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ZAID ABDULAGATOV. EXTREMES OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN (CONTINUED IN №1, 2022) // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: extremity of consciousness, Islamic educational institutions, Daghestan, Russia, fundamentalism, extremism, secondary school.

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Abstract. The author, basing on sociological surveys of different years, showed the extremes of the religious consciousness of Moslems who studied in Islamic educational institutions of the Republic of Daghestan. The statistics of Islamic education in the republic are shown. The factors that strengthen the role of religious worldview in the socialization of Daghestan youth are revealed. The issues discussed are considered from the standpoint of the interests of the secular state in solving the problems of social stability, the formation of a secular legal culture, countering religious extremism and terrorism.

Introduction

The issues of extremism and terrorism still remain problematic for the Russian state. In the North Caucasus region, these negative phenomena are predominantly religious, more precisely, Islamic in nature. In 2020, more than 20 participants of terrorist cells were neutralized on the territory of the North Caucasus Federal District, more than 70 of their accomplices were detained, as well as 480 citizens who were wanted. More than 100 objects of the bandit underground infrastructure were discovered and destroyed.¹

A very important statistic of extremism, which is little talked about, takes place in connection with the financing of extremist activities. The significance of such statistics is due to the emphasis on the factor of support for extremism and terrorism by part of the Moslem population. The accomplices of extremists invest money in this business, and not small money, which refutes, at least partially, the widespread explanation of extremism as ordinary banditry, the desire to earn money, poverty of the population. The financing of religious extremism is an activity aimed at achieving Islamic goals. Based on Rosfinmonitoring data, Rossiyskaya Gazeta provides a list of organizations and individuals in respect of which there is information about their involvement in extremist activities or terrorism by laundering proceeds from crime and financing

terrorism. Since the end of 2013, the author has analyzed a number of Lists of this kind.² From the entire list, five subjects of the Russian Federation, the most significant in terms of Islamic activity, were analyzed: Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan. A significant excess of the number of those included in the List from Daghestan in 2013–2016 is striking – 32.6 per cent, almost a third of the Russian list.

The statistics of extremism after 2016 do not give grounds to believe that the extremist activity of Daghestanis has declined. Rather, it has changed the forms of its manifestation. Thus, according to Rosfinmonitoring, Daghestanis in one of the lists of those involved in extremist activities and terrorism, published in January 2017, turned out to be 25.3 per cent,³ at the end of 2018 – 24.1 per cent.⁴ In the list published in early 2019, there were 38.3 per cent⁵ of them. These are mostly people under 30 years of age, i.e. young people.

The total number of Daghestanis included in the List in the analyzed lists of 2013–2016 turned out to be almost twice as many as in the other republics combined (CR, IR, CBD, RT). In percentage terms, this ratio is 32.6 per cent: 16.6 per cent. In Tatarstan, separately, this indicator turned out to be equal to 1.1 per cent.

The recent decline in terrorism indicators should not be misleading. It is possible to talk about a decrease in the indicators of extremism and terrorism only in relative assessments of the development of events. The Syrian conflict, linked to the activities of ISIS,⁶ has become an outlet for the North Caucasus suffering from violence caused by extremists and terrorists. According to the head of the FSB A. Bortnikov, in Syria, only according to confirmed data, more than 4 thousand Daghestanis fought on the side of the Islamic State and other detachments.⁷ Ethnologist A. Yarlykapov believes that there were at least 5 thousand of them.⁸ This is the “tip of the iceberg” in terms of the radical Salafist consciousness of Daghestan Islam.

Modern extremism and terrorism have begun to work more in the information field. Young people, especially of school age, become the object of their interests.

The author proceeds from the fact that it is wrong to link the origins of Islamic extremism in the North Caucasus, in particular in Daghestan, exclusively with external influence, unambiguously identifying the external religious factor with manifestations of radical Salafism. Firstly, Salafist ideas, leaders-carriers of these ideas, their followers have taken place in the history of Daghestan since the XVIII century.⁹ Secondly, Islamic extremism and terrorism can also take place in the so-called traditional, not identifying itself with radical Salafism, or even just with extremism, Islam, Not every Salafism leads to extremism, not every traditionalism is moderation in religious consciousness and behavior.

A well-known leader of radical religious and political Islam, Bagautdin Magomed, on May 27, 1997, in response to a question about the recognition of the madhhabs, said: "We recognize the founding imams of the madhhabs as great scientists." When asked about his belonging to one of the madhhabs,¹⁰ he replied: "Since I grew up in Shafi'i madhhab, I belong to Shafi'i, but we try not to violate other madhhabs."¹⁰ The researchers noticed that in the military events in Chechnya in the 90s of the last century, "Wahhabis" and "traditional" Sufis turned out to be shoulder to shoulder.¹¹ In one's time, the Mufti of the CR, A.D. Shamaev, the Minister of the Interior of the RD, A. Magomedtagirov, and not only them, stated that recruitment to the "Wahhabis" takes place mainly in Tariqa, Sufi mosques. This work is conducted predominantly with young people.

The main question underlying Islamic extremism is to what extent a Moslem is able to peacefully adapt to the existing conditions of life, confessional and secular.

The author proceeds from the fact that Islam has played and plays a positive role in regulating the morality of a Moslem, the public life of Daghestanis, and their social behavior. At the

same time, there is no reason to consider objective the assessment of some Moslems, especially Islamic leaders and representatives of power structures, that “there is no extremism in Islam,” or that it takes place exclusively in individual Islamic movements. Upbringing and education in Islamic educational institutions (IEI), as well as Islamic consciousness in general, would be more consistent with objective phenomena in Islam, the interests of Islam itself, society and the state, if it were based on the following principles:

a) Islam, like all world religions, involves goodness, tolerance, harmony.

b) As in other complex phenomena of the human spirit, in Islam there were, there are at present and are possible in the future such components of it that harmed both Islam itself and society and the state. They are connected both with complex objective historical processes in which the Islamic consciousness turned out to be, and subjective.

The object of this study were students and scholars of Islamic educational institutions of Daghestan. The purpose of the study was to identify the extremes of the Islamic consciousness of students in Islamic Educational Institutions of the Republic. The extremes of Islamic consciousness were understood as its extremes, manifested within the framework of the law, which could have their undesirable, from the point of view of the interests of the state and society, development in the direction of the practice of violent extremism and terrorism.

Contexts of the formation of the Islamic educational process in Daghestan

The processes of formation of the religious educational system in post-Soviet Russia had their own contexts of ideological, political, legal and other nature. The state ideology regarding religion has changed, a number of laws have been adopted defining the place of religion, religious education and

upbringing in society. Social institutions have emerged that actively implement religious interest in the educational system of the state. In the North Caucasian republics with Moslem population, religious education and upbringing, along with secular education, have become the two main trajectories of socialization of young people.

1. The Law of the Russian Federation "Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" eliminated the article on the separation of schools from churches (religious organizations) in the Law of the USSR of October 1, 1990 No. 1689-I "Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations".¹² The Law of the Russian Federation "Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" refers to the possibility of religious organizations "at the request of parents or persons replacing them, with the consent of children," the administration of secular educational institutions, local governments, to provide "a religious organization with the opportunity to teach children religion outside the educational program."¹³ In 2003 by the order of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation "Provision by state and municipal educational institutions of religious organizations with the opportunity to teach children religion outside the framework of educational programs", religious organizations received access to the school.¹⁴

2. In Russia, the balance in the promotion of ideas of religious and secular worldviews in society has been disrupted. The ideology of "United Russia" is the ideology of "Russian conservatism", as the party stated at its 11th congress, held on November 21, 2009.¹⁵ Russian conservatism, like conservatism in general, places a strong emphasis on the revival of religious traditions. And this is often done contrary to the secular interests of society. Thus, at the initiative of religious leaders, the activities of such a secular and educational organization as the society "Knowledge" were closed, which in the new conditions could continue to work on popularization and dissemination of scientific knowledge. The reason is plausible: the popularization

of modern natural science knowledge comes into conflict with traditional religions, for example, on the theory of evolution, or the history of the origin of the Earth. The activities of the society "Knowledge" would contribute to strengthening the secular foundations of public life. The authorities did not listen to the opinion of scientists and intellectuals on the necessity of restoration "Knowledge" society. This gave an advantage to religious educational institutions in the formation of a religious worldview among young people.

3. The state policy of modern Russia in the field of education from the very beginning said that the school is obliged to provide only "educational services". Although in the latest editions of the law the problem of education is raised, the definition of this concept is given,¹⁶ the question of its content in the practice of school education remains problematic and debatable. Of the 15 chapters and 111 articles of the law, there is not one where the issues of education would be considered separately, specifically. The school is not legally responsible for the upbringing of children: "Taking care of children and their upbringing is an equal right and duty of parents."¹⁷ The recognition of ideological diversity (Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), the impossibility of state ideology in the field of education (Article 13, paragraph 2), the exclusivity of the rights of parents in the upbringing of children (Article 38, paragraph 2) pose difficult problems for secondary schools. Of course, the teachers are not completely removed from the issues of educational work with children. But they are detached from the main issues of education related to the choice between secular and religious worldviews. In fact, more than 40 thousand teachers of the Republic of Daghestan, who have almost daily contact with more than 400 thousand students of secondary schools, cannot carry out educational work in this ideological sense. According to the survey, 31.0 per cent of teachers consider educational work at school to be useless due to external factors such as the mosque, Islamic education and

upbringing in mosque schools, at home, systematic educational work of religious leaders in secondary schools, Islamic upbringing in the family, etc. Another 20.3 per cent of respondents indicate that the school does not have clear guidelines for educational work. "The school, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is not obliged to upbringing" – 14.2 per cent, "The school does not know how to bring various ideological attitudes – religious, secular – to uniform, generally accepted norms" – 6.3 per cent." The current situation creates favorable conditions for strengthening the role of religious education and upbringing. In a number of settlements of the RD, in particular in Gimry, Balakhani, Gubden, Gurbuki, facts were revealed when children stop attending secondary schools, but necessarily receive religious education.¹⁸

This is one of the main reasons for the lack of a proper role of secondary schools in the prevention of extremism and terrorism. It is also a favorable context for strengthening religious socialization in society.

4. To start with, the religious leaders of Russia initiated optional lessons on teaching "religious cultures" in secular schools. Later, in 2012, the school introduced compulsory lessons on the program "Fundamentals of religious cultures and secular ethics".

5. The presence of religion in the secular educational system has not been limited by school education. On September 1, 2014, the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation on the approval of the federal state educational standard of higher education for the training of highly qualified personnel (postgraduate studies) in the direction of "theology" came into force in Russia. The intellectual society of Russia, represented by ten academicians, including Nobel Prize laureates V.L. Ginzburg and Zh.I. Alferov, opposed the inclusion of the specialty "theology" in the list of scientific specialties of the Higher Attestation Commission (HAC). The letter raised the issue of the impossibility of introducing the compulsory subject

“Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” in Russian schools, since it is not a culturological subject.¹⁹ Naturally, the same applies to the “Fundamentals of Islamic Culture”.

6. The diversity of Islamic socialization trajectories in the regions forms intra-confessional conflicts. They become problematic both for the confessions themselves and for the secular state, which has been and is taking place in the republics of Daghestan, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia since the second half of the 80s of the last century due to conflicts between representatives of Sufism and “Wahhabism”.

In this situation, the state position in solving the problem of Islamic socialization was expressed in the choice of “traditional” for the region “true” Islam. Such trend in the Republic of Daghestan among the dominant Sunni trends was Sufism (an ascetic-mystical trend in Islam - tasavvuf). As a result, the official system of Islamic education in the republic turned out to be subordinate to the “Sufi” Muftiate of the RD. This is despite the fact that the Salafi opposition to Sufism in the republic has repeatedly and acutely raised the issue of their rights to their independent republican organization, to Salafi-oriented educational institutions. In particular, the Association of Moslem Theologians of Daghestan “Haya” (AMTD “Haya”) in its address to the President of the Republic of Daghestan²⁰ expressed its intentions to achieve the right to organize its own system of Islamic education in the Republic. These appeals were unsuccessful. This circumstance deprived Salafi-minded Moslems of the RD of receiving the desired education. Nevertheless, this kind of education is carried out at home in some schools attached to mosques. It is uncontrolled by the state.

7. The changed situation in the Islamic priorities of the state should, in accordance with political attitudes, lead to a coordinated, peaceful coexistence of religious and secular educational systems in a secular state. Nevertheless, this coexistence is not an identity, but a dialectical unity that presupposes the existence of opposites. According to the

philosophical principles of dialectics, one of the opposites in the unity of opposites is decisive, dominant. There is no dualism of essence. The opposites of the secular and religious are given by some experts, not without reason, a large-scale domestic, and even global, intercivilizational character. Thus, Metropolitan Kirill, now Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, argues that the main conflict of Russian modernity, especially in the North Caucasus is a conflict between secular and religious. In his opinion, there is a conflict process going on, the essence of which is "a global clash between two models of civilization – secular and religious... The shadow of this conflict has recently fallen on the North Caucasus..."²¹ Metropolitan Kirill sees the resolution of the conflict in the North Caucasus in the fact that the peoples professing Islam could obey the norms of Sharia, and not the all-Russian laws. This confessional point of view finds wider expression in the statement about the unjustified monopoly of secular humanism and liberalism on the philosophical justification of the most significant public decisions.

Metropolitan Kirill's point of view was adopted by the interreligious forum in November 2000 in Moscow, where the leaders of the main Russian confessions gathered at the same table. In fact, a program document was adopted, where the spiritual leaders of Russia affirm the need for the exclusivity of the priorities of religious values in public life and the state legal space. Naturally, these general attitudes are transferred to the Russian educational system. The point of view common to the confessional circles of Russia is that in Russia it is necessary to fight against the "monopoly of atheistic views in the public education system."²² At the same time, the natural-scientific, atheistic, and secular are identified.

It must be admitted that religious leaders have fairly objectively assessed both the current political situation and their interests and opportunities in the educational system of Russia.

Excerpts on the history of Islamic education in Daghestan: the reasons for the priority of Islamic values

The first madrasah in Daghestan appeared at the end of the 11th century in the village of Tsakhur. Prof. G.SH. Kaimarazov²³ writes about this with reference to A.N. Genko. At the same time, A.N. Genko refers to the author of the 13th century Zakaria al-Qazvini. The famous orientalist A.R. Shikhsaidov also indicated the appearance of scribes in Tsakhur as the most important event in the spread of Islam in Daghestan, And in his opinion, the first madrasah in Tsakhur appeared in the 9th century.²⁴ The almost millennial development of Islamic education in Daghestan confirms the idea that for Daghestanis, Islamic culture is a vital component of their ethnic cultures. The level of Daghestanis' involvement in Islamic culture through the educational system can be understood according to I.Y. Krachkovsky's assessment: "Daghestanis, even outside their homeland, wherever the fate threw them, turned out to be universally recognized authorities for representatives of the entire Moslem world as a whole."²⁵

According to historians, in the 19th century there were many people in Daghestan who studied Islam in maktabas, madrasahs, individually. P.K. Uslar's quote is very convincing in this sense: "If the people's education is judged by the proportionality of the number of schools with the mass of the population, the Daghestani highlanders in this respect outstripped even many enlightened European nations. The teaching is available to every mountain boy. In every village there will be one or two people who teach children to read and write for a piece of bread; at each mosque there are schools where those who want to study can continue their studies. ...they study from the age of 8 to the age of 30 or more, the transition from one school to another, more famous for the scholarship of the teacher."²⁶ At the next stage, a madrasah graduate could continue

his studies with a Moslem scholar – alim. In a sense, for a Daghestani, it was the highest Moslem education of the time.

Another, perhaps the most common form of Islamic education is homeschooling, the main purpose of which was to teach children to read the Quran.²⁷ It can be said that it is thanks to this form of education in the conditions of the rigid atheistic ideology of the Soviet period of Russian history that not only Islamic educational traditions, but also the traditions of the Islamic faith have been preserved. Teaching Islam at home could not be controlled by the state to the extent that it was organized in the form of maktabas, madrasahs. Some small groups of Daghestani Moslems were able to preserve rich libraries of Islamic literature, practicing both self-education and learning from compatriots more advanced in Islamic education. The manuscript fund of the Department of Oriental Studies of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the DFRC currently counts about 6,000 Arab and Turkic manuscripts of Islamic content. Arabic-language literature of the past centuries is still widely distributed in the personal libraries of Daghestanis.

These circumstances preserved Islamic thought and subsequently made it possible to quickly restore the system of Islamic education in post-Soviet Daghestan.

The researchers tried to find out the reasons for such a high interest of Daghestanis in the Arabic language, in Arabic culture. Academician G.G. Gamzatov sees this interest in the fact that the process of mastering Arabic is a reflection of the spiritual need of the mountain population for knowledge and familiarization with the achievements of world civilization. Indeed, Arabic was, along with Iranian and Turkish, and even surpassing them, one of the most attractive, elegant languages that paved the way to the values of a developed civilization. It is well known that in the Middle Ages the Arab East was famous for its achievements in various fields of science: philosophy, astronomy, logic, mathematics, geography, medicine, chemistry, etc.

Director of the Institute of Language and Literature of the DFRC at the Russian Academy of Sciences A.T. Akamov expressed a different point of view: "The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Daghestan probably contributed to the widespread spread of the Arabic language as a means of communication accessible to a significant part of the population, in particular the clergy."²⁸ Knowledge of the Arabic language became an obligatory element of every educated Moslem.

Indeed, the Arabic language was a kind of guide of not only religious ideas to Daghestan. Without replacing local languages in everyday life, it has at the same time become the main language of literature, science, education, office work, assembly materials, private and official correspondence. It was also a means of interethnic communication for more than 30 indigenous nationalities living in this territory. All this largely determined the high role of Moslem educational networks in the life of Daghestan society.

Nevertheless, such an answer to the question of the reasons for the development of Moslem education in pre-revolutionary Daghestan remains incomplete. In modern Daghestan, the Russian language has a firm position. It is not only the language of interethnic communication, but also has opened wide opportunities for Daghestanis to access world science and culture. At the same time, a huge craving for Islamic education, for Islamic culture, far surpassing other subjects of the Russian Federation, persists in Daghestan.

The reasons for the interest of the population of Daghestan in Islamic education are mainly of a religiously sacred, religious, ideological nature. The main reason for the interest in Islamic education, according to a survey among Daghestanis studying in foreign Islamic educational institutions, is the possibility of "rapid and high-quality mastering of the Arabic language."²⁹ Almost 60 per cent of respondents say this. It is fair to assume that this interest is not related to the need to satisfy secular cultural values. This assumption is confirmed in the results of a

survey conducted by the author in 2019.³⁰ As it turned out, the relative majority of students in grades 10–11 of comprehensive schools in the Republic of Daghestan are inclined to join the eastern (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, etc.) culture – 39.6 per cent. The western culture (USA, France, Italy, etc.) is of interest only for 5.4 per cent. Both west and east – 27.5 per cent. Similar results were obtained in the course of opinion polls among schoolchildren, students of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions of the RD in 2018 by the senior researcher of the Department of Sociology of the Institute of IAE DSC RAS M.A. Rasulov.³¹

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2021.04.002. ELENA DMITRIEVA. GEOSTRATEGY OF THE CASPIAN STATES // *Condensed abstract was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Caspian region, resources, security, challenges, legal status of the Caspian Sea, national interests, geopolitical interests.

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The author of the article (1) believes that the situation prevailing today in the Caspian region is complex and requires sustained attention from the Russian authorities. Geopolitical rivalry has been spurred by entirely diverging interests of countries of the Caspian Sea region, growing importance of energy resources, strengthening of the political influence of the

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.