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2020.04.004. ELENA DMITRIEVA. THE KEY ROLE OF THE ENERGY-RELATED FACTORS IN CURRENT RUSSIAN-TURKMEN RELATIONS // *Condensed Abstract*.

Keywords: Russia, Turkmenistan, cooperation, regional security, hydrocarbons, energy export, arms import, humanitarian cooperation, cultural exchange.

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1. E. Garbuzarova. Russia in Turkmenistan: the Policy of Strengthening Cooperation* // *"Post-Soviet Issues"* 2020. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 63–72.

2. E. Orlova, O. Koval. Turkmenistan and Russia as Competitors in the Field of Power Export to PRC* // *Materials of the 27 All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference with International Participation. "Teoriya i Praktika Ekonomiki i Predprinimatelstva"* V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Simferopol, IP Zueva T.V. 2020. P. 66–67.

3. K. Muratshina. Institutional Structure of Russia-Turkmenistan Humanitarian Cooperation* // *"Vlast."* Moscow. 2020, Vol. 28, № 4, P. 245–252.

E.G. Garbuzarova [1] notes recent revitalization of the Russian-Turkmen relations thanks to the return of the Russian Gazprom to the energy market of Turkmenistan in 2019. Until then, cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan was limited due to the neutral status of Turkmenistan in the international arena, as well as Russia's lack of action in the post-Soviet area throughout the 1990s, owing to its internal political problems. Having received the status of a neutral state in 1995, Turkmenistan sought to distance itself from Russia and avoided any forms of multilateral interaction.

Sustainable economic development of Turkmenistan directly depends on hydrocarbons exports and, therefore, Turkmenistan tries to diversify the routes for the transport of hydrocarbon resources. Since independence, Turkmen authorities have sought to slightly inflate figures for hydrocarbon resources in order to attract foreign capital inflows into the development of oil-gas fields. The country has fourth largest reserves of gas in the world after Russia, Iran and Qatar and actively implements projects proposed by the European Union, China and Iran. The author notes that Russia is one of the transit countries for Turkmen hydrocarbons. Russian-Turkmen relations are primarily governed by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 2002 in

Ashgabat. Also, an agreement was concluded between Russia and Turkmenistan in 2003 on gas supplies to Russia for 25 years.

While analysing the history of relations between the two countries, the author points out to their rather turbulent collaboration in the natural gas industry. The U.S. and the EU ambitions for the Caspian region inspired Russia to develop new projects for cooperation with Turkmenistan in the energy sector, which would strengthen Russia's position on the Caspian. The endeavours resulted in the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project. However, the Turkmen authorities revised their plans for this project and removed Gazprom from the draft, out fear of being heavily dependent on Russia. The 2009–2010 Russia's decision to cutback imports of Turkmen gas and the subsequent suspension of gas imports for over six months led to a decrease in gas production in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen authorities retaliated by actively promoting cooperation with China and Iran in the oil and gas sectors. In 2016, the Russian Gazprom opted to completely abandon gas imports from Turkmenistan, having gradually reduced Turkmen gas purchases over the previous years. The cooperation in the gas sector between the two countries ceased to exist because of disagreements over gas prices.

In 2017, official visit of the President of Russia to Turkmenistan opened up a new stage in cooperation of the two states. During the visit, the leaders discussed not only economic cooperation between the two countries, but also regional security issues associated with the tense situation in Afghanistan. According to the author, Ashgabat views Russia mainly as a driving force for its dynamic economic development and has no interest in developing military and political cooperation with Russia. So far, the authorities of Turkmenistan have handled the emerging tensions on the Turkmen-Afghan border without external support. Security in Central Asia is a priority for Moscow.

Turkmenistan's proposal to join the construction the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI) came

unexpected for Russia, given that Russia had repeatedly expressed its readiness to take part in the project earlier, but the project participants showed no support for the proposal. This is due to the geopolitical nature of the project, which is promoted by the United States in a bid to limit Russia's influence in Central Asia. Russia's joining the TAPI project would aid Russia in both strengthening its role in promoting regional security and increasing its influence in the region. However, there is another gas project that runs counter to Russia's interests in the Caspian region and Central Asia. The project known as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TKGP) between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan has been in development for decades. Although the construction is protracted, there has been some progress in the implementation of the natural gas pipeline recently. The U.S. and the EU have geopolitical interests in the region and by lobbying this project they offer an anti-Russian project to the Caspian states. Western countries' increased activities in the Caspian region prompted Gazprom to resume the purchase of Turkmen gas.

While in the first years of independence Turkmenistan sought to diversify gas routes to the EU and China bypassing Russia, now Ashgabat is beginning to consider Russia as an alternative to above all China, which in fact has become the main exporter of Turkmen gas. To date, China, in turn, has not demonstrated much engagement in the construction the fourth line of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. It is interesting to note that the total capacity of the current Turkmenistan-China pipeline is designed to transport 55 billion cubic meters of gas per annum, but reaches only 36 billion cubic meters per annum.

According to the researcher, Gazprom's decision to resume Turkmen gas supplies to Russia stemmed from the need to ensure security in the region rather than interest in buying Turkmen gas. At the moment, the authorities of Turkmenistan are not eager to cooperate with Russia on strengthening regional security, relying on their own military force. However, the situation on the border with Afghanistan urges Russia to

strengthen its military and political influence in Central Asia. Both Russia and Turkmenistan are interested in a timely response to the destabilization of the situation on the Afghan-Turkmen border. While Russia has extensive experience in fighting radical extremists and terrorists in the Middle East, Turkmenistan doesn't have such experience. During the presidency of Saparmurat Niyazov it was possible to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Taliban and to make the situation on the Afghan-Turkmen border less tense, but such a scenario is not feasible today. At the point, the authorities of Turkmenistan still lean towards Uzbekistan and refuse to cooperate with Russia in the military sphere. Now, relations between the two states in this sphere are limited only to the purchase of military equipment. The author cites an expert opinion that Russia in fact has no need to purchase gas from Turkmenistan due to cost recovery issues. Also, Turkmen gas was previously supplied to Ukraine, but the supplies have been suspended in recent years. The author comes to the conclusion that Russia's decision to resume the import of Turkmen gas is of a political nature; it was made in order to obtain foreign economic and foreign policy advantages from Turkmenistan. Russia's foreign policy priority in Turkmenistan is to prevent the breakthrough of the Turkmen-Afghan border, where the situation is perpetually unstable. By resuming purchases of Turkmen gas, Russia is counting on the loyalty of the Turkmen leadership in security matters, which implies close coordination of the work of special services, law enforcement agencies and constant exchange of information. Gazprom's return to Turkmenistan may be an answer to two major challenges faced by Russian foreign policy in Central Asia. Firstly, third world countries lose a chance to strengthen their positions in the region and, therefore, the proposed construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline becomes uncertain. Secondly, Russia gets a chance to transport Turkmen gas via Turk Stream, which will reduce transportation costs and allow redirecting gas

from the Yamal Peninsula and Western Siberia fields to Nord Stream 2 and Baltic LNG projects.

The author notes that Turkmenistan continues to distance itself from all post-Soviet integration groupings, which includes Russia and only takes part in the CIS Interstate Council sessions, where Turkmenistan, at his own request, participates as an associate member.

A dual citizenship issue also has a negative impact on relations between Russia and Turkmenistan. The 2008 amendments to the constitution of Turkmenistan prohibit nationals from holding a second citizenship. Thus, dual citizenship of Russia and Turkmenistan is not recognized in the republic. This allows the authorities of Turkmenistan to put pressure on Russia in matters of possible recognition of Russian-speaking population with dual citizenship.

At the same time Turkmenistan is interested in establishing foreign economic ties with the subjects of Russia. Turkmenistan is focused on further cooperation with Tatarstan and the Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Astrakhan, Kostroma, Pskov and Saratov regions. Ashgabat is highly interested in new mining and processing technologies of oil and gas. To this effect, the current president of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow arrived in Tatarstan on a working visit in June 2019. The president got acquainted with state-of-the-art technologies for oil production and oil refining and their adaptation to the conditions of Turkmenistan. At present, Turkmenistan, as before, sticks to multi-vector policy and navigates between the world's centres of power. The existing level of trust between Russia and Turkmenistan hampers the realization of all the opportunities.

Researches E.A. Orlova and O.G. Koval [2] analyse possible competition between Russia and Turkmenistan for energy resources supplies to countries in Asia and especially China. The authors believe that oil and gas export capacity of Turkmenistan should not be underestimated. This is particularly relevant in

connection with the construction of Power of Siberia gas pipeline, aimed at growing gas exports to China.

According to the data of experts, China has been increasingly expanding its military-technical cooperation with Russia's traditional partners in this area, and, above all, with the countries of Central Asia. As for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the import of weapons in these countries is relatively low, and they pay with products considered unimportant for Russia. Turkmenistan, which pays for the weapons with gas, is a different matter. The authors provide statistical data on the foreign trade of Turkmenistan. For example, today, Russia accounts for 20 per cent of the total import of arms in Turkmenistan but is ranked only 3rd after Turkey (36 per cent) and China (27 per cent). Arms purchases from China are carried out mainly with the use of proceeds from gas contracts with Beijing, which is the main importer of Turkmen gas. According to Ashgabat's plans, such cooperation with Beijing includes a significant increase in gas production and export (by 2030, up to 250 billion cubic meters per annum and up to 180 billion cubic meters per annum, respectively). Nevertheless, despite the fact that now about 90 per cent of Turkmen gas is supplied to China, in 2017 the volume of supplied gas barely exceeded 30 billion cubic meters. In 2018, Turkmenistan was ranked 1st biggest gas supplier to China (33.8 billion cubic meters), followed by Australia (23.6 billion cubic meters) and Qatar (10.3 billion cubic meters).

The authors point out, that in the spectrum of Turkmenistan's export commodities in 2018, 80 per cent of exports are products of fuel and energy complex, and gas in particular. It is unlikely that other industries can significantly change the structure of the economy, although tourism in the country is growing steadily.

As for Russia's fuel and energy exports, oil exports stood at 267.5 million tons in 2019. Oil was mainly supplied to China (69.6 million tons making up 26 per cent), Turkey (8.2 million

tons) and Netherlands. Exports of petroleum products to Turkey reached 8 million tons and 7.9 million tons were transported to China. In 2019, the export of natural gas through pipelines amounted to 219.9 billion cubic meters (Turkey purchased 15.1 cubic meters of natural gas). During that period there were no natural gas supplies through pipelines to China, although China did receive small volumes of liquefied gas (1.79 million tons). By 2024, Power of Siberia gas pipeline is expected to transport up to 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China per year. Thus, China will become the second largest consumer of Russian gas in the world after Germany, where Russia exported 58.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia in 2018. Turkey (24 billion cubic meters) and Italy (22.8 billion cubic meters) are currently ranked second and third largest consumers, respectively.

As can be seen from the above, despite proclaimed diversification policy, Russia plans boost energy resources exports, both oil and gas. Therefore, the authors of the article suggest analysing whether this scenario is feasible and whether it might cause a conflict with Turkmenistan. After all, Turkmenistan also plans to ramp up the production and export of gas, primarily to China. On matters of transportation, Turkmenistan counts on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) with the capacity of 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Also, there are prospects for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, designed to transit Turkmen energy resources to the EU countries through the Caspian Sea and Transcaucasia. However, Russia and Iran are boycotting the pipelines construction along the Caspian Sea bed. Speaking of bilateral cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan, K.A. Muratshina [3] identifies institutions involved in the interaction between the two countries in the humanitarian sphere. The author shows the importance of humanitarian cooperation, which comprises international

partnerships in such areas as culture, science, education, youth work, sports, tourism, information and mass communications.

The author believes that research on the development of cooperation is closely connected with the understanding of the institutional structure, which can display symmetry (or asymmetry) in relations between states and sustainable cooperation, facilitate analytical work and predict the further prospects of international relations.

Turkmenistan, in a way, is a closed country, and the humanitarian sphere is the least explored field of relations between Russia and Turkmenistan. State institutions of bilateral humanitarian diplomacy include primarily formal contacts at the highest level. Every year, the presidents and government delegations of the two countries hold meetings in bilateral contacts or during CIS summits. Thus, the ministries of culture build ties between specialized organizations within the framework of their subordinate institutions. In a similar way an interaction in the fields of science and education is carried out. For example, cooperation between a number of leading universities of the two countries has been established, namely Moscow State University (MSU) and Turkmen State University, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, the National University of Oil and Gas (Gubkin University) and International Oil and Gas University in Turkmenistan, etc. In addition to higher education institutions, there are ties between secondary education institutions.

Russia is highly interested in developing tourism in the Caspian region; therefore, negotiations on this issue have been particularly intensive in recent years. Tourism is fully under the State's control: there is a list of Russian companies approved for providing tourist services and tourist escort, and routes for tourist groups are also fixed. According to the Federal Tourism Agency, the approval of the Turkmen side was received only in 2019, and

only after that the agreements became concrete. Moreover, diplomatic missions in the two states, namely the Russian embassy in Ashgabat and the consular post in Turkmenbashi, as well as the Turkmen embassy and consular department in Moscow and consulates in Astrakhan and Kazan, regularly organize international activities in humanitarian sphere.

At the same time, Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian country where there is no network of Russian cultural centres. In 2012, then-head of the Russian Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo K. Kosachev said, that the Turkmen authorities do not allow the agency into the country. In 2018 the new head of the department E. Mitrofanova noted, that the agency had to invent a “special format for cultural and information activities” due to the position of Turkmenistan. The reason for this is the sweeping “Turkmenization” policy conducted by Ashgabat, which force ethnic minorities to adopt Turkmen culture. The Turkmen authorities allow very little spread of foreign cultures, despite the fact that Russia is its closest neighbour. Turkmenistan deems Rossotrudnichestvo as a “soft power” instrument, although its purpose is not to impose, but to promote cross-cultural exchange between two neighbouring friendly countries. However, so far only individual projects of Rossotrudnichestvo have been approved.

The author also notes the importance of non-state institutions of cooperation, and the most important one is the diaspora. There is no information in the media or scientific literature on the activities of organized Russian community in Turkmenistan. Most likely, this is due to the State’s full control over society and the “Turkmenization” policy. There is evidence that Turkmenistan actually prohibits the establishment of such public organizations and also tries to gain full control over the Turkmen diaspora in Russia. There is no data on the exact size of the Russian community in Turkmenistan, but it has decreased dramatically following entry restrictions for individuals with dual citizenship. Those Russians who continue to live there represent and promote Russian culture in Turkmenistan.

A survey of several dozen migrants and students from Turkmenistan conducted by the author included question as follows: "In Turkmenistan, have you ever encountered Russian culture somehow?" Two persons questioned replied that they saw Russians celebrate Orthodox holidays. According to the survey, Turkmen learn about Russian culture mainly in Russian language and literature classes at school.

The Turkmen diaspora has structured public organizations in Russian regions; also, in those cities with Turkmen diaspora, multiple festivities and events that celebrate Turkmen culture take place every year. The author identifies international public organizations as another important institution. Under the auspices of the Russian Association for International Cooperation, the Russian-Turkmen Society for Friendship, Cultural and Business Relations and the non-profit partnership "Russian-Turkmen House" operate.

The author concludes that, in general, the humanitarian sphere of Russian-Turkmen relations is rather institutionalized and the majority of the institutions are state-owned. The scope of the opportunities for direct contacts between the communities of the two countries is still small, due to the closed nature of Turkmen society. There is a symmetry at the state level (interaction between the ministries, their subordinate institutions and regional authorities), whereas there is a total asymmetry at the non-state level as a result of Turkmen policy, which bans Russian public structures from actively operating on its territory. The Russian side fully complies with the principles of bilateral relations, which prescribe to ensure "free and equal development of the culture of the Russian minority living on the territory of Turkmenistan and the culture of the Turkmen minority living on the territory of the Russian Federation." The structure of cooperation between the two countries lacks a number of state and non-state institutions typical of Russia's partnerships with other Central Asian countries: in Turkmenistan, Rossotrudnichestvo is not allowed to operate and there are no direct ties between youth associations and continued

interactions between media organizations. The author considers that Russia should preserve and expand bilateral ties that have evolved over decades.

GULSINA KHOSHIMOVA. SPIRITUAL AND MORAL BASIS OF MILITARY CULTURE OF THE ARMY OF UZBEKISTAN // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: military art, spirituality, Islam, national army, military tradition, humanism.

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Abstract. This article describes the history of military culture as the spiritual and moral basis of the modern army of Uzbekistan. The role of military culture and traditions in education of military personnel in the spirit of patriotism is revealed.

The providing of effective moral education of military personnel at all historical stages has been and still is an important factor in ensuring national security of the country. The tasks of spiritual and moral education of army soldiers were solved in many ways and means in line with the course of the state personnel policy towards the armed forces.

According to the historical experience of Uzbekistan at the critical stages of development of the Uzbek state, military personnel, as the category of the most professionally trained