

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2021.02.003. ELENA DMITRIEVA. IMRAN KHAN AS THE KEY TO SUCCESS OF PAKISTAN TEHREEK-E-INSAF // *Condensed abstract.*

Keywords: Pakistan, elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan, Pashtun, corruption, National Assembly, Kashmir, Afghanistan, USA, Pakistani army.

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1. Alina Filimonova. PTI Election Success in Pakistan: Socio-political Aspect* // *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya. Moskva, 2019. № 7, P. 32–38.*

2. Andrey Demidov. Imran Khan – A Non-system Prime Minister of Pakistan* // *Simvol Nauki: Mezhdunarodnyj Nauchnyj Zhurnal. 2020, № 12-2, P. 182–186.*

Alina Filimonova (1) analyzes internal political and socio-economic trends in Pakistani society that brought to power Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Pakistan Movement for Justice) in 2018. The author notes that rise to power of this party for the first time in the history of Pakistan caused a great resonance, but, upon closer examination, this unprecedented event has a certain logic. PTI was founded in 1996 in Lahore and thus is a relatively new player in the Pakistani political arena, but nevertheless, in a

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

short period of time it managed to achieve a phenomenal increase in electoral support. Having received only 1.61 percent of the votes in the 1997 elections, PTI obtained 31.92 percent of the votes in 2018, which allowed it to become the ruling party.

The author notes that according to a number of analysts, PTI is backed by the Pakistani army. The party currently has over 10 million members and is considered to be the largest in Pakistan. The success of PTI in the political arena means the decline in the popularity of “traditional” political heavyweights. However, if we take into account the socio-cultural specificities of Pakistan, the situation seems to be much more complicated, since Pakistani society is ethnically heterogeneous, rigidly stratified and defined by the traditional system of political allegiances. In this context, the success of one party and the decline in popularity of another means not only a change in the voter attitudes, but also a display of those informal obligations that allows an average Pakistani to consider himself part of a particular social group. Thus, the change in the dynamics of the vote indicates a more profound and long-term social change.

The personality of Imran Khan, the founder of PTI and its permanent leader, is a key success factor of the party. Imran Khan comes from a family of Punjabi Pashtuns; according to him, his paternal ancestor was one of Sher Shah Suri’s leading generals, commanded troops during the battles in India and later became the governor of Punjab. Imran Khan’s maternal relatives are Indians who immigrated to Pakistan after its formation in 1947. Thus, the ancestry of Imran Khan contributes to his image, making him appealing to the general public, because people of Pakistan consider him Punjabi, Pashtun and Muhajir at the same time. In addition, Imran Khan is a former captain of the Pakistani cricket team, under whose leadership the team achieved great success. It’s important to note that cricket in Pakistan is a major sport and in the mass consciousness is closely associated with national greatness.

Imran Khan also meets another Pakistani criterion for success, as he was able to reach certain heights and achieve recognition in the UK. The PTI leader graduated with honours from Oxford, was married to an English noblewoman and became quite popular in the Western media. British newspapers cite Imran Khan and Benazir Bhutto, who was killed in 2007, as two Pakistanis to be well known worldwide. Although Imran Khan became a public figure at a relatively young age, he managed to create a positive image in the mass media and use various scandals around him to his advantage.

According to the author, the success of PTI was also facilitated by the changes in Pakistani society, i.e. gradual rejuvenation and computerization of society at the same time. Access of the population to modern means of communication and obtaining information has increased; the number of Internet users increased from 0.1 percent in 2000 to 22.2 percent in 2018. In the world of fast-moving development of new information technologies, a large number of young voters represent a significant political force, and therefore the use of social media is becoming more and more important for the party and its leaders. In this situation, PTI was most able to capitalize on these social changes. It is also noteworthy that PTI develops much more mobile applications for smartphones than any other Pakistani political party; these applications contain information about ideology of the party and updates on its activities, as well as popularize the image of Imran Khan in a playful way.

The leader of PTI does not belong to any of the traditional “ruling families” of Pakistan, which makes the author wonder about the kind social forces behind PTI. The phenomenon of new parties coming to power, which managed to integrate into the already established (usually two-party) political system, has been widely studied using the example of European countries, but there is no such researches on Asian countries. However, the general paradigm is noteworthy and provides a better understanding of some of the developments in Pakistan. Political

parties can achieve success under two major internal political conditions:

- a fully functioning electoral system, which is not controlled by the country's ruling circles;
- a change in socio-economic conditions in society, which leads to the transformation of electoral requirements.

Pakistan features both of these conditions. PTI has always positioned itself as a new party, not associated with traditional elites, which are branded corrupt and anti-democratic. Nevertheless, at some point the party resorted to generally recognized levers of social influence. Initially, Imran Khan was reluctant to cooperate with those popular candidates, for whom ordinary people vote regardless of their party affiliation, but over time he changed his views on the matter. As a result, PTI managed to significantly increase the number of socially prominent figures in its ranks, e.g. the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mahmood Qureshi joined the party in 2011. By the 2018 elections, there were so many influential politicians in PTI that all of them could not be listed on the electoral list. Thus, PTI easily secured the support of the elites, a traditionally important political resource.

The author notes that PTI relied heavily on political clientelism, i.e. the exchange of goods and services for political support. PTI implemented a number of land improvement projects, including the construction of eight dams, which provide different areas with electricity and water for irrigation. Imran Khan Foundation works on the improvement of areas suffering from floods, builds temporary hospitals there and is involved in infrastructure rehabilitation. Also, microcredit programs, which provide zero interest loans to those wishing to start their own business, are a separate object of expenditure.

The author concludes that the huge success of PTI was possible due to systematic replenishment of the party leadership with traditional elites, adherence to the principles of clientelism,

widespread use of modern media tools and appeal to a steadily growing number of young voters.

A. Demidov in his article (2) discusses Imran Khan as a politician. For the first time in more than 70 years since independence, the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, a former professional cricketer, comes neither from the military nor from the richest aristocratic landowning families. Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi was born on October 5, 1952 in Lahore, the province of Punjab. They were an upper-middle class family and thus were able to pay for his education at Keble College, Oxford, where he studied philosophy, politics and economics. While in college he joined a cricket team and upon his return to Pakistan had an impressive career as a cricketer, becoming captain of the national team in 1982. At the end of his sports career in 1994, Imran Khan wrote several articles on cricket for various British and Asian newspapers, and also appeared as a commentator at international cricket competitions. In the 1990s, Imran Khan did charity work, founded a memorial fund named after his mother Shaukat Khanum and was the primary benefactor of the only cancer hospital in Pakistan.

Eventually, Imran Khan went into politics. A nationalist and populist, he advocated the need to protect Islamic values, develop the economy on a liberal basis, create a welfare state, reduce bureaucracy, draft anti-corruption laws, establish an independent judiciary, restrict police violence and build a democratic Pakistan free from terrorism and extremism. Imran Khan demanded a Pakistani apology towards the Bangladeshi people for the 1971 repressions by the Pakistani military. He likened it to current treatment of ethnic Pashtuns in the war on terror, and called for the army's withdrawal from the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. Imran Khan was a fierce critic of the US policy in the region. In 1994, Imran Khan and the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Hamid Gul created a pressure group, which was a first step towards the creation of a new political party. In April 1996, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was

founded. In 1999, Imran Khan supported a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. He publicly expressed the hope that Musharraf would “end corruption, clear out the political mafias.” In 2002, Imran Khan was elected to the National Assembly. In 2007, Khan and 85 other MPs resigned from Parliament in protest of the presidential election, which general Musharraf was contesting without resigning as army chief. In early 2010s, Imran Khan became one of the most influential politicians in the country already, and PTI was one of the most popular political parties in the country. In August 2018, his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf won 156 of the 342 seats in the National Assembly and, following the election, Imran Khan assumed control of the coalition government. The author points to the fact that Khan formed the government mostly from the members of Musharraf’s government or that created after his resignation.

The new government placed economic issues at the top of the agenda. In his victory speech, Imran Khan said that his party would build Pakistan as a humanitarian state based on principles of the first Islamic state of Medina. He also said that the government would put interests of the poor and commoners of the country first. The government announced that the “New Pakistan” plan involved the construction of five million houses for the poor over the next five years and solution to the problem of unemployment. In February 2020, the government decided to allocate 10 billion rupees (64.8 million US dollars) to contain the rise in prices for basic foodstuffs. In March 2020, against the backdrop of a slowdown in global economic growth and COVID-19 pandemic, Imran Khan called upon major creditor countries to write off the external debt of Pakistan. The author notes that the external political situation remains unfavourable for Pakistan: terrorist groups still operate along the border with Afghanistan; tensions in Kashmir are high; and New Delhi makes provocative statements. This situation causes the Pakistani military to demand an increase in military expenditure, already burdensome for the country, as the military spending accounts for over

50 percent of the State budget. While emphasizing the importance of partnership with Saudi Arabia, Imran Khan, at the same time, pointed out the need to maintain a balance between the leading states of the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Khan's government supported the Turkish military operation in northern Syria in 2019. Another important problem the government faces is religious extremism. Over the past decades, successive military and civilian regimes have sought to strengthen their positions not by improving living standards in the country, but by fostering religious intolerance.

In conclusion, the author points to the fact that Imran Khan is a non-system politician for Pakistan. On the one hand, he is not of humble origins, his net worth is approximately 50 million US dollars, he owns real estate and agricultural land; and is a shareholder in various private enterprises. On the other hand, he is a Pashtun raised in the centre of the Punjab province and the first Pashtun to occupy the highest positions of power. He started his career as a sportsman, not a military man, businessman or government official. His party, unlike other Pakistani political parties, is not dynastic and unites like-minded people, not people from the same ethnic group. Political opponents of Imran Khan argue that only the strong support of the Pakistani military secured his success in the 2018 elections. They state that the army is the real ruling power in the country during the PTI leader's term as Prime Minister.

The author draws attention to the fact that the civilian politicians who ruled in Pakistan, i.e. the Bhutto family, the Sharif family, etc., discredited themselves as corrupt officials and neglected the duty to develop the national economy and improve the living standards and well-being of the population. In contrast, the Pakistani army during the years since independence has always played an important part in shaping the State policy. In Pakistan, the army is greatly respected and is a source of national pride. Nevertheless, the highest military officials are well aware that today an undisguised military leadership of the

country will only lead to the international isolation of Pakistan. Thus, a new political figure is required: an incorrupt civilian politician, on the one hand, and one who suits the army, on the other hand. Imran Khan has shown his loyalty to the military in the past, owing in part to his Pashtun ancestry (the number of Pashtuns in the army is large and growing). Last but not least, Imran Khan has been popular with young people ever since he was the captain of the country's national cricket team, and managed to build on this popularity in the early years of his political career.

VLADIMIR KIRICHENKO. SULTAN QABOOS AND THE MODERNIZATION OF OMAN // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World"*.

Keywords: Oman, Sultan Qaboos, foreign policy, domestic policy.

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Citation: Kirichenko V. Sultan Qaboos and the Modernization of Oman // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, № 2 (312), P. 88–98.
DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.02.04

Abstract. The article is devoted to the activities of the Sultan Qaboos (1970–2020). The Sultan of Oman made a unique contribution to the development of this country. In addition, the neutrality in foreign policy, which Oman adhered to during his reign, helped to establish relations with neighboring countries and become a mediator in conflict situations.

Sultan Qaboos bin Said was born on November 18, 1940 in the Dhofar governorate of the Sultanate of Oman. Sultan Qaboos