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KAMIL AZIMOV, OLGA BIBIKOVA. SHIITES IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SPACE OF MODERN LEBANON. (Continued in the next issue) // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Shiites, Musa Sadr, Amal, Lebanon, Iran.

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Abstract. Lebanese Shiites have become the focus of attention of Tehran, which is trying to involve them in the plans to strengthen its influence in Arab countries.

Article I.

The emergence of the Shiite community in Lebanon

Shiism began to penetrate Lebanon in the 7th century. It is believed that the Shiites came to Lebanon with part of the Yemeni tribe Hamadan, which had previously settled in the area of the city of Kufa (Iraq). They supported the claims of Ali, a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants, to the Caliphate. But, after the Umayyad dynasty (661–750) came to power and imposed unbearable taxes on the population, part of the tribe moved to Lebanon. First they settled in Mount Lebanon, which several centuries later became a stronghold of Christianity. In Caesruan, up to the beginning of the 14th century, they dominated, until the Maronite Christians fleeing repression from the Sunnis drove them out. Moslem historians claim that during that period Shiites settled in Homs, Damascus, Aleppo, as well as on the Mediterranean coast of Syria. When Syria fell under the rule of the Fatimid dynasty (909–1171), which professed Ismailism,¹ the Shiites, feeling supported, settled throughout Lebanon. In particular, the city of Tripoli, now considered the Sunni capital of Lebanon, in the 11th century possessed a significant Shiite population, as the famous Iranian poet and traveler of the 11th century Nasir Khosrov wrote.

However, the split that occurred in Islam after the death of Imam Hussein (626–680), divided Moslems into Sunnis and Shiites forever. The famous Arab commander Salah ad-Din, who defeated the crusader army at the Battle of Hittin (1187), united the territories of Egypt, Syria (including Lebanon) and Iraq and created the Ayyubid state, where Sunnism was preferred. The

Ayyubid dynasty (including the founder of the dynasty, Salah ad-Din) had a distrust of Shiites.

And later – in the 14th century – after the fiery speeches of Ibn Taymiyyah² (1263–1328), who declared the Shiites “Rafidites” (apostates), i.e. denying the three first “righteous” caliphs who ruled before Ali ibn Abu Talib, who was considered the 1st Shiite Imam, many rulers began to consider Shiites people of “second class.”

When the Mamluk army entered Lebanese territory in 1309, many Shiites fled to the mountains, the Beka'a Valley and southern Lebanon. The persecution of the Shiites by the authorities forced them to resort to the practice of “takiyya,” which involved concealing their true faith³. Later, some, in order to save their loved ones, were forced to accept Sunni Islam

Nevertheless, the Shiite community strove to preserve their faith, maintained contacts with Shiites of other countries, and sent their children to study in Shiite centers. In the 15th century the small settlement of Karak Nuh⁴ (near Baalbek) became the center of Shiite education, where Shiite theologians worked. Among them were Ali ibn Abdullah al-Karaki al-Amili⁵, who developed the theory of “wilayat al-fakih” (the reign of a lawyer replacing the 12th imam during the period of his concealment⁶) and “niyabat al-fakih” (governorship). Later, the sheikh left for Iran at the invitation of Shah Ismail (1487–1524) from the Safavid dynasty, where, having received the title of “Sheikh ul-Islam”, he became one of the largest propagandists of the Shiist ideology. Ismail also invited Moslem jurists from Bahrain and Southern Iraq to Iran. Subsequently, they developed the teaching of Imami Shi'ism and made it available to the population, which contributed to its spread⁷.

In 1516 the territory of Syria (including Lebanon) fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The city of Tripoli, which had a significant Shiite population before the Ottoman invasion, was depopulated as the Shiites fled from persecution. In the

homeland of al-Karaki, in Lebanon, the genocide of the Shiites began.

During the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1465–1529), 44 thousand Shiites were killed in Jebel Amil and 40 thousand in Aleppo. Ahmed Jazzar (1721–1804)⁸ famous for his cruelty, who was appointed by the Ottomans the ruler of Palestine and a significant parts of Syria in 1775–1804, followed the example of his masters and exterminated tens of thousands of Shiites. It was after the Ottoman occupation of Syria and Lebanon in 1516 that many Shiite theologians, disciples and followers of al-Karaki were forced to move to Iraq and Iran. Due to the fact that the Ottoman sultans were most interested in obtaining taxes from the subordinate Arab population, the jurisdiction in Lebanon was nominal. So, despite the power of the Sultan, the Baalbek area in the 18th century was under the control of the Shiites. In the Ottoman Empire, Shiites were not allowed to serve in military service, did not have the right to serve in the administrative apparatus. Shiite hawza (religious seminaries) in Jebaa, Jizzin, Mashgar, Al-Karka, Maisal Jebel, and Shakra, where young Lebanese Shiites had studied, textbooks had been developed, and discussions on religious topics had been held, were closed. By the beginning of the twentieth century Shiites of Lebanon were concentrated in the Beka'a Valley and Jebel Amil. These were mainly poor peasants and the urban poor who worked in the service of wealthy families. But gradually large Shiite clans that owned the land were formed. After the introduction of the French Mandate (1920), armed Shiites were the first to attack French positions in southern Lebanon. They are also credited with the unsuccessful attempt on the life of the High Commissioner of France, Henri Gouraud.⁹ By that time they already numbered 17% of the population.¹⁰ The French authorities transferred 7 villages in southern Lebanon, inhabited by Shiites, under the control of the British Mandate over Palestine. Later these villages became part of Israel. However, during the war of 1948–49 the villages were depopulated as the

Shiites inhabiting them fled to Syria. Subsequently, these villages were settled by Israelis¹¹.

Socio-economic situation of Shiites after Lebanon obtained independence

Shiites professing the main Shiite trend - Imamism - in Lebanon are called mitawali (from قلاواتم). After gaining independence (1946) during the formation of the Lebanese state, the Shiites failed to get a share in the power structures. The balance of forces was not in their favor, and, in the words of one of their leaders, they only got a "folding seat." According to the National Pact, which was negotiated in 1943 on behalf of Christians by the Maronite Bishara al-Khuri and on behalf of the Moslems by the Sunni Riyad Solh, the Shiites were in third place in the communal hierarchy based on the 1932 census. During the formation of the parliament, the Shiites were given the seat of the speaker of parliament, which was traditionally occupied by representatives of the wealthy Shiite clans al-Asaad, al-USayran, al-Khalil, Hamad. Indeed, "the key positions in the government have always been reserved for the Maronites, the auxiliary ones for the Sunnis. So in 1974, on the eve of the civil war, out of 85 top administrative posts, 43 belonged to Christians, 22 to Sunnis, 14 to Shiites and 6 to Druses."¹² The vast majority of Shiites are the poorest stratum of the country's population. As noted by the Russian orientalist A.I. Aleksandrov: "the domination of the feudal elite blocked protest moods among the Shiites. Oppositional Shiites, as a rule, joined the ranks of the secular left parties, in particular the Lebanese Communist Party."¹³

Of particular note is the role of the Communist Party in awakening the national consciousness of Shiites. Indeed, the communists worked among the poorest sections of the population, where they had great influence. Thanks to the help of the USSR, dozens of young Shiites from Lebanon were able to receive secondary technical and higher education. It is estimated

that about one-third of the leadership of the Lebanese Communist Party consisted of Shiites. René Chamussy, French researcher of the history of modern Lebanon, in his book *Chronicle of a War* wrote in regard of Lebanese Communist Party: "half of the party's personnel were Shiite Moslems, 30% were Christians of various faiths, 20% were Sunnis and Druses."¹⁴ Later, in 1984, the French orientalist Eric Rouleau cited other data for the mid-1980s: "the party is 50% Moslem, of which about half are Shiites."¹⁵

The famous philosopher and publicist Husayn Muruwwa (1910–1987) was a communist. Coming from a Lebanese Shiite family, at the age of 14, he was sent by his father to the city of Najaf (Iraq) to study Islamic sciences. However, in Iraq, he read the "Communist Manifesto" written by Hussein Muhammad al-Shabibi, one of the founders of the Iraqi Communist Party, after which he became interested in Marxism. Returning to his homeland, he joined the Communist Party in 1951.¹⁶ H. Muruwwa is considered the founder of the school of criticism of socialist realism in the Arab world. His main work, *Materialistic Tendencies in Arab-Moslem Philosophy*, was a Marxist rethinking of the reading of traditional Arabic texts. From 1966 to February 1987, H. Muruwwa was the editor of the *at-Tariq* magazine and a member of the editorial board of the *al-Nahj* magazine, published by the Center for the Study of Socialism in Arab Countries. On 02/18/1987 H. Muruwwa was killed by Shiite extremists who considered the scientist apostate from Shiism.

The spread of the Marxist atheistic worldview was not to the taste of the eminent Shiites, who came from the middle classes. First of all, this concerns religious leaders who considered it a threat to the cohesion and protective capabilities of their community at a time of aggravation of interfaith tensions.

However, under the influence of socialist ideas, the Shiites, deeply politicized by the very circumstances of their existence, brought up on the egalitarian ideology of the first imams, starting in the 1970s started to join trade unions and left-wing parties.

In the 1980s, due to the concentration of Palestinian units in southern Lebanon and their almost constant attacks against Israel, to which the Israelis responded with artillery shelling, the Shiite population of this area began to move to the suburbs of Beirut, creating a vast area of Dahiya in the southern suburbs. Those who remained suffered greatly from the presence of the Palestinian commandos, who fortified there after they were expelled from Jordan. During the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990), the Shiite community of Lebanon was recognized by the Constitution of the country as one of 18 confessions. In terms of the number Shiites traditionally ranked third, since the first census, conducted during the formation of the state in 1932, found that only 20% of the population in Lebanon professed Shiism (200 thousand out of 791 700)¹⁷. In fact, even at that time there were much more of them.

According to the Taif Agreement (Saudi Arabia, 1989), which marked the end of the civil war in Lebanon, Shiites won two seats (out of 72) in Parliament.

The modern Shiite community in Lebanon is still discriminated against, although there is an opinion that in the 21st century they make up the majority of the Lebanese population. Among them there are representatives of different directions of Shiism: Imamites / Twelvers, Alawites, Ismailis and Druses. The latter split away from traditional Shiism quite a long time ago, but traditionally they are considered Shiites. In addition to the Shiite Imamites, Lebanon is also home to about 40 thousand Alawites. They settled there in the 16th century in the Jebel Mohsen region of Tripoli and 10 villages in the Akkar region. With the outbreak of the war in Syria, the conflict between local Sunnis and Alawites resumed. On the one hand, these are the Sunnis of the Bab al-Tabbani region, who support the Syrian Free Army¹⁸ which is in opposition to the government. On the other hand, these are people from Jebel Mohsen, an area dominated by Alawites who sympathize with their fellow believers in Syria. Characteristically, this is not the only example

of confrontation between the inhabitants of the two districts. A similar conflict took place after the Syrian army invaded Lebanon in 1976.¹⁹

Among Lebanese Shiites, the level of education is lower than that of Christians or Sunnis, and the percentage of large families is high. In the absence of family planning skills, their numbers are constantly increasing. As of 2005, they accounted for 32% of the country's population²⁰, and this despite the fact that some of the Shiites do not have passports and do not participate in population censuses. This can be explained by the state's indifference to their needs, as well as by the desire of the Maronite elite, which has long dominated the power structures, deliberately not to raise the question of the ratio of the number of Moslems and Christians in the country. In 2017, the CIA reported that Shia Moslems make up 25.4% of the Lebanese population²¹. According to other sources, Lebanese Shia Moslems have become the largest religious community in Lebanon, accounting for about 40% of the total population.

The rise of Lebanese Shiite self-awareness in the 1960s - 1970s

In the late 1960s there arose a Shiite movement, led by Musa Sadr, who came from a family of religious leaders well-known in Lebanon, Iran and Iraq²². It is said that his ancestor Saleh Sharaf ad-Din, a Shiite and theologian from South Lebanon, back in the 18th century was sentenced to death by the Ottoman authorities, but managed to escape execution and took refuge in Iran. Since then, strong ties have been established between Jebel Amil's Lebanese Shiites and Iran.²³ Sadreddin, the father of Musa Sadr, was a native of the city of Tire (Lebanon). Musa's mother was the daughter of Ayatollah Hussein Tabatabai Qumi.²⁴ To give his son an education, the father sent him to the city of Qom (Iran). Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Khadr - a distant relative of the family - according to some sources wanted to make

Musa Sadr his successor. In the 1950s M. Sadr returned to Lebanon. In the homeland of his ancestors, he took on the mission to unite his fellow believers, bring them out of poverty and help them take their rightful place in Lebanese society. In the 1960s – 1970s he became an influential figure in the political arena of Lebanon, advocating for equality of communities, for social justice and dialogue between faiths. He contacted the leaders of various parties, spoke at various political forums. In May 1969, he was elected chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, the first representative body of the Shiite community authorized by the authorities. Besides being the central religious body, this Council provided a space for political debate among various actors, including the communists. Now a political and religious framework has been created for the Shiites.

In an effort to improve the situation of Lebanese Shiites, M. Sadr “revived the charitable organization Jamiat al-Birr wal-Ihsan and raised money for the Social Institute (al-Muassasa al-Ijtimaya), a shelter in Tire. In 1963, Sadr founded a sewing school and a kindergarten. In the same year he founded the Institute for Islamic Studies (Mahad al-Dirasat al-Islamiya). In 1964, Sadr founded the Technical Institute (Burj al-Shimali) with funding from Shiite philanthropists, bank loans and the Lebanese Ministry of Education. In 1974, together with Hussein el-Husseini (his deputy – auth.), he founded the Movement of the Disinherited in order to achieve better economic and social conditions for the Shiites. They opened a number of schools and medical clinics throughout South Lebanon, many of which are still in operation.”²⁵

Musa Sadr initiated an Islamic-Christian dialogue in order to get Christians to surrender some of their power to the Shiites, who had been deprived of it for a long time. To do this, he promoted the idea of rapprochement between Christians and Moslems, as a guarantee of strengthening the foundations of the national state. Interestingly, he sought support for his ideas even outside Lebanon. In particular, in 1963 he was the only Shiite

present at the enthronement of Pope Paul VI. As head of the Supreme Shiite Council, he delivered a speech at the Beirut Catholic Cathedral of St. Louis (19.02.1975) at a ceremony marking the beginning of Lent.

At that moment it was an unprecedented act, testifying to M. Sadr's desire to make his community a full-fledged confession. It is also known that he was friends with the Greek Catholic Bishop Gregory Haddad (1924–2015), nicknamed for his views “the red bishop.” The bishop proposed to conduct a social survey of the areas of Lebanon, where the poorest population lived. In particular, during the reign of President F. Shehab (1958–1964), he proposed a project to mobilize volunteers in various regions of the country to collect data necessary to prepare projects of assistance for regional development. Musa Sadr supported the bishop's initiative. Companions and students of M. Sadr took part in the collection of information. Ultimately, this idea formed the basis for the project to create a Ministry to formulate development plans based on quantitative data on the needs and opportunities of various regions of Lebanon.²⁶

He further expanded his participation in Christian and Moslem religious forums, promoting morality as the common goal of religions, while simultaneously informing his audience of injustice against Shiites. In 1973, Musa Sadr (probably at the request of Syrian President H. Assad) issued a fatwa recognizing the Alawites as Shiites.²⁷ Prior to this, the Sunnis considered the Alawites to be heretics, insulting Islam by their very existence.

The bright and charismatic personality of M. Sadr inspired deep respect. He, unlike his fellow Moslem jurists, having a religious education, attended lectures at the Faculty of Law at the University of Tehran.

In February 1974, Musa Sadr created a movement that aimed to fight against the exploiters, against the expansionist aspirations of Israel and for the elimination of confessionalism in the current political system. The movement became known as the “Movement of the Disadvantaged” (Harakat al-Mahrumin, since

1974 – the Amal movement). Soon Amal (abbreviation of Afwaju al-muqawamat al-Lubnaniyya – Lebanese resistance units) became a structure with military units, which are often called the “Shiite militia.”²⁸ They were created to protect the rights and interests of Shiites. But Musa Sadr refused to use force to solve Lebanese problems and did not involve the militia in hostilities. At the beginning of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), Musa Sadr went on a hunger strike to stop the bloodshed in Beirut. He made a statement and closed himself in the al-Safa mosque. The reaction to his actions was amazing. Thousands of people wanted to join him. The government has banned the sale of gasoline, because people from all over Lebanon were driving to the mosque. Besides Moslems, many Armenians went on hunger strike. In the mosque, he was visited by priests, sheikhs and statesmen who expressed their solidarity. After learning that Christians had been killed in several villages in Baalbek, he himself broke off the hunger strike and went there to end the violence. Later it became known that the killings were committed in order to blame Moslems for them.

M. Sadr communicated a lot with Shiites from different countries, including visiting the countries of West Africa, where a large Shiite diaspora lives. He met with J. Chirac, L. Senghor, M.A. Nasser, Y. Arafat and many other statesmen. In August 1978, Musa Sadr went to Libya, at the invitation of M. Gaddafi. This was his last trip. He disappeared.

There were many versions regarding the reasons for his disappearance. Most of the opinions agreed that he was tortured by order of M. Gaddafi. Later, Lebanon even tried to bring Gaddafi to court, and in the 2000s his son Hannibal was brought to Lebanon in order to undergo interrogation about the circumstances of M. Sadr's stay in Libya.²⁹

In our opinion, we are talking about the fact that Musa Sadr was “removed” by supporters of the radical Shiite course. Let me remind you that later the Lebanese philosopher Hussein Mruvwe was killed in the same way, he was shot by two strangers in his

own house. There were also "disgruntled" Sunni sheikhs who did not agree that Sadr issued a fatwa according to which the Alawites despised by the Sunnis were ranked as Shiites. However, the most popular version was that during the meeting with Gaddafi, there was a quarrel between them. Considering all the versions in retrospect, one can come to the conclusion that the latest version (especially after the death of Gaddafi) is "beneficial" to all enemies of M. Sadr. The media wrote that Musa Sadr's luggage was found in an Italian hotel, but later, representatives of the Libyan authorities reported that Sadr had not left Libya.

One of the versions of Sadr's death - his murder by order of the Iranian special services, is confirmed by the further Iranian policy in Lebanon. In our opinion, the policy pursued by Sadr came into conflict with Tehran's point of view on the situation in southern Lebanon, which Khomeini's supporters viewed as a springboard for the fight against Israel.

Musa Sadr understood that Iranian radicalism was leading to undermining the relatively stable situation in Southern Lebanon. According to rumors leaked at that time, there was mentioned a certain plan "Karbala", which, according to the plan of the Iranian strategists, was to radicalize the Lebanese Shiites and send them, under the Iranian revolutionary banners, against Israel.

After the disappearance of Musa Sadr, a political vacuum emerged in Southern Lebanon, was exploited by Iran, which has long watched the Lebanese Shiite community. The new pro-Iranian structure Hezbollah immediately took advantage of the weakening of Amal and began to actively spread its influence among the Lebanese Shiites. One of the reasons for the weakening of Amal after the death of Sadr is that, despite the creation of a military wing, the organization was unable to protect the Shiites of Southern Lebanon from the Israelis who invaded Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. In addition, Musa Sadr took a more tolerant approach to the situation in the region. He did not

want to turn it into a militarized springboard even for the sake of the lofty ideas of the Islamic revolution.

In fact, the rivalry between Amal and Hezbollah is a reflection of the tensions between Syria and Iran over Lebanon. In 1988, the Syrians threatened to send their troops into the southern suburbs of Beirut in order to deprive the Khomeinists of a recruiting base for young Shiites if they undermined stability in Lebanon. In response, Tehran threatened to start riots in the south, under the guise of guerrilla resistance, which could provoke a direct armed intervention by Israel, followed by the involvement of the Syrians in the conflict. After the death of M. Sadr, the Amal organization was headed for some time by Hussein Husseini, at that time a member of the Lebanese parliament. He was then replaced by Nabih Berri,³⁰ who remains the head of Amal to this day.

In 1985 (7 years after the disappearance of M. Sadr) the program document of the Hezbollah party was published, which, in particular, said: "We appeal to all Arabs and Moslems to tell them that the experience of Moslems in Islamic Iran has proved, that people, motivated by faith, with bare breasts can, with the help of Allah, destroy iron and the oppression of tyrannical regimes ... only Islam can lead to the revival of humanity and make progress."³¹

Pro-Iranian elements managed to take root within the Amal Shiite movement. Demands for a more radical course in line with the calls of the Khomeinists split the movement. A heated debate erupted within Amal's leadership. The supporters of the Khomeinist policy have shown considerable persistence. But the leader of the movement, Nabih Berry, got out of the situation by postponing the date of the upcoming congress in order to discuss the current situation.

Note also that the Khomeinists in Amal called their faction the "Correctional Movement" (*harakat at-takhassusiyya* - by analogy with the "correctional movement" in Syria, which H. Asad proclaimed in November 1970") Through a faction of its

supporters Tehran demanded that the Amal leadership accept the following conditions: 1. Agree with the principle of “vilatat fakikh” (i.e. recognize the leading role of the ayatollahs in politics); 2. Agree with the plans to establish in Lebanon an Islamic republic on the Iranian model; 3. Organize new elections to the Politburo and the Amal Executive Committee taking into account the persons recommended by Tehran. The leadership of Amal rejected these demands.

References

1. Ismailism is a Shiite movement. The Ismailis believe in the oneness of God, as well as the completion of divine revelation with Muhammad, whom they regard as “the last Prophet and Messenger of God to all mankind.” Initially, the ideology of Ismailism showed the influence of Neoplatonism. Ismailis and Imamis revere the same imams. In X–XII centuries they created their own state – the Fatimid Caliphate. Later, new trends arose in the bosom of Ismailism. In Lebanon, the Druses are considered followers of Ismailism, actively demonstrating their departure from the original doctrine.
2. Ibn Taymiyyah – (1263–1328) Arab-Moslem theologian, follower of Ahmed ibn Hanbal (780–855) Iraqi jurist and founder of the Hanbali madhhab. He was a fierce critic of “innovations” in religion. Subsequently, his ideas were taken up by M. Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792).
3. The practice of concealing faith was widespread in other ancient religions (“Reservatio menyalis” – a meaningful slip of the tongue – lat.).
4. Karak Nuh is a small village in the Beka'a valley. It is believed that the tomb of Noah is located here, which is reflected in the name. Nuh is Arabic for Noah.
5. Ali bin Al Hussein bin Ali bin Muhammad bin Abdel Aal, known as “al-Karaki”, was born in the village of Karak Nuh, in 865 or 870 AH (~ 1492), died in 940 (~ 1492) in. Najaf (Iraq). Al-Karaki has many titles, among them “Zayn ad-Din” (the treasure of religion), which he received after writing numerous works. As a legal scholar, he supported Islamic law students through the creation of schools and material subsidies using his own funds.
6. In 874, the last, 12th Imam, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Mahdi (born 868), is considered a mahdi (messiah). Its disappearance is considered temporary. Shiites are confident that he will return, restore peace, justice, and establish the rule of Islam.
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- 15 Roulot E. Liban: les chiïtes veulent devenir des citoyens à part entière du pays. Le Monde. P., 12-13.02.1984.
- 16 From 1948 to 1958 it was the united communist party of Lebanon and Syria. The division into the Syrian KP and the Lebanese KP took place in November 1958 after the unification of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic.
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- 18 They are actually a group of defectors from the government army.
- 19 Syrian violence finds its echo in Lebanon. // <https://www.mcclatchydc.com/> (date of treatment: 10/15/2020).
- 20 Lebanese Shiite Moslems // https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Lebanese_Shia_Moslems. Aleksandrov A.I. On the political elite of Lebanon, part 3 // <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=20499>. (date of treatment: 10/16/2020).
- 21 2012 Report on International Religious Freedom - Lebanon "[, United States Department of State, 20 mai 2013 // <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012/nea/208400.htm> ... (date of treatment: 10/16/2020).
- 22 The Sadr family belongs to the Musavi clan, whose origins date back to the 7th Shiite Imam Musa ibn Jafar, and further through Fatima, the daughter of the prophet, wife of Ali ibn Abu Talib, to the Prophet Muhammad.
- 23 Musa Sadr was married to the daughter of Ayatollah Azizollah Khalili. He was also related to Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, who married M. Sadr's niece. M. Sadr's son is married to the granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini.

- 24 Musa as-Sadr // https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Musa_al-Sadr (date of treatment: 10/18/2020).
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- 30 Nabih Berry – born in 1938 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, a lawyer by training. In the 1970s was the legal counsel of Amal. The current Lebanese Shiite politician, speaker of parliament since 1992. Since 1980, he has been the head of the Amal Shiite movement.
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