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Maria Vidiiasova,

DSc(History), Professor,
Moscow State University

Tamara Gasanbekova,

PhD(History), Associate Professor,
Moscow State Linguistic University

The authors of the articles note that the current situation in Egypt is characterized by the predominance of pro-regime political parties in the Parliament and relative internal stability. In March 2018, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was re-elected for a second term, receiving 97.8 percent of the vote; there was only one alternative candidate. After the re-election of el-Sisi, his supporters raised the issue of extending the presidential term from four to six years. The majority of the members of the House of Representatives (the former People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt) welcomed the idea, citing the example of China. However, el-Sisi himself claimed he had no interest in following this example and repeating the bitter experience of Mubarak.

El-Sisi had an absolute majority in the Parliament, although his authority was undermined by the increase in consumer prices and, in particular, state tariffs for transportation, which also had an impact on fuel prices. Previously, the Government raised

electricity and water tariffs, as well as ticket prices for public transport.

The authors note that el-Sisi tried to win over feminists by allowing men and women to pray together in Egyptian mosques. Traditionally, there are separate areas in mosques for men and women. Moreover, a spokesman for the Ministry of Awqaf of Egypt (the Ministry of Endowments) announced that more than 140 women had received licenses to preach and are tasked with religious educational work among women and girls.

The authors of the article believe that the aftermath of the July 2013 military coup served as a barometer of public attitudes in the country. Egypt has been fighting against armed Islamists for years, but since the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 they have strengthened, creating a network of gangs operating against the army and police in the north of the Sinai Peninsula.

Having analyzed the foreign policy of Egypt, the authors note the importance of the country's relations with Libya. As of 2010, 1-1.5 million Egyptians worked in Libya, most of them illegally. During the civil war in the country, hundreds of thousands of them fled and by middle of 2017 there were only 70 thousand citizens of Egypt. At the beginning of 2018 their number reached 121 thousand, but the return to the pre-war figures is unlikely.

The authors point to the fact that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has allied himself with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Earlier, the UAE and Egypt violated the UN embargo on the supply of arms to Libya, thereby making Haftar's military success in 2016 possible. The UAE supplies the LNA with aircraft and military vehicles. In January-April 2017 many dual-use Toyota vehicles were shipped to the LNA via Port Said.

According to the authors, there are three problems that cloud relations between Egypt and Sudan: the issue of using the waters of the Nile, the territorial dispute over the Halaib Triangle,

and the infiltration of terrorists from the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood into Egypt. The question of the use of the waters of the Nile was first raised by President Mohammed Morsi in June 2013. In his speech at the National Conference, the President declared the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on one of the tributaries of the Blue Nile illegal. Sudan, on the other hand, supported Ethiopia, since the construction of the dam and the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed will automatically increase the share of Sudan's use of the waters of the Nile. At the end of December 2017, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Sameh Shoukry went to Addis Ababa for talks after months of tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa. He voiced concerns about the possible shortage of water for Egyptians and proposed the World Bank as a neutral interlocutor in the talks to resolve the crisis. In 2018, a tripartite meeting at the level of foreign ministers and ministers of irrigation was held. It was decided to create a scientific committee made up of politically independent representatives from the universities of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, tasked to assess the environmental impact of the construction of a high dam on the Blue Nile.

The authors give an overview of the territorial dispute over the Halaib Triangle. Having created a condominium over Sudan in 1899, the United Kingdom set the border strictly at the 22nd parallel. However, in 1902 they transferred the seaside "triangle" covering more than 20,000 square kilometres, located north of the 22nd parallel, under the jurisdiction of the administration of the condominium. In 1995, Hosni Mubarak sent troops to the Halaib Triangle after accusing Sudan of the assassination attempt on his life in Addis Ababa. From an economic perspective, Egypt has a certain interest in mineral deposits and probable oil fields on the territory of the notorious "triangle". In December 2017, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, sent a petition to the UN protesting against Egypt's occupation of the Halaib Triangle. This immediately caused tension between the two countries in early January 2018 both Sudan and Egypt recalled their ambassadors

for consultation. In early April, the three parties to the conflict (mediated by the US) reached an agreement in Khartoum. The agreement committed Ethiopia to launch only 2 of the 16 turbines of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (formerly known as the Millennium Dam) in the near future, and Egypt to raise the water level of the artificial Lake Nasser above the Aswan Dam in order to protect farmlands from drought during low-water years. However, the authors note the fragility of this arrangement. Egypt and Sudan have different foreign policy directions: Egypt allies itself to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Sudan is getting closer to Qatar and Turkey.

In December 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Sudan, making Egypt and Turkey's relations with Sudan extremely complicated. First, Erdoğan and Omar al-Bashir signed a number of agreements on the development of economic ties between the two countries. Second, Turkey received the right to improve the infrastructure on Suakin Island in the Red Sea. Officially, Turkey is going to set up a tourist business, but there is also a possibility of creating a Turkish naval base on Suakin. These developments stirred up Egyptian public opinion.

President el-Sisi remains suspicious of Turkey after Erdoğan condemned the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état (i.e. the overthrow of Muhammad Morsi) and sheltered many members of the Muslim Brotherhood who fled from Egypt at that time. They regularly criticize the current political regime in Egypt through the media they founded in Turkey. The authors also discuss Cairo's reasonable suspicion that Khartoum turns a blind eye to the movement of terrorists through Sudan both into Egypt and Libya. In turn, Khartoum insists that anti-government elements are infiltrating into the rebellious region of Darfur through Egypt.

The authors examine the relations between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Egypt sealed makeshift underground tunnels connecting the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip so that no one could bypass the Rafah Border Crossing, which is the sole crossing point on the Gaza-Egypt border. From

time to time the authorities of Egypt close the border crossing, reopening it for only one hour or one day, as it was done on February 22–23, 2018. On May 14, 2018, Donald Trump moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, triggering violent unrest in the Gaza Strip. In this connection, on June 2-3 the Israeli Air Force bombed the northern part of the Strip, killing dozens of people. Egypt faced a delicate situation, since President el-Sisi was keeping ex-President Morsi in prison under threat of death penalty, in particular, for his connections with Hamas. On March 30, 2018, the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, declared the Great March of Return. However, on May 13 Haniyeh arrived in Cairo, where he was persuaded to soften his position towards Israel, and the next day he called for a new Intifada. After only one day of relative calm the Gaza-Israel border became a front line with all types of conventional weapons used.

The authors give a thorough analysis of economic issues. Relatively recently, Egypt was predicted to become an importer of hydrocarbons in the near future. The discovery of new large gas fields on its territory has improved the situation. In 2017, following the development of the Zohr field, Egypt has significantly reduced the purchases of liquefied gas. The start of the production at the Atoll field was scheduled for the first half of 2018.

In Helwan Egypt has built the largest metallurgical complex in the Arab world. As of 2015, it produced 5.506 million tons of steel, compared to 803.825 million in China and 105.134 million in Japan. However, it should be taken into account that the metallurgical plants in Helwan are part of the military-industrial complex, as they produce both rolled ferrous metals and steel, and weapons. Not only small arms and light weapons. Under the 1992 agreement between the US and Egypt, M1A1 Abrams tanks are assembled from kits of parts supplied by the US. In the fourth quarter of 2019, the Helwan plant was set to start assembling T-90 tanks from kits of parts supplied by Uralvagonzavod. Thanks to shipments of frigates, corvettes and submarines by the USA, Germany and France, Egypt strengthens

its navy. The Egyptian Air Force is ranked 9th in the world ahead of the German Air Force.

Historically, the US and France are the main suppliers of military aircraft to Egypt. Russia also continued to export military aircraft to Egypt after the collapse of the USSR; deliveries of the MiG-29M have already begun. Under the bilateral contract, approximately 50 fighters of this type are expected to be shipped. Overall, arms imports in Egypt increased by 215 percent in 2013–2017, compared to the previous five-year period. According to this indicator, Egypt is the second-largest arms importer in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia (225 percent).

The authors note that relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia are particularly important. According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Egypt, in 2018 Saudi investments in Egypt amounted to 6.1 billion USD, which is 11 percent of total foreign investments and approximately 27 percent of investments from Arab states. On March 6, 2018 in Ismailia, President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Crown Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia discussed a number of projects related to the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Corridor Area Project will allegedly turn Egypt into a global trade and transport hub that is expected to attract large investments to the region. This was seen as a compensation for the transfer of the uninhabited Tiran and Sanafir islands in the Red Sea from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. In April 2016, the transfer caused a storm of resentment against President el-Sisi from the Egyptian opposition, since it virtually meant a delimitation of the disputed maritime border, which came under the jurisdiction of Riyadh.

The authors conclude that Egypt is currently in the midst of the post-Arab Spring political changes. There was no violent civil war that still goes on in Syria, Libya and Yemen. However, Egypt teeters on the brink of such a war due to internal and external reasons. In the face of such a crisis, Egypt arms itself heavily, despite serious economic difficulties.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich