

began the stage of erosion of the foundations of the ethnic and clan structure; the process of updating the political elite is ongoing. This is a turning point in the history of Daghestan, when any professional can participate in the socio-political life of the Republic, the government is as open as possible for the people and ready to meet its needs.

Particular attention is paid to high-quality elitogenesis in Daghestan, the effectiveness of the political elite and professional competence.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.04.002. VERONIKA TSIBENKO. TURKISH RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNO-POLITICAL PROCESSES // *"Islamovedenie," Makhachkala, 2019. Vol. 10, № 1. P. 27–40.*

Keywords: Muslimactivecore, imamtypology, spiritual administration, Muslim community (Ummah), religious education.

Veronika Tsibenko,
PhD(History), Director,
The Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities,
Southern Federal University

Abstract. The article analyses the Turkish religious influence on the development of Bashkir Islam at the turn of the 20–21 centuries.

Veronika Tsibenko considers the Islamic revival in Bashkortostan in the context of the ethnopolitical situation. Bashkortostan is a national republic with three predominant ethnic groups – Russians, Bashkirs and Tatars. The ethnopolitical system of Bashkortostan is distinguished by regulation by the authorities

of ethnosocial stratification. At the same time, within the framework of development of the Bashkir national project (ethnic nationalism), it is maintained highness of mobilization of Bashkir identity. Until the 2000s, religion (Islam) wasn't a factor of serious transformation of ethnopolitical processes for several reasons. First, the highness of secularization and interruption of the religious tradition in Bashkortostan enacted significantly, which was due to accelerated urbanization and industrial development of the region during the Soviet era. Secondly, Islam in Bashkortostan, unlike neighboring Tatarstan, failed to become a part of national identity, instrumentally maintaining ethnicity. Both Bashkirs and Tatars belong to so-called ethnic Muslims, that does not allow religious identity in the republic to become a fundamental marker of ethnic differences. In case of accumulation, this led to the fact that the politization of religious identity on a nationwide scale did not occur. On the contrary, the authorities officially emphasized their secular character and equal distance from all confessions.

The reluctance of the authorities to bet on religious identity concerned the historically contingent slight rootedness of Islam among the Bashkirs in comparison with the Tatars and the established practice of religious clergy development among the Tatars. Whereas since the 18th century it was Ufa, where "Ufa Mohammedan Spiritual Lawful Assembly" , renamed in 1846 to "Magometan Orenburg Spiritual Assembly" (now Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia, CMSB) was located, which was chosen as the center for Islam institutionalization in Russia, the Bashkirs got the perception of Islamic institutions as a strictly Tatar phenomena. This perception persisted until the mid-2000s. On the rebound of rejection of "Tatar Islam" in 1917, it was established the Bashkir Muslim Spiritual Authority which existed until 1936 and resumed its activities in 1992 in the form of the independent Regional Muslim Spiritual Boards of the Republic of Bashkortostan (RMSB RB), which broke away from CMSB of Russia. Although creation of its own Spiritual Board was supported by Bashkir national organizations for the purpose of "Bashkirizing" Islam,

and rivalry with CMSB of Russia continues to the present day, this is not about the influence of religious factor on the ethnic sphere, but, on the contrary, about the invasion of ethnic national factor in the religious sphere. In this regard experts note that the Bashkir Muslim Spiritual Board in both 1917 and 1992 was considered as one of the institutions of nationhood of sovereign Bashkortostan. Against the background of general growth of religion in the country, multiple increase in the number of Islamic institutions in Bashkortostan itself and the prevalence of “popular” Islam as a synthesis with archaic beliefs in rural areas, with a large lagging in the mid-2000s, the appeal to Islam of the city Bashkortostan, including members of national movements, begins. Prior to this, ethnicity of the city Bashkirs overwhelmed religiousness, and ethnoreligious consciousness and behavior were not related to the “ethnocultural Renaissance.” Right in the 2000s the process of re-Islamisation of urban youth and national intellectuals (humanitarian professions), previously oriented more towards the glorification of the pre-Islamic past of Bashkirs, as well as their ancient religion (Tengriism), began to gain momentum. At the same time, the number of so-called mosqueless or unofficial Muslims who did not recognize the authority of official Muslim institutions – CMSB of Russia and RMSB RB – began to increase. This was caused both by mutual discrediting of these organizations during the turf war and by the discontent of Islamized urban youth with the level of imams’ training, most of whom were elderly people without religious education, including former “Soviet-workers.”

In rivalry with pro-Salafi and pro- Sufi jamaats, official structures lose due to lack of educated youth and financial support. At the same time, in parallel, there was developing the process of integration of members of pro- Salafi jamaats into the official Islam structures in Bashkortostan. The functioning of Muslim religious organizations (MRO) classified as Salafi is also recorded in the MSA RB. The phenomenon of “young Muslims” – Bashkirs, which arose in Bashkortostan in the 2000s, usually adjacent to various pro-Salafi jamaats, is considered by scientists

from two sides: as politicization and nationalization of Islam, merging of religious extremism on the basis of Islam with nationalism of regional “passionaries,” on the one hand, and as mass withdrawal of Bashkirs from national movements to Islamic ones because of systemic crisis of the Bashkir national movement on the other hand. Researches note that in the second half of the 2000s there was the process of active youth loss from the ethnonational movement to jamaats.

Nevertheless, in the 2010s the idea of “Bashkir Islam” spread. It was made an attempt to replace the traditional Bashkir congresses (kurultai) with an Islamic council of Bashkirs (shura). However, it failed - soon the Bashkirs were replaced by the Tatars in the leadership of this Islamic structure.

According to the researcher, the Turkish religious influence on ethnopolitical processes in Bashkortostan are possible to be considered as a serious factor only since the 2000s. Although in the 1990s, there were established contacts of Muslim organizations and ordinary Muslims of Bashkortostan with the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and it was introduced the practice of sending members of the Muslim clergy to that country for religious training. The religious focus on Turkey then was due to lack of its own capacity to satisfy the demand for Islamic education and the doctrinal proximity of Turkish Islam (Hanafite Madhab), which contributed to its perception as traditional and moderate. That is why CMSB aimed to send clerics for training to Turkey.

In the 1990s, a network of Turkish lycées of the religious and political movement Hizmet Fethullah Gulen began to develop in Bashkortostan, spreading among the pupils the ideas of the Nurjular community and the Turkish preacher himself. However, the degree of influence that Nurjular and Gulen's jamaat could have on the ethnopolitical situation in Bashkortostan has not been determined yet. The same can be attributed to Suleimanjilar (Suleimanites), a Turkish jamaat which activities are recorded by researchers on the territory of Bashkortostan. The activities of Suleimanjilar, like Nurjular, belong to the educational sphere and

are confidential. Members of this jamaat pay great attention to higher education and extension of their influence in mosques (including through preachy literature). At the same time, not always Turkish religious influence is successful. In that regard, it's appropriate to note the Bashkir Youth Association (BYA), which was in contact with the Turkish "Idealist" movement (better known as the Grey Wolves) since the 1990s. Although the latter adhere to the so-called Turkic-Islamic ideal, the BYA has always distanced itself from religion. Thus, the "Idealists" did not have a meaningful religious impact on this structure, although perhaps notably under the influence of the ideas of the Turkic-Islamic synthesis the Bashkir youth from the BYA began to leave for religious movements in the 2000s.

The pro-Sufi jamaat of Erenkoy which followers are known also as topbashevtsi (by the name of their religious mentor and the founder of jamaat in Turkey Othman Nuri Topbash) is the most interesting in terms of influence on mobilization of ethnicity in the republic. Precisely because the activities of the leader of the jamaat Erenkoy in Bashkortostan, director of the publishing house "SAD" Ayrat Habibullin at the turn of decades of the 21 century, Muslim literature began to be published in Bashkir in thousands of editions. A distinctive feature of the jamaat was collaboration with national movements and pro-Salafi groups. Jamaat Erenkoy did not maintain contacts with official Muslim structures – CMSB of Russia and RMSB RB. At the same time, another of the pro-Sufi jamaats, the Haqqanis, formed in Bashkortostan in the 2010s and associated with the Turkish neo-Sufi brotherhood (tariqah) of the Haqqaniyah, unlike the jamaat of Erenkoy, started violent confrontation with the Salafis.

The Haqqani jamaat demonstrates a simplification of traditional ceremonialism and commitment to esoteric practices, but its main activities in Bashkortostan are related to the classic Sufism veneration of holy places. The Haqqani jamaat was widely practiced in the southern and eastern regions of the Republic, and among its

followers there were many representatives of the Bashkir intellectuals, opposition political set, media and national organizations.

On the example of the jamaats of Haqqani and Topbashev in Bashkortostan, it is possible to trace the request of the Bashkir national movement for Sufism. It is the lost Sufi tradition which is perceived as true popular, Bashkir. It is Turkish regional Sufism and Islam in general which are perceived as close to the Bashkir and capable of reviving the lost Bashkir religious Islamic tradition. However, it is necessary to take into account the discontinuity of religious tradition in Turkey itself, which had survived a period of radical restructuring and secularization of society in the 20th century, which were accompanied by the elimination of Sufi brotherhood and a total ban on their activity. These processes entailed transformation of traditional Sufi brotherhoods in Turkey in neo-Sufi or pro-Sufi jamaats as the phenomenon of modern society. In this regard, the perception of Turkish jamaats with Naqshbandian roots ("Nurjular," jamaat of Gulen, "Suleimanjilar," Erenkoy and Haqqani jamaat) as actual traditional Sufism is built on the ignorance of Turkish historical realities and modern features of religious life in Turkey.

Veronika Tsibenko considers it necessary to note the request of the Bashkir national intellectuals for the use of the archaic layer of popular religiousness, manifested in the synthesis of Islam with pre-Islamic beliefs, i.e. "mobilization of archaism" or "postmodern antiquity." It contributes to ethno-national mobilization and helps to fight against religious general Islamic project in which the Bashkirs, as part of the ummah, lose their entity. The Bashkir National Movement seeks to subordinate religious projects to ethno-national ones. Simultaneously, there is a process of combining "orthodox" Islam with Sufism and a compromise between Salafism and Sufism on an ethno-national basis, when Sufis, together with Salafists, seek after those stories that will be relevant to the Bashkirs.

Meanwhile updating of the problematic historical stories of the Bashkirs and strengthening of the Bashkir ethno-nationalism are in the interests of the Turkish jamaats, crossing over the Bashkir

Muslims to Turkish Islam and Turkey as the center of the Turkic and Islamic world. In general, traditionally large politicization of the Naqshbandian branch of Sufism, staginess of rituals of some jamaats, attracting the national intellectuals, and high mobilization potential are important for ethnopolitical processes in the Republic. In the context of the revival of the interrupted Sufi tradition, it is Turkey that is becoming the main center of religious influence for the Bashkirs, and Turkish Islam begins to adapt to the Bashkir environment, weakening, displacing and replacing the muftiats – CMSB of Russia and RMSB RB – with alternative informal structures. The researcher suggests that, although the national project now subordinates to religious one, power balance might change at the next stage, and then Turkish religious projects would subordinate to national ones. In such a case, there will be a possibility of replacing the Bashkir ethno-national project with a general Turkish project with an apparent Islamic component.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.04.003. NODAR KARIMOV, VYACHESLAV DANILOV. THE PROBLEM OF ISLAM RADICALIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN // Condensed from “Religious Policy, Radicalism and Evolution of Islam in Kazakhstan in the Beginning of the Twenty First Century: Theoretical Aspects” by Nodar Karimov, Vostok, Moscow, 2017, № 3, P. 152–161, and “Modern Religious Situation in Kazakhstan as a Threat to the National Security of Russia,” by Vyacheslav Danilov, Vestnik Omskoy Pravoslavnoy Duhovnoy Seminarii , Omsk, 2018. № 2 (5). P. 202–209.

Keywords: Kazakhstan, Russia, Islam, religious extremism, radicalisation of Islam, religious policy.

Nodar Karimov,
PhD(History), Independent Expert,
Kazakhstan