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1. Savin L.V. Multipolarity and Foreign Policy of Russia // *Postsovetskiye issledovaniya*, 2020, V. 3, № 1. P. 9–18.

2. Savchenko A.E., Zuenko I.Yu. The Driving Forces of Russia's Pivot to East // *Sravnitel'naya politika*, 2020, № 1. P. 111–125.

Leonid Savin, the chief editor of the “Geopolitics” journal at Moscow State University, discusses the theory of multipolarity, which has recently become a topic of debate among political scientists and journalists from all over the world. Such interest is stirred by the fact that the role of the US in global politics is declining that makes a number of states strive to fill the emerging geopolitical vacuum. As the analysis of doctrinal documents and strategies shows, multipolarity is one of the key trends of the foreign policy of Russia. Multipolarity is a kind of discursive framework that has expanded and adjusted over the years, with a focus on criticism of the foreign policy of the US.

The author notes that Russia participated in the drafting of the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order (1997), one of the first international documents on multipolarity. It particularly states that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China will contribute to the development of a multipolar world and the establishment of a new international order. The

Declaration defended the rights of states to choose their own path of development independently and without interference from outside. The developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement were named the driving force contributing to the formation of a multipolar world.

The Declaration also noted several profound changes in international relations at the end of the 20th century:

- Establishment of the political, economic and cultural diversity of all countries.
- Enhanced role of the forces advocating for peace and international cooperation.
- Increased understanding by many countries of the need for mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.
- Creation of a peaceful and stable international political and economic order is on the international agenda.

The author points out that the 2005 Declaration signed by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China was intended to strengthen efforts to organize a new international order in the 21st century. In the new Declaration the diversity of cultures and civilizations are named the basis for mutual enrichment, not for conflict; it also advocates the need for global cooperation, denouncing the clash of civilizations. Speaking about the transformation of the foreign policy priorities of Russia, the author draws attention to the 2000 concept, which is that Russia will seek the formation of a multipolar system of international relations that reflects the diversity of the modern world and its interests. The 2008 concept associates multipolarity with global security and states that addressing the issues of strategic stability cannot remain the exclusive responsibility of Russia and the United States. The 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept deals with the transitional period in international relations, which involves the formation of a polycentric international system. The paper notes the increasing complexity of international relations, the strengthening of newly emerged centres of economic growth and political influence, and the

important role of regional integration. In the next 2016 concept the intention to promote constructive dialogue and partnership reaffirms the policy based on multipolarity. The paper also mentions a considerable reduction of the ability of Western countries to dominate the world economy and politics.

The concepts of polycentricity and multipolarity are reflected in multiple national security strategies of the Russian Federation. The policy to promote the formation of a multipolar world and the development of equal and mutually beneficial relations with all countries and integration associations was established by Presidential Decree in the early 2000s. The paper noted the attempts by a number of states to hinder Russia to become one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In the 2009 strategy the policy to defend national interests was seen as a key factor in the emerging multipolar international relations. Strategic stability and equal strategic partnership strengthened by Russia's active participation in the development of a multipolar world order were deemed as a top priority for the Russian Federation. In 2015, the next document discussed creating a stable basis for further strengthening economic, political, military and spiritual potential of the Russian Federation, promoting its role in the polycentric world, the establishment of which is accompanied by greater global and regional instability.

It should be noted that Russia understood the need to develop a theory of multipolarity following a series of crisis situations: the collapse of the Soviet Union that entailed ethnic conflicts; the collapse of Yugoslavia; the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia; and the self-proclamation of independence by the territory of Kosovo. Attempts to redefine the place and role of Russia in the world political system were made.

In 2003, Yevgeny Primakov, one of the Russian advocates for multipolarity, argued that after 11 September two opposing trends became clearly apparent: the UN based mechanism of

multilateral action, on the one hand, and unilateralism, i.e. the belief that major decisions can be made by one country, the US, on the other. He pointed out that the EU was turning into a centre of power, comparable in its capabilities to the US, and stressed the need for the UN to contribute to the development of multipolarity. He also noted that China, Russia, India and Japan were not going to be one step behind the events determined by Washington. It is important to note that even back then Y. Primakov denied the leadership of the US, drawing attention to the rapidly growing capabilities of other states and alliances. He observed that the collapse of the USSR did not mean that the world should be unipolar with Washington as its centre. The GDP of China and India is larger than that of the US. As of 2011 the US is not the only driving force of scientific progress: the US accounts for 31 per cent of world R&D expenditures (measured at purchasing power parity), the EU accounts for 24 per cent, China accounts for 14 per cent, and Japan accounts for 11 per cent.

According to Y. Primakov, the multipolar world order in the context of globalisation does not lead to conflict situations or military clashes, but at the same time does not rule out a gradual and extremely difficult transition process towards such an order. As a supporter of the Russia-India-China triangle, which could counterbalance the US and along with other challenges, Primakov is rightfully considered to be one of the first Russian advocates for multipolarity.

On February 10, 2007 Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference, which went down in history as the Munich speech and a milestone in the process of development of multipolarity. In his speech, the President noted that “the unipolar world proposed after the Cold War” failed to materialize. One centre of power, one sovereign is destructive not only for everyone within this system, but also for the sovereign himself because it destroys him from the inside. For the modern world, unipolar system is not only unacceptable, but virtually impossible, since the potential of the new centres of global

economic growth bolsters multipolarity. Putin questioned the legitimacy of military operations conducted by a number of states, implying the US and NATO, since only the UN has legitimate power to approve use of force. The speech also covered the issues of disarmament, militarization of outer space, imbalance within the OSCE and economic security. The President finished the speech with a call for cooperation among states in order to build a democratic world order and ensure security and prosperity for all.

The author notes that the concept of multipolarity is based on the Alexander Dugin's idea of Neo-Eurasianism, among others. Eurasianism in terms of global trends is a revolutionary civilizational concept, which is intended to become a new ideological platform for cooperation of a conglomerate of various forces, states and peoples rejecting Atlantic-centred globalisation. It is the combination of all the obstacles in the path of unipolar globalisation, which developed from simple negation to a creative alternative. Although classical Eurasianism is associated exclusively with Russia, described as Eurasia due to its uniqueness, vast territory and location between Europe and Asia, Dugin complemented the ideology with new methodologies and scientific concepts. In this new understanding, Eurasianism is a philosophy of multipolar globalisation, designed to join together all societies and nations of the Earth in building a new world.

This opinion is shared by another Russian scientist Boris Martynov, who noted that the new emerging multipolarity cannot be anything other than civilizational. According to the scholar, intercivilizational communication is the political reality of the modern world. States along with various economic and financial institutions, non-governmental associations and even individuals as representatives of their civilizational archetypes engage in permanent multidisciplinary and multi-level international dialogue. In addition, multipolar world order system is based on law, since it is essential to provide a

reasonable *modus vivendi* between several major players on the international scene.

The deterioration of relations with the West prompted Russia to actively develop the principles of multipolarity, since the multilateralism of the EU and the US implies joining existing international institutions, whose agenda is mainly set by the West. Russia views such approach as a form of collective unilateralism, which raises a number of alternative ideas about a multipolar world. Some authors tend to believe that the multipolar world order is not a concept, but a historical reality in the process of development.

The author concludes that today there is still no clear vision of the future poles of power, but nevertheless, a vague shape of the future world order is already visible. Theoretical foundations of multipolarity should be further developed, especially from the perspective of non-Western international relations theories. It is also necessary to define ontological factors, ethical and legal aspects, and to analyse cultural, identification and civilizational elements. Once it is done, it will be possible to introduce this concept into international rule-making and incorporate it into practical interaction with other centres of power both on the Eurasian continent and beyond.

Anatolii Savchenko and Ivan Zuenko, researchers at Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnology of the Peoples of the Far-East, study the prerequisites for the phenomenon of Russia's "pivot to the East". The phrase "pivot to Asia" first appeared in the foreign policy of the US in 2011. The Russian pivot the East comprises global, national and regional interests, strategic considerations and priorities for territorial development, which generates a social and political resonance. This topic has been discussed in numerous Western media outlets and is a permanent item on the agenda of various conferences on international relations. Talking about the essay on Russian Asia by Fyodor Dostoevsky, the authors raise the question of what the turn to the East really is and how to assess it. With the reference

to the well-known debate between Igor Shuvalov and Alexei Kudrin at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in 2015, the researchers conclude that politicians do not have an answer to these questions. They question concerns about real purposes of the pivot to the East and allegations that this is only a diversification of foreign economic relations. Today, there is no consensus yet on what exactly constitutes the turn to the East, its starting point or purposes. Also, there is no analytical framework for systematizing the transformations in the foreign policy and foreign economic priorities of Russia. The authors seek to identify the driving forces of Russia's pivot to the East and to understand its relationship with the major global, national and regional priorities of the country.

The pivot to the East is viewed in terms of three global processes:

- Russia's part in the global competition for the reshaping of the world order.
- Russia's strategy for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space.
- Russia's endeavours to establish political and economic ties alternative to those of the West.

The revitalization process of the Asia-Pacific policy direction could be defined as a ratio of "structure" and "motion". A stable world order, subdivided into those in dominant or subordinate positions, leaves little room for major geopolitical manoeuvres of individual states. However, so-called "rising powers" shake the foundations of the established world order and are capable of affecting the status quo. The motivations and objectives of Russia in the international scene are subject to various readings and interpretations. The pivot to the East should be analysed primarily through the prism of geopolitics, since its role in political decision-making of Russia is growing steadily.

At the turn of the 17th century Russia was one of the first states committed to a policy of Westernisation. At the time of the global expansion of the West, this policy direction turned Russia

into one of the key players in world politics. Through a policy of Westernisation Russia implemented its own geopolitical integration project along its borders in the West, South and East. Today Russia adopts a reversed policy of “de-Westernisation” or “pivot to Asia”. Russian top officials underline the significance of global changes. In 2012 Vladimir Putin spoke about the time of profound transformation; and in 2015 Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia, pointed to the current transition period from unipolar and bipolar systems of international relations to a polycentric one. In the 1990s and 2000s, during the global redistribution of economic and military power, the strengthening of large non-Western countries reduced the ability of the West to impose its power on the rest of the world. This became particularly visible during the “commodities super cycle” from 2001 to 2008. The global reconfiguration is acquiring a dynamic of its own, as the largest developing countries, mainly Asian, managed to geopolitically capitalise on their economic successes. This results in the emergence of international associations like the BRICS and G20, which promote a multilateral format for major economic decision-making.

The authors note a new struggle to reshape the world, a competition of a number of large-scale integration projects: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (the “Belt”) serve as an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the Asia-Pacific region. In the post-Soviet space, there is a clash of the Eastern Partnership (European joint initiative), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) integration projects and the “Belt” (Chinese initiative). The shape of the new world order remains unclear, but East Asia is set to play a fundamental role in it, since China and India have enough potential to change global politics and economy. In 2016, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation declared a shift of the potential power and development centres to the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia has been using its high-tech military-industrial complex to gradually erode the strength of the West for the past thirty years. The purchase of Russian weapons helped China and India form armies they have today. Thus, the largest Asian countries acquired significant economic power due to their relations with the US and Europe, and Russia helped them geopolitically capitalise on their economic success. In the early 2000s, the English historian J. Hosking referred to these developments while discussing the key role (negative, in his opinion) of Russia in shaping the world.

At present, modernisation, as well as globalisation, is less and less associated with Westernisation. China combines authoritarian regime with state capitalism, which reduces the dependence of the regime's legitimacy on its recognition in Western countries. For the political elites of developing countries, it becomes an alternative to the Western political model. Thus, a significant number of the post-Soviet states are moving forward towards the China model. Since late 1980s and until recently Russia was economically, ideologically and institutionally tied to the Western world. Participation in the G8 and the Russia-EU and Russia-NATO summits was the usual format for international communication, leading to Eurocentrism in the foreign policy of Russia. The economic system of Russia implied sterilization of oil export revenues, ensuring macroeconomic stability. Strong macroeconomic performance enabled Russian companies to access Western financial market.

Since the beginning of the 2010s the things has changed for a number of reasons:

- The domestic political development deviated from the Western ideology of the rule of international law, while the ideology of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states has gained momentum.

- Economically, Russia was a mere supplier of raw materials to the Western world; however, the subsequent crash in energy prices, difficulties to reach Western capital markets and

revision of Russian economic stance in a negative light have cast doubt on the system of economic relations with the West.

– Since 2014, the usual channels of interaction with the US and EU have been blocked.

According to the authors, it is practically impossible to measure de-Westernization, since it cannot be distinguished from economic diversification, a “multi-vector” foreign policy, or integration into the Asia-Pacific region. The change in Moscow’s foreign policy priorities, readiness to sever ties with the West, values other than those of the West and growing importance of Asia are the hallmarks of de-Westernisation. In geopolitical and economic terms, Russia has few incentives to uphold a Western-centric world order, because the competition with the West led only to a gradual loss of its long-standing interests in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. Thus, Moscow has become one of the main supporters of the shift of geopolitical power to the “non-Western” countries.

The main catalyst for the pivot to the East, in the authors’ view, was the difficulty of reintegration of the post-Soviet space, caused both by the discourse for decolonization and strengthening of sovereignty, and the geopolitical pressure of the West in two waves. The 2003–2005 “colour revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were the first wave. The second wave is associated with the EU “Eastern Partnership” joint indicative (2009) aimed at strengthening integration ties with the six former Western republics of the USSR, namely Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, since the early 2000s, the post-Soviet space has been a foreign policy priority for Moscow.

The authors note the transformation of the project for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space from a regional into a global one, as well as a change of the geopolitical vector of reintegration. Initially, the project involved Russia’s emergence as a regional power; and now the neighbouring countries start to view it as an alternative to integration under the auspices of

Europe or China. The “European element” of the project virtually disappeared, and the focus shifted to the “Eurasian” one. After the Georgian and Ukrainian crises, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) focused on post-Soviet Central Asia, which is also an area of interest for China. In 2015, Moscow and Beijing managed to find an optimal format for interaction of their integration initiatives by signing the Joint Declaration on coordinating cooperation between the EAEU and the “Belt”.

The authors point to a similar metamorphosis with the integration policy into the Asia-Pacific region, which in the early 2010s was not as important as the European direction of foreign policy. The Asia-Pacific region was fairly far down on the list of the foreign policy priorities of Russia than the post-Soviet space, the EU, NATO, the US and even Canada and the Arctic. However, following the Crimean crisis in 2014, the Asia-Pacific region became a priority of Russian foreign policy, putting an end to Moscow’s strategic plans to pursue a balanced and multi-vector foreign and economic policy. With the current political stance of the West, there are virtually no alternatives to the development of integration ties with Asia, including the post-Soviet space.

The development of the Eastern regions of Russia, on the one hand, was supposed to enable the access to the Asia-Pacific markets; on the other hand, the benefits from the deepening of ties with the Asia-Pacific region and post-Soviet Central Asia should first become apparent in the Eastern region. This linkage is set forth in Russian strategic documents, in which the Far East is regarded not only as an instrument, but also as a beneficiary of the “turn to the East”. The process of intensifying ties with the Asia-Pacific region comprises the development of the transit transport system and export infrastructure in the Far East, financial flows from Asian states and the establishment of a legal framework that facilitates foreign investment.

Nevertheless, the achievements to date are relatively modest, since Asian development institutions are reluctant to

invest in the Russian economy. In 2018, there were zero Russian projects, approved or pending by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The New Development Bank (NDB) is financing three Russian projects (total of \$628.8 million), but these investments have nothing to do with the turn to the East. At the annual Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, created to encourage investment in the Russian Far East, agreements with Russian companies are not binding.

Projects on the development of the Far East are funded by the state or state-related corporations. Even the international transport corridors (ITR) Primorye-1 and Primorye-2, which give the north-eastern provinces of China, as well as Mongolia, direct access to the Sea of Japan, have not yet been able to attract foreign investors. The only tangible evidence of the turn to the East is the construction of a powerful energy complex, designed for the transportation, processing and export of hydrocarbons to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. However, this is connected more with the diversification of sales area and geographical shift of the raw material base rather than with geopolitical manoeuvres.

The authors conclude that the pivot to the East has not yet produced tangible results, but nevertheless it exists. After a thorough analysis of the pivot to the East, the researchers name the driving forces of this process:

- Rapprochement between Russia and China allows us to view the Asia-Pacific region as a means for successful manoeuvring in a changing world.

- A change in geopolitical priorities would have been impossible without an inclusive preparation, namely the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). The implementation of the Eurasian integration project (EAEU-based) would also have been impossible without preparatory work within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community

(EAEC) and the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), facilitated by the constructive stance of Kazakhstan.

- During the 2000s Russia rid itself of the monopoly of Europe on consumption of Russian energy resources and shifted exports to the developing countries in Asia. This shift in the geography of the oil trade is one of the most significant prerequisites for Russia's pivot to the East, as it creates room for geo-economic manoeuvre.

As a result of the Crimean crisis, the existing institutions of interaction with the West collapsed, the foreign policy priorities of Moscow shifted, and after the imposition of sanctions the old model of economic growth of Russia ceased to work. All the aforementioned developments turned Russia to the East. The growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region for Russia is primarily associated with the geopolitical priorities of Moscow and the convergence of the political systems of the EAEU Member States, coupled with the simultaneous divergence of these systems from the West. The problem is that the pivot to the East does not mean the establishment of a new model of economic growth and successful development of the country's eastern territories. Its solution will be the final indicator of whether Russia's pivot to the East proves to be successful.