

2. Tkachenko A.A. State policy and the national project "Demography" // *Narodonaseleniye* [Population]. M., 2018. Vol. 21, No. 4. P. 23–35.
3. Scherbakov A.I. Increasing the birth rate is the main goal of the demographic policy of Russia // *Sotsialno-trudovye issledovaniya* [Social and Labor Studies]. M., 2019, T. 36, No. 3. P. 143–152.

IGOR DOBAYEV. THE MECHANISM OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN RADICAL ISLAM // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islam, ideology, Islamism, mobilization, political Islam, radical Islam.

Igor Dobayev,

DSc(Philosophy), Professor, Expert of Russian Academy of Sciences,
Director of Center of Regional Studies,
Institute of Sociology and Religion, Southern Federal University,
Rostov-on-Don

Citation: Dobayev I. The Mechanism of Social and Political Mobilization in Radical Islam // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 23–29. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.02

Abstract. The article defines the essence of radical Islam (Islamism), and examines in detail the key factors contributing to the mobilization of adherents of Islamism to an uncompromising struggle with the "enemies of Islam" (polytheists, apostates and hypocrites). It seems that these provisions can be used to block Islamism, as the ideological doctrine of radicals.

Radical Islam (Islamism), as an extreme form of political Islam, is a complex and multidimensional socio-political phenomenon. We consider Islamism as an independent phenomenon that cannot be identified with Islam itself or exclusively with any of its versions (Sunnism, Shiism, Harijism) or brands (madhhabs – religious and legal schools in Islam –

I.D.). In reality, it exists and manifests itself in two main forms: as an ideology and socio-political practice based on it.

In this case, speaking of ideology as a whole, we mean not only "certain systems of philosophical, artistic, moral, legal, political, economic, social knowledge ... about the world and the role of man in it, which organize, regulate, integrate and direct the activities of individuals in all spheres of society's life", but also the value layers underlying these systems. At the same time, ideological power commands and controls the practical activities of individuals, as well as coordinates and directs the functioning of the state, political, economic forms of power of society [1, p. 134-135].

Depending on the nature of society and the state, the level of their development, the circumstances of the place and time, the correlation of ideology and politics (political practice) can appear in three forms: ideology as a means of politics, politics as a means of ideology and ideology as an ideological and theoretical motivation and justification of practical politics. Of course, such a division is quite conventional, since all these functions can constantly change, move from one to another, combine, but, depending on the circumstances, more emphasis can be placed on one or the other function of ideology in its connection with socio-political practice. The latter, on the whole, shows that ideology and politics are constantly changing places as a cause and effect, as a goal and a means. Such a close interweaving of one and the other is especially characteristic where ideology takes the form of state ideology, as a result of which the line between politics in the person of the state and state ideology is blurred [2, p. 244].

A similar relationship and interdependence is also characteristic of radical Islamic ideology and the Islamists' practical activities based on it. However, radical ideological principles are brought to a specific individual not in the form of theoretical constructions that are difficult to understand, but in the form of slogans or appeals (archetypal ideologemes), which in

the case of Islamism (radical Islam) are proclaimed the norm or the establishment of Islam itself. At the same time, Islamic radicalism, as an ideological doctrine, acts as a way of socio-political mobilization of its supporters to solve those problems and achieve those goals that are put forward by the developers of Islamic ideologies. Such ideologies suggest the everyday existence of their adherents in the form of a mission of the struggle for "true faith," which ultimately means the establishment of a theocratic form of the political organization of society. In other words, by radical (social and political) mobilization in radical Islam we mean the way (including the social mechanisms of its practical application) by which people's behavior is organized and aimed at solving the problems and achieving the goals that Islamism as a political ideology sets itself.

Understanding the historical material associated with the institutionalization in Islam of the doctrinal directions of the radical sense, reveals the valid mechanisms of social mobilization in general and its political component in particular [3, p. 64]. The essence of the issue is that in Islam there is a rich tradition of using religious worldview constructs in socio-political practice, when doctrinal prescriptions are embedded in the context of the goals and objectives of current politics, that is, they are actually used as ideologemes. Factors due to which this state of affairs becomes possible can be classified into several types.

The first one is represented by the actual doctrinal specificity of Islam. We are talking about the fact that initially the basic world outlook postulates suggest the formation of a special attitude of believers to the world and their place in it. The basic philosophical postulates in this case are the provisions on the nature (causes, essence) of the world order and the existence of a certain order in society. This also includes such core provisions as the interrelation of God, the Islamic Ummah and man, as well as provisions explaining the nature of power in society and clarifying the purpose of a believer in the world, the meaning of

his existence. For example, there is a canonical assertion, especially characteristic of traditionalism and fundamentalism, about the impossibility of arbitrary intervention of an individual in the existing world order, and for believers to organize the life of society and accordingly establish power in it at their discretion, if there is no sacred, divine will. However, these provisions, which are especially characteristic of radicals, are combined with the postulates that such an intervention becomes not only possible, but also necessary, mandatory for a true believer in case of violation of the order established by God.

As a result, a rather simple semantic worldview is initially formed in the minds of adherents and operates at the archetype level: the world, including society, are perfect by the will of God, any imperfection of society (evil and injustice in it) is introduced by people (unbelievers, those who believe in a wrong way and those who believe insincerely). This leads to the conclusion that the fight against the “enemies of Islam” (polytheists, apostates and hypocrites) is the essence of the true faith. Thus, the initially presented semantic scheme of world perception contains a mobilization attitude [4, p. 56].

The second group of factors ensuring socio-political mobilization in Islam is related to the forms of collectivism practiced in it and the norms of community life. Continuing the development of the above-designated logic of world perception at the level of motivation for social activity (by the motivation of social activity in accordance with the existing tradition, we mean the motivation for action, by the motivational attitude – the corresponding stable non-reflective behavioral reactions, unified and ordered stereotypical patterns actions that are also normatively fixed in radical Islam) are as follows: a true believer cannot always independently correctly evaluate the correspondence of the surrounding phenomena of public life to divine plan and proper world order. Hence the need for an appeal to connoisseurs – ulama, fakikhs, ustases, carrying out a kind of “expert evaluation.” Their competent opinion on a

particular issue removes the personal, individual responsibility of the adherent. And then a specific member of the Moslem community in their actions becomes accountable only to religious authorities for the full and accurate implementation of their instructions. In other words, an ordinary believer, and in social terms an ordinary member of a Moslem society or even a community (in their radical understanding), does not bear personal worldview and legal responsibility before God, unlike, say, a Christian. He is responsible to the “mediator” between him and God.

Thus, the initial attitude of perception is formed, lowering the worldview and personal legal responsibility for committed acts. Such an attitude rests responsibility not on the acting individual, but on authority external for him, which, in particular, finds wide consolidation in the procedural and normative system of Moslem law – fiqh [5].

And finally, the third type from among the factors mentioned above refers exclusively to the political and legal experience of radicalism. The Ulema Council is never personified in decision-making; it speaks on behalf of the community as a whole to the members of the same community. Moreover, the very concept of the Ummah – a community of co-religionists – in addition to the actual rural community – the jamaat, is also interpreted in a metaphysical sense. The Ummah is a community of Moslems living in a given territory, in a given state, in a region, and even in the world as a whole.

On the basis on this understanding of the problem, an ordinary believer as a separate individual practically does not mean anything in the world of socio-political relations, he is only a member of different in scale, but united in religious affiliation (and in fact on the political and ideological platform) communities: from real, revealing itself in everyday existence, up to associative communities of the spiritual and ideological plane.

In turn, the condition for the individual to enter a community, the condition for the former to be recognized as a

full member is a demonstration of loyalty, solidarity. Such a demonstration requires fulfillment of the instructions of its religious authorities as a prerequisite. And since such authorities come up with demands and claims of a socio-political nature, socio-political mobilization is carried out through a kind of assimilation of the individual by the community and the community by its authorities [6, p. 71–72].

Thus, from the three indicated groups of factors, the mechanism of social and political mobilization of an adherent in Islamic radicalism is formed. The specificity of such a mobilization is a kind of dissolution of the individual principle in the community of fellow believers, the community as a real form of collectivism, and the community as a spiritual, political and ideological association. Moreover, it is precisely in radicalism that a peculiar “phenomenon of representation” reaches its peak, when the community itself is personified in its authorities, they represent it both in sacred and in political and practical terms. Proceeding from this, we can define the essence of Islamism as an ideological doctrine and socio-political practice based on it, which are characterized by normative-value consolidation of the ideological, political-worldview and even armed opposition of the world of “true Islam” to the world of “infidels” outside and the world of “untrue faith” within Islam and require absolute social control and mobilization (service to the idea) of their supporters [7, p. 32].

Literature

1. Dobaev I.P. Islamic radicalism: genesis, evolution, practice. – Rostov-on-Don, 2003.
2. Pozdnyakov E.A. The philosophy of politics. – M., 1994.
3. Dobaev I.P. Wahhabism as a socio-political phenomenon in Saudi Arabia and the North Caucasus // Nauchnaya mysl Kavkaza [Scientific Thought of the Caucasus.] – 2001. – No. 3.
4. Dobaev I.P. The historical and doctrinal roots of Islamic radicalism, its modern problems and trends // Central Asia and the Caucasus. – 2001. – No. 2.

5. Kirabaev N.S. Social Philosophy of the Moslem East (Middle Ages). – M., 1987.
6. Dobaev I.P. Blocking Islamic radicalism in the conditions of the North Caucasus // *Onechestvennye pagiski* [Domestic notes.] – 2003. – No. 5.
7. Dobaev I.P. Political processes in the Islamic movement in the North Caucasus // *Nauchnaya mysl Kavkaza* [Scientific Thought of the Caucasus.] – 2008. – No. 1 (53).

THOMAS FLICHY DE LA NEUVILLE.¹ THE CORONAVIRUS: A PARASITE FOR GLOBALISATION, AN UNEXPECTED BOON FOR MEDICAL DATA COLLECTION // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World"*.

Keywords: CORONAVIRUS, Wuhan, epidemics, pandemics, developed countries, virus, incurable disease, mass gathering of medical data.

Thomas Flichy de La Neuville,
PhD(History and Geopolitics),
Rennes School of Business

Citation: Flichy de La Neuville T. The Coronavirus: a Parasite for Globalisation, an Unexpected Boon for Medical Data Collection // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 29–34. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.03

The respiratory syndrome that first appeared among fish market stall-holders in Huanan, Wuhan in January 2020 has since claimed several hundred lives. While the virus has spread rapidly, the epidemic bears no relation to the major pandemics that have continually struck the world's population throughout history. These include the Black Death which killed 30–50% of Europeans between 1347 and 1352, successive cholera epidemics in the modern era and a yellow fever outbreak that halved the population of Philadelphia in 1793. But unlike the pandemics that are currently crippling Africa, the coronavirus is now affecting