

Editorial note: The Russian Bureau of Interpol reported that 68 people were extradited from abroad to Russia under the International Counter-Terrorism Project in 2019, including members of armed gangs that fought as part of ISIL in the Middle East. According to the Defense Ministry, more than 5,000 fighters from the Russian Federation were annihilated in the course of hostilities in Syria.

IGOR DOBAYEV, ELENA SCHUKINA. ISLAMOPHOBIA IN RUSSIA: THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem world."*

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Abstract. The article considers Islamophobia, its historically determined origins, a complex historical path of development, the current state and possible vectors of leveling the challenges, risks and threats to the country's national security associated with this phenomenon as a type of xenophobia in Russia. The conclusion is that such a task is within the power of Russian society and the state.

At the turn of the 20th – 21st centuries xenophobia in Russia has become one of the most acute challenges to national security. The systemic crisis of the 1990s exacerbated social contradictions, which in the context of a multi-component multi-ethnic society acquired the character of inter-confessional and interethnic conflicts.

Xenophobia means hostility to strangers; the attitude to regard them as the source of one's problems. It is the eternal companion of human history, and not just the product of the modern transforming and contradictory world. Xenophobic tendencies in an open or latent state usually exist at the state, public, or personal level. They are based on negative stereotypes, in which the negative characteristics of representatives of another ethnic group, faith, social group are fixed. As a rule, they represent absolutization, the extension of ideas (real, but often distorted) about responsibility for any negative phenomena to an entire social group. In a social process that is developing evolutionarily, xenophobia is in a latent state; negatively colored stereotypes are replaced by positive or neutral. However, in a crisis, xenophobia is becoming one of the causes of ethnic, religious intolerance, conflict and even war.

Among the religious-based phobias in modern Russia the greatest danger to national and regional security is Islamophobia, which has its historical grounds.

The non-acceptance by the People of the Scriptures (Christians and Jews) of Islam, as the last world monotheistic religion, goes back to the Medina period (since 622) when Muhammad received divine revelations, since it was then that the Jewish tribes living in Medina (Banu Kainuka, Banu Kuraiisa and Banu Nadir) questioned his prophetic mission. In turn, the controversy between Christians and Moslems was opened by the famous St. John Damascene (died c. 787). In his treatise "On a hundred heresies in a nutshell," which is a catalog of heresies "from where they began and from what they came from," Islam was placed in the category of heresies descended from

Christianity. The interpretation of Islam given by Damascene had for a long time determined the attitude of Christian polemicists (both Orthodox and Catholic): "The religion of the Ismaelites, the forerunner of the Antichrist, is still hitherto valid, misleading the people." Damascene further notes that the ancestors of the followers of the new "heresy," until the time of the emperor Heraclius (d. 641), "clearly served idols; from that time and until now they had a false prophet called Mamed (Mohammed). Having got acquainted with the Old and New Testaments, as well as having communicated with the Arian alleged monk, he composed his own heresy."

A similar perception of Islam is demonstrated at the end of the VIII century by an Arabic-speaking bishop Theodore Abu Kurra. Considering himself the ideological successor of St. John Damascene, Theodore Abu-Kurra also reacted negatively to the personality of Muhammad and his teachings: for him he was a false prophet-Arian, obsessed by a demon.

As for Russia, the history of Islam on its territory is as ancient as Christianity. During the reign of the Kiev prince Vladimir I Svyatoslavich (980-1015), Islam was already established in the lands of the closest geopolitical neighbor of Russia, Volga Bulgaria. Close military-political and economic contacts with the Bulgars, the presence of a common enemy in the person of the Jewish Khazaria – all this acquainted the population of Kievan Rus with the Moslem faith, its principles set forth in the Quran and the Sunnah, its rites, and everyday life of Moslems. And although Christianity triumphed in Russia later, the influence of the Islamic world on Russian civilization and culture had never weakened.

Acquaintance with Islam was reflected in the most ancient written monuments of Russia, in particular, in the so-called "Tale of the Choice of Faith," which was included in the most authoritative of the surviving written sources: the code "The Tale of Bygone Years." According to the Tale, in about 986 the Bulgars sent an embassy to Kiev with the aim of converting the pagan Vladimir to a new faith. However, the embassy was not

successful, since the adoption of Islam involved circumcision, rejection of eating pork and drinking wine (polygamy was approved by the prince, who, judging by the everyday legend, before his baptism had a great fondness for women), which the prince did not agree to. As far as is known, after the Bulgarian ambassadors, Prince Vladimir was visited by German and Jewish ambassadors, followed by a certain Greek “philosopher,” who spelled out the Christian doctrine quite extensively and retold a number of plots of the Old and New Testaments. The prince liked the speech of the Orthodox missionary, generously gifted him and let him go. However, the “philosopher” began with the “blasphemy” of other people’s faiths, and his assessment of Moslems was especially striking, translated from ancient Greek it sounds as follows: “We heard that the Bulgarians came and taught you to accept their faith; their faith defiles heaven and earth, and they are cursed beyond all people, they likened to the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, on whom the Lord let out a burning stone and flooded them, and they drowned. So these ones will also face the day of their perdition, when God comes to judge the nations and destroy all those who do iniquity and evil. For, having washed themselves, they pour this waste into the mouth, smear their beards with it and commemorate Mohammed. So their wives do the same filth.” Hearing about this, Vladimir spat on the ground and said: “This is a dirty thing” [2, column 106 (p. 37)].

When the Russian ambassadors, fulfilling the will of Prince Vladimir: “First go to the Bulgarians and test their faith,” returned to Kiev, they literally told the following: “We went to Bulgaria, watched them pray in the temple, that is, in the mosque, they stand there without belts; having made a bow, one sits down and looks here and there like crazy, and there is no fun in them, only great sadness and stench. Their law is not good” [2, column 108 (p. 37)].

Thus, the findings from “Tales of the Choice of Faith” show that the initial outward acquaintance of the Russians with the ritual side of Islam was superficial and negative and caused

certain hostility to this religion. Subsequently, Russian authors called Moslems (Basurmans) nothing more than "godless," "infidel" and "filthy." So, even before the complete Islamization of the Horde, the chronicler curse "Basurmans" and wrote: "Release us from the fierce languor of Basurmans" [2, column 476 (p. 167)].

That was how the relations between the population of Russia, which became Orthodox in 988 and the Islamic world neighboring with it, began. Both sides, probably through their mutual misunderstanding, contributed to the creation of a negative image of Islam. It is also obvious that the Russian chronicle tradition, once established, continued to be reproduced; moreover, all new external enemies (Polovtsy, Tatar-Mongols, Turks, etc.) were associated with the world of Islam, its aggressive militancy, which, of course, strengthened Islamophobia tendencies among the Russians. The rising process of entry into the Russian state of new territories with a predominantly Moslem population, as well as the gradual secularization of Russian culture, along with a deeper penetration into the spiritual world of Moslems, which began in the middle of the 16th century, changed the image of a Moslem in the eyes of the population of Russia, mainly the Orthodox.

The first inclusion of territories inhabited by Moslems began in the 16th century, when the Kazan (1552), Astrakhan (1556) and Siberian (1589) khanates, fragments of the once powerful Golden Horde, were incorporated into Russia. At the end of the 18th century, Crimea became Russian, the Caucasus (North Caucasus and Transcaucasia) became part of the Russian Empire relatively late – in the 20–80s of the 19th century, and Central Asia was annexed to Russia in the last third of the 19th century.

The annexation of the Caucasus to Russia was dictated by religious and moral considerations (salvation from extermination and annexation of the Christian peoples of the Caucasus to Russia) and the military-strategic position of the Caucasus, as a

barrier to the expansion of Great Britain and its instrument, Turkey, as well as a springboard for Russia in the completion of its natural geopolitical development both as a European and a world power (Constantinople, Bosphorus and Dardanelles). The economic aspect in the 18th – first half of the 19th centuries did not play any significant role for Russia in the development of events in the Caucasus, although in the future it was taken into account by the Russian power sub-elites.

Russian-Turkish wars of the second half of the 18th century led not only to the annexation of Crimea to Russia, but also to the transition of the Caucasus and the Northern Black Sea region to the sphere of influence of Russia. Subsequently, two Russian-Persian (1804–1813), Russian-Turkish (1806–1812) and World War predetermined for the Russian Empire, practically, the status of a superpower of the time. The Bucharest (1812), Gulistan (1813), Turkmanchay (1828) and Andrianopol (1829) peace treaties secured the international legal transition of the Caucasus under the jurisdiction of Russia.

The violent reaction of Great Britain to the annexation of the Caucasus pushed Russia to force the establishment of control over the region and the introduction of the military and civil administration of the empire. This was one of the reasons for the protracted and bloody Caucasian war (1817–1864), in which Russia had to fight against not only the imamate of Shamil and the Circassians of the North-West Caucasus, but also the intervention of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Polish, Hungarian and other European revolutionaries and adventurers.

The Caucasian war was particularly fierce in the eastern part of the North Caucasus region, where it was run by the legendary Avar imams (Gazi Muhammad, Gamzat-bek and Shamil) under the slogan of ghazavat (ghazavat is jihad “in the form of a sword” or a combatant jihad). No doubt, at that time, the role of Islam in the socio-political life of the North Caucasian highlanders sharply increased, and a powerful movement, known as “Caucasian Muridism,” emerged in the North-East

Caucasus, It reached its zenith under Imam Shamil. "Caucasian Muridism," as a religious and political phenomenon, emerged on the basis of the Sufi order of Naqshbandiya, which was developed in the region, but differed from it in its parameters using only the ideological and organizational shell of this tariqa. During the years of the Caucasian war, Shamil even created on part of the territories of modern Dagestan and Chechnya a theocratic state, the Imamate, which ceased to exist in 1859 with the capture of Imam Shamil.

At the same time, it should be noted that before and after the end of the Caucasian war, certain forms of "agitation" of Islam, ethno-religious extremism and even terrorism were recorded in the North Caucasus: raiding system, kidnapping for sale or ransom, Abrek bands, armed separatism and calls for jihad (after the end of the Caucasian war); political banditry (20-30s of the twentieth century); ethnic collaborationism, creation of mountain military units and their participation in military actions on the side of fascist Germany.

The activation of the "Islamic factor" was especially acute on the eve of and as a result of the revolutions of 1917 (February and October) and the ensuing civil war. At that time, the so-called "Shariatists," whose leaders advocated creation of an Islamic state like the Shamil's imamate. Sheikh N. Gotsinsky and Sheikh Uzun-Haji were especially active in the implementation of the idea of an imamate. As a result, in August 1917, at the second congress of mountain peoples, held in the village of Andi (Dagestan), Sheikh N. Gotsinsky was elected the imam of Dagestan and Chechnya, and, in alliance with Sheikh Uzun-Hadji, began to create a religious monarchy as part of Chechnya and Dagestan. In the fall of 1919, the sheikh proclaimed Chechnya and the northwestern part of Dagestan the "North Caucasian Emirate." However, this project was not viable and soon collapsed under the pressure of the Bolsheviks, and Soviet power was established in the North Caucasus.

No less dramatic events were developing during the civil war in Central Asia. Soviet power was established there after the revolutionary events of 1917, and in January 1918 the counter-revolutionary separatist action of the local Moslem nobility, trying to create "Kokand Autonomy" in the Ferghana Valley was suppressed. However, it was not possible to completely localize this movement, as a result the Bolsheviks soon encountered a wide rebel movement – Basmachestvo, whose ideological basis was pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Turkmens are Turkic peoples; Tajik belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-Europeans; they all profess Islam, predominantly Sunni).

If in 1918 the Fergana Valley was the main center of resistance, then in 1919–1920. It spread throughout almost the whole Central Asia. Arousing religious fanaticism and flying the banner of a "holy war against the infidels," gang leaders pursued the goal of separating Turkestan from the Soviet Russia and restoring there medieval feudal orders. The leaders of Basmachestvo had a relatively broad accomplice base, which included rich landowners, most of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and Moslem clergy, who had a significant influence on the mindset of the bulk of the local population. This made it possible to put together numerous gangs, freely navigate in the unfolding situation, and also be equipped with weapons, ammunition, food and horses.

The main forces of the Basmachi were defeated by the Red Army in the early 1920s, but the bandits and their western patrons managed to escape from the final defeat. In the years 1924–1925 the Basmachi, with the active assistance of the United Kingdom, reorganized, received centralized management under the leadership of an agent of the British special services, a Uzbek named Ibrahim Bek, a bodyguard of the former Bukhara emir. He was actively supported, trained, supplied with weapons, ammunition and equipment by a number of foreign intelligence services, primarily the United Kingdom. After heavy losses during clashes with the Red Army, the Basmachi, as a rule,

retreated to Afghanistan, where in the northern provinces their ethnic groups lived: Tajik, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and others. There they restored forces, replenished their troops with personnel and weapons, receiving comprehensive help, first of all, from the British (the territory of Iran was used to a much lesser extent for the same purpose). As a result, in the second half of the 20s the Soviet government undertook severe political pressure on Afghanistan. As a result, the Afghan Emir Amanullah Khan sharply limited aid to the bandits, forcing some of them to leave the country.

However, at the end of 1928, a rebellion supported by the British broke out in Afghanistan. As a result of it the power was seized by the adventurer Bacha-i Sakao ("the son of a water-carrier"), an ethnic Tajik with whom "the best intelligence agent of all time and people," a British intelligence colonel Lawrence of Arabia worked. As a result, the situation of the Basmachi in Afghanistan improved dramatically. In this regard, Red Army detachments crossed the Afghan border twice (in April 1929 and June 1930), smashing the Basmachi gangs and the infrastructure of their support throughout the north of Afghanistan, up to the spurs of the Hindu Kush. Bacha-i Sakao was overthrown and killed. King Nadir Shah, who came to power in Afghanistan after a harsh Soviet ultimatum, disarmed part of the Basmachi detachments, and in the spring of 1931 the cavalry of the nomad Turkmen, who were paid well by the Afghan government, apparently with the Soviet money, delivered a sudden attack to the bases of the irreconcilable Ibrahim Bek. By that time, the mood of the Central Asian population had changed, its representatives began to actively join volunteer groups to combat the Basmachi, and in the mass consciousness, bandits were no longer perceived as "Basmachi" (raiders), but as "Dushmans" (enemies) and "Shaitans" (demons). Only after that the Basmachi movement began to fade. However, their separate attacks were recorded until 1939-1940. The last Basmachi groups disappeared after the Soviet Union and Great Britain agreed in 1942 to stop

subversive activities from Iran and especially Afghanistan, which once again underlines the geopolitical conditioning of Basmachestvo in Soviet Central Asia.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, thanks to the educational activities of Russian Moslem Jadidists, among which we single out the Moslem reformer, the Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, the phenomenon of "Russian Islam" gradually began to take shape. However, in the period after the revolution of 1917 and in the Soviet period, "Russian Islam," as well as other traditional religions in our country, was dealt a powerful blow, blocking the further course of their natural and positive development. The politicization of Islam was gradually gaining momentum, leading to the emergence of the so-called "Islamic factor."

The "Islamic factor" was actively used in various separatist projects aimed at splitting Russia, its dismemberment, weakening, depriving it of its ability to influence the world processes in any way between the First and Second World Wars, as well as during the last World War. It should be emphasized that separatism in the geopolitical space of the Russian state has always had interested external sponsors. In the times of the Civil War, hard for our Motherland, and then the Great Patriotic War, there were always forces that raised the banner of separatism. A significant part in this was played by a certain part of the post-revolutionary, including Moslem, emigration from the USSR, which some European and Asian countries could not resist the temptation to use.

The next surge of separatism under Islamic banners was recorded after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Separatist-oriented elites who came to power in Chechnya, headed by a former Soviet general Dzhokhar Dudaev, set a course for a forceful secession from Russia and formation of their own independent state. The events in Chechnya of 1994–1996 under the slogan of "establishing constitutional order," opened doors for accelerated internationalization of the radical Salafi movement in the region. This period of time was marked by a

massive participation in military actions in Chechnya on the side of the separatists of their like-minded people from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and various Moslem countries.

The Chechen "off-season" (1996-99), marked by the transformation of the Chechen Republic into a practice ground of terrorism, a haven of murderers, traffickers of "living goods," drugs and weapons, allowed the development of an extremist movement under the cover of Islam. In turn, this circumstance predetermined the invasion of gangs of local and foreign terrorists in August 1999 on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan. The extremists were rebuffed by the joint efforts of the federal armed forces and the Dagestan population. In the fall of 1999, the "anti-terrorism campaign" began on the territory of Chechnya, which evolutionarily passed a number of important stages: from frontal battles, the climax of which was the storming of Grozny, to the process of "Chechenization" of the conflict, that is, solution of the latter mainly by the forces of the Chechens themselves. This, of course, led to positive results in Chechnya itself, as a result of which the counter-terrorist operation on the territory of this republic was officially completed in April 2009.

Thus, in the post-Soviet period, under strong external influence, in Russia there was recorded a steady process of politicization and radicalization of Islam and Islamic groups. This process was aggravated by the weakness and fragmentation of traditional and official Russian Islam, and the implementation of separatist projects in some regions of the country. At the same time stable groups of radical Salafists, institutionalized initially in some North Caucasian republics, emerged and strengthened under the influence of the doctrines of radical Islamists and military operations in the North Caucasus. Subsequently, there occurred the process of "spreading jihad" practically throughout the North Caucasus, and prerequisites were created for the creation of radical Salafi groups in the Volga region, in the Urals and in Western Siberia, as well as their appearance in the "Moslem enclaves" of Russian megacities.

In this regard, it is not surprising that in the post-Soviet period, marked by a religious, including Islamic, revival, the politicization of Islam and extremist manifestations of militant Islamism appeared in the public mind, international journalism, and sometimes even in the writings of scientists, precisely as an essential feature of Islam itself, the radicalism of which is allegedly stemming from its endogenous properties. In our country, especially with the outbreak of military actions in Chechnya, Islam in the mass consciousness began to be associated with the threats and challenges to the Russian statehood, with radicalism, extremism, and even terrorism. Such speculations and fears result in a rampant domestic everyday nationalism, in Islamophobia and xenophobia, which is manifested in numerous publications and fabrications on Islamic topics.

However, it should be emphasized that the main supplier and distributor of terrorism is not the authoritative world monotheistic religion of Islam itself, but its perverted form of existence: the so-called "Radical Islam" (other names – Islamic radicalism, or Islamism). "Islamic radicalism," as an ideological doctrine and the political practice based on it, is realized in the activities of various kinds of Islamic organizations, which together form a radical Islamic movement. This movement is part of a broader trend of re-Islamization of society and the politicization of Islam, recorded in recent decades in many regions of the world, including Russia. In other words, Islamism manifests itself as an extreme, aggressive part of politicized Islam.

Traditionally, Islamism is relatively arbitrarily divided into moderate and radical. Their goal is the same: construction of an Islamic state, but the methods for achieving it are different. The moderates favor the evolutionary way, and the radicals stand for the revolutionary way to achieve their worldview ideal. Extremism and terrorism under the guise of Islam are produced by radical Islamists (they are also called takfirist-jihadists). Of course, "Islamic radicalism," especially in its extreme forms, cannot be identified with Islam in general.

At the same time, we emphasize that the basic, indispensable attributes and qualities of "Islamic radicalism" are the general Islamic concepts of "takfir" and "jihad," interpreted in a special way and the practice of them in the modern world generates Islamophobia.

Takfir is an accusation of unbelief, i.e. accusation of Moslems of believing incorrectly or insincerely. The Sunnah of the Prophet says: "When a person calls his brother an unbeliever, it returns (at least) to one of them." The Code of Sunni Orthodoxy, the Qadiri Tract of Faith (ar Risal al Qadiriyyah), adopted during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph al-Qadir (11th century), also prohibits accusing Moslems of disbelief if they missed any of the legitimate principles of the faith excluding prayer."

From the Prophet's sayings, it follows that by tradition no Moslem can call another unbeliever (regardless of his shortcomings or committed sinful deeds) until the latter himself publicly admits it. This provision was specifically stipulated and considered very important, since apostasy was considered one of the most serious sins and was punishable by death (although in this case people were given three options to renounce unbelief). However, takfirits arbitrarily assumed the right to declare other Moslems apostates (murtaddun) or hypocrites (munafikun) on the basis of some deviations made by them, according to takfirits, from the faith or worship, with which takfirits salafis did not agree or simply did not understand. And, of course, they themselves act as judges for such "bad" Moslems. As the world and North Caucasian practice shows, this kind of "court" becomes a prelude to takfirits killing other Moslems who do not share their ideological principles.

Further, takfirits consider all Christians and Jews unbelievers and even infidels (kafirun), while orthodox Islam calls them "Ahl al-Kitab" ("people of the Scriptures"), believers, same as Moslems, but professing earlier scriptures sent by God. On this basis, takfirits consider themselves entitled to kill them.

So, for example, members of the Shariah and Jennet (Dagestan), Caliphate (Ingushetia), Yarmouk (Kabardino-Balkaria) and other gangs acted, committing terrorist attacks and killing Russian policemen and military personnel, calling them "infidels," which, as we see, is a departure from Islamic orthodoxy.

Attitude to political power. Traditional Islam requires believers to obey their legitimate rulers (even if they commit sinful acts and are immoral in behavior) in all matters that do not contradict Sharia. The Quran says: "O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the messenger and those who hold power among you ..." (4:62).

In various madhhabs (schools of thought in Islam), there is no complete agreement on the problem of what specific meaning should be put in the words "legitimate ruler," but suffice it to say (since there is agreement between all four Sunni madhhabs that one should always proceed from the simplest rule in any orthodox madhhab) that in the most common Hanifah madhhab, a ruler is considered legal until he: 1) has not publicly recognized himself as an apostate or heretic; 2) participates in general prayers; 3) maintains public order and protects the state; 4) does not actually commit or does not lead to the commission of serious crimes (such as fitna, a civilian riot), even if he does not introduce the Sharia completely. In Islam, the order and security of the population (i.e. the most important element of national security) is seen as the primary responsibility of the government, and anarchy, riot and civil war are considered the greatest danger to the population. The Quran explicitly states: "...Temptation is worse than killing" (2: 187).

Takfirits, however, believe that all branches and structures of political power that do not adhere to their ideas - and absolutely all their vicious and heretical ideas regarding Islam - are illegal. They consider the leaders of states and republics to be illegal usurpers (tağuts), and representatives of power and administration, law enforcement officials and law enforcement agencies from among local citizens - apostates. Therefore, they

have appropriated the right and even consider it their duty to try to overthrow them, kill, remove from power.

Jihad (holy war) in Islam. According to Moslem orthodoxy, jihad (holy war in Islam) can be declared if the lives of Moslems and their lands have been threatened by attack or assault. Jihad is a holy war for the sake of legitimate self-defense. Jihad can only be declared by the rightful ruler, if and when he considers it necessary, in order to protect the lives of Moslems, their descendants and their land. In this sense, the sacred duty of every healthy man is participation in jihad, otherwise there will be an eternal curse on him.

Moreover, even if jihad is declared, there are rules of conduct and military operations that cannot be violated, regardless of how the enemy acts. In Islam, there are no concepts like "total war," "politics of scorched earth"; murders (including by means of explosions) of the civilian population, etc. are blamed. All these are absolutely alien and immoral, regardless of conditions, concepts for traditional (orthodox, standard) Islam.

Takfirits, meanwhile, recognize neither the rules for declaring jihad, nor the form, nor the methods of conducting it.

Sabotage and terrorist acts of takfirits. Since takfirits - jihadists themselves have assumed the right to declare people "enemies of Islam" (infidels, apostates and hypocrites), reject traditional political power, because they not only sanction the suicide of their comrades-in-arms (shahidism), but also incite people to these anti-state actions, while ignoring all the rules of jihad, from the moral point of view it is very easy for them to commit murders, sabotage and terrorist acts.

Thus, these are takfirits-jihadists, the bandits who are guising themselves with Islam and are still operating in the North Caucasus and in some other regions of Russia. Then it also becomes clear how, calling themselves Moslems and claiming to act in the name of Islam, they at the same time completely ignore all the basic principles of Islam regarding murders and the rules of jihad. Familiarity with the basic principles of the ideology of

radical Islamists in the field of key concepts for them (takfir and jihad) explains not only their numerous killings, but also the fact that militants and bandits planning and committing such actions can feel completely right.

However, it should be emphasized that among millions and millions of Moslems around the world, including in Russia, takfirits-jihadists make up only a fraction of a percent. Yes, indeed, any Islamist is a Moslem, but not every Moslem is an Islamist, the more so radical. The vast majority of Moslems for whom the religion of Islam is faith are respectable and law-abiding citizens of their country. Secular Islamic scholars, religious Islamic scholars, representatives of the Moslem clergy, the vast majority of ordinary Moslems do not share the ideology of takfirist-jihadists, do not accept terrorism, do not associate it with jihad, and condemn the inappropriate use of violence for political purposes.

In conclusion, we emphasize that, in general, Islamophobia in modern Russia and its regions is of situational nature. Its reasons are connected with the systemic crisis that has not yet been fully overcome, which hit the North Caucasian republics with the separatist tendencies of the turn of the 80s and 90s. XX century especially strongly, as well as with numerous external and internal conflict factors that threaten the national security of the Russian state. At the same time, Russia has rich experience in building constructive relations between different religions and confessions, opposing the mythology of inevitability of a clash of civilizations. On the basis of the dialogue of traditional confessions for Russia, a balance of spiritual and moral values has historically been formed (with full preservation of independence of each of them and rejection of proselytism in relation to ethnic groups professing other religions from century to century), which underlie the socio-cultural system of Russia and without reliance on which it is impossible to implement any major social project.