetence of managers" - 18.6%; "isolation of the authorities from the people" - 15.2%; "defiance of the laws" - 11.8%; "low executive discipline" - 11.8%; "low wages" - 1.1%.

It is the corruption of officials, the incompetence of leaders, and clans that are the main factors that impede the quality of elitogenesis in Daghestan, which determines the effectiveness of the political elite, its professional competence, and leadership positions. Personnel replacements and high-profile arrests that took place in the republic with the arrival of Ramzan Abdulatipov gave a positive momentum - the corruption business has staggered. Despite the fact that Ramzan Abdulatipov is less involved in clans in the republic, nevertheless, his family-kinship relations and ties enable many old

officials remain in their posts or move to similar ones, and therefore the talk about large-scale updating of the political elite is out of question, the author of the article emphasizes.

The main mechanisms for the formation of a regional elite structure are interaction with federal, political, economic, religious, ethnocratic, intellectual, anti-elite groups, which are characterized by family relationships and ties, wealth, money, personal loyalty to the authorities, nationalism, and political economic interests. The basis of everything is the problem of the elite's struggle for self-preservation. And in the absence of effective channels for updating the political elite, one can observe the isolation of the elite within itself. Therefore, the Daghestan people have many times advocated the appointment of a person from the center who would not depend on clans and family relations to the post of the head of the republic. Daghestanis positively accepted the appointment of the new head of the republic Vladimir Vasiliev – the first Russian in this post. The main challenge for Vladimir Vasiliev was the interaction with local clans and the struggle their erosion. The newly appointed president pays special attention to the fight against corruption, “which is becoming systemic,” the protection of social and labor rights of citizens, the observance of the rule of law in the field of housing and communal services and the fuel and energy complex, the fight against violations in the field of land legislation and construction, the strict registration of all crimes and priority consideration of citizens' appeals. Vladimir Vasiliev's personnel clean-ups give young people and professionals a chance to work in the interests of the state and its citizens.

Before Vladimir Vasiliev came to power, each new appointee began his activities with the inclusion of relatives and friends in the team. The issue of updating the elite was limited and almost frozen at all levels, because the circulation of elites took place along the lines of blood, kinship, or national identities. Formation of the leadership, the political elite, and the distribution of posts in the region was carried out according to such a system. With the arrival of Vladimir Vasiliev, in the Republic of Daghestan there

began the stage of erosion of the foundations of the ethnic and clan structure; the process of updating the political elite is ongoing. This is a turning point in the history of Daghestan, when any professional can participate in the socio-political life of the Republic, the government is as open as possible for the people and ready to meet its needs.

Particular attention is paid to high-quality elitogenesis in Daghestan, the effectiveness of the political elite and professional competence.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.04.002. VERONIKA TSIBENKO. TURKISH RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNO-POLITICAL PROCESSES // *"Islamovedenie," Makhachkala, 2019. Vol. 10, № 1. P. 27–40.*

Keywords: Muslimactivecore, imamtypology, spiritual administration, Muslim community (Ummah), religious education.

Veronika Tsibenko,
PhD(History), Director,
The Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities,
Southern Federal University

Abstract. The article analyses the Turkish religious influence on the development of Bashkir Islam at the turn of the 20–21 centuries.

Veronika Tsibenko considers the Islamic revival in Bashkortostan in the context of the ethnopolitical situation. Bashkortostan is a national republic with three predominant ethnic groups – Russians, Bashkirs and Tatars. The ethnopolitical system of Bashkortostan is distinguished by regulation by the authorities