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NIKITA KUKLIN. ISLAMIC VECTOR IN INDONESIA'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE // *Article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Indonesia; Pancha Sila; Sukarno; Islam Nusantara; diplomacy.

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Article one*

Abstract. Indonesian foreign policy in the Islamic direction is often viewed from the standpoint of the religiosity of the elites and their solidarity with the "brothers in faith", however, the history of the development of Indonesian statehood and the peculiarities of Indonesian Islam show that the Islamic vector has long been identified by the elites with the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist discourse and only at the present stage began to acquire the features of the discourse of political Islam.

Indonesia today is the largest Moslem state by population (about 225 million people), but does not officially position itself as a Moslem state, in accordance with the model of religious balance enshrined in Pancha Sila, the official ideology and philosophy of the country, developed by the first president of the country, Sukarno (1945–1968). Pancha Sila proclaims the principles of social justice and collective community,¹ traditional for the peoples of Indonesia. Even to this day, Pancha Sila acts as a unifying instrument, consolidating territorial integrity, linguistic and national Indonesian identity and the rule of religious balance. All these components are extremely important for the unique Indonesian model of statehood.² Sukarno, and then the subsequent presidents, made a significant contribution to the unification of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society.

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A well-thought-out policy in this direction has led to the formation of a special Indonesian mentality of tolerance, where interfaith friendship is valued above all, and statements about the superiority of a particular religion are condemned and regarded as radicalism and an encroachment on the foundations of statehood. In addition to 87.2 per cent of Sunni Moslems, 6.9 per cent of Protestants, 2.9 per cent of Catholics, 1.7 per cent of Hindus, 0.7 per cent of Buddhists and 0.05 per cent of Confucians live in the country, not counting atheists and representatives of any other faiths.³ Islam is mostly spread on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Lombok, Sumba and Molucca. On islands such as Bali or Papua, Hinduism and Christianity are widespread, respectively.⁴

The Moslem community of Indonesia is heterogeneous, as it has its own peculiarities of internal development. In this regard, it is important to pay attention to the specifics of Indonesian Islam. Its main feature concerns the division of Indonesian Islam into traditionalist (Adat) and modernist (Sharia). Speaking about traditionalists we mean supporters of the Adat (syncretic version of Islam under the influence of Javanese elements of ethnic culture, pre-Islamic Pagan and Hindu beliefs) "Nusantara Islam", and modernists, on the contrary, are zealots of the Sharia way of life, rejection of Javanese elements of culture and spiritual life of the pre-Islamic period.⁵ At the same time, the followers of these movements equally follow the Shafi'i madhhab. Despite the dominance of Javanese traditionalists in politics, modernist Moslems, as well as Christians and Hindus, are also widely represented in politics.⁶

The main currents of Islam in the country are represented by the world's largest (each counts 30 million members) Moslem organizations "Nahdatul Ulama" (for traditionalists) and "Muhammadiyah" (for modernists), which are very influential and form, along with state institutions, a certain system of social governance. For example, Nahdatul Ulama carries out educational activities through a network of more than 6830 Islamic boarding

schools (pesantren) throughout the country. The organization also owns 44 universities and many research centers in the fields of economics, Islamic finance, agriculture, social policy and family planning.⁷ The organization finances Moslem communities in the United States, Taiwan and Europe, while helping refugees from the Middle East. No fewer institutions belong to Muhammadiyah.

Since the proclamation of the country's independence in 1945, Moslem organizations and parties have been active in the political field and have contributed to the development of the Moslem community as one of the political forces. At different times, they took opposite positions in relation to the state system, from the adoption of a model of social and religious balance to the requirements of Islamization of domestic and foreign policy.⁸ However, the first presidents Sukarno, and then Suharto (1968-1998), initially took a cautious position on this issue and for a long time did not allow Indonesian diplomacy to use Islam as a basis for foreign policy. The growing influence of Islamic parties and organizations after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the politicization of the Islamic issue in the world after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA again actualized the so called Islamic vector in Indonesia's foreign policy, in which Indonesia secretly views itself as a "leader of non-Arab Moslems" and gradually introduces Islamic discourse into foreign policy.

On the other hand, the high degree of collectivism in Indonesian society and broad public attention to political issues makes it dangerous to "flirt" with political Islam and external information guides, which would give ground for strengthening the political platform of conservative parties and movements seeking to Islamize the country and abolish the ideology of Pancha Sila.⁹ The complexity of this political model, as well as its strong connection with the religious sphere, can often mislead a researcher who is not familiar with country specifics in regard of the motives and foundations of Indonesian diplomacy in the Islamic direction. Hence, it seems logical to consider the role of Islam in foreign policy, depending on external and internal

challenges at various stages of the formation of modern Indonesian statehood.

Features of the implementation of the Islamic vector under President Sukarno (1945–1968)

President Sukarno's foresight was determined not only by his inner view of the structure of Indonesian society and the balance of socio-political forces. The key foreign policy idea of Sukarno was the policy of neutrality as an attempt to protect the young states of the Southeast Asian region from the processes of the Cold War and involvement of Indonesia in the global confrontation within one camp or another. And immediately after the declaration of independence, Indonesia outlined its principled positions in foreign policy. The existence of its own model of state construction allowed Sukarno to protect the country and the region to some extent from the export of ideologies from the outside, rather strengthening the development of nationalist tendencies of the countries of the region, beneficial for nation-building, the prosperity of the elites and the contentment of the people with a high level of stability.¹⁰

In 1948, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, M. Hatta (1948–1950), delivered a speech entitled "Maneuvering between two stones", which outlined Indonesia's position in the Cold War. Thus, M. Hatta put forward the thesis that, in conducting its foreign policy, Indonesia should be guided only by its own interests, and not by the interests of superpowers.

The doctrine proposed by Hatta was called the "Doctrine of Active Independence" and still serves as the basis of Indonesian foreign policy. By "independence" it was meant that Indonesia intends to independently determine its own position in relation to world problems without pressure and influence from outside, while "activity" assumed Indonesia's participation in constructive efforts that will help build and maintain peaceful relations with all states.¹¹ Indonesia played a truly outstanding

role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, adopting in 1955 The Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and African States, which allowed Sukarno to isolate the region from the processes of the Cold War and lay the foundation for Indonesia's regional leadership and its active and independent foreign policy.

Such a significant position of Indonesia put Sukarno on a par with other leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah. Sukarno, in turn, relied on the image of a revolutionary and liberator both inside the country and in foreign affairs. He saw the struggle against world imperialism and colonialism through the transfer of Indonesia's experience to other liberated countries as an important challenge for himself. In the future, Sukarno's anti-colonial rhetoric was developed within the framework of the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Sukarno has expressed support for the Arab people, insisting on the obvious position of the newly formed Israel as a conductor of the neocolonial interests of the United States.

Sukarno spoke about the unity of Moslems and solidarity, but his initial motivation was the anti-imperialist nature of Indonesia's actions, which is confirmed by Sukarno's similar refusal to support Taiwan's independence in favor of the newly formed PRC, where there was no question of religious solidarity at all.

Such a need for statements of religious solidarity was required by Sukarno for the internal agenda as a means to attract the attention of the above-mentioned Moslem organizations, since even in the period preceding official independence, Indonesians were known in the Middle East through interaction with such centers of Islam as the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as through the participation of many Indonesians in the study programs of Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

Indonesians living in Arab countries also played their role during the War of Independence, persuading the League of Arab States (LAS) to come out in support of Indonesia's independence

at the UN, based on the unity of religion and a sense of brotherhood of the Arab peoples and the people of Indonesia. In 1946, the Egyptian diplomat and the first Secretary General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha (1945-1952), supported the release of an official statement in support of Indonesia, and in 1947, with his own submission, the Consul General of Egypt in Bombay, Muhammad Abdul Munim, visited the rebellious capital of the Indonesian rebels in the city of Yogyakarta.¹²

However, the internal difficult political situation and Sukarno's fears of strengthening the Islamic bloc did not allow the president to openly use Islamic rhetoric, and at the same time, in a dialogue with the Arab League, Sukarno did not abandon Moslem solidarity.

Later, even before Sukarno lost power as a result of the military suppression of the pro-communist coup of September 30, 1965, the president continued to follow his anti-colonial rhetoric in the Israeli direction, refraining from pro-Islamic positions in his statements. It also follows from this that Sukarno linked the religious theme with domestic politics. The subsequent formation of Malaysia and the declaration of it the country of Islamic basis as the dominant of its development convinced Sukarno to focus even more on the development of unifying concepts, such as: NASAKOM (an acronym based on the Indonesian words NASionalisme (Nationalism), Agama (Religion) and KOMunisme (Communism)), or NEKOLIM (neocolonialism, colonialism and imperialism). There developed a public demand for practical actions to overcome the economic crisis and the consequences of the policy of abstract acronyms of Sukarno, which allowed the military in the person of General Suharto to seize power and remove Sukarno.

The Islamic Trend in President Suharto's Foreign Policy (1968-1998)

During the era of Suharto's New Order regime (1968-1998), Indonesia continued the same policy in regard of the Middle East,

while the United States, due to Suharto's reorientation towards economic relations with the Western Bloc, was no longer considered a potential enemy, but the need to maintain neutrality allowed Suharto to maneuver in issues related to Islam and the Arab world as a whole. Despite the support of religious organizations for the subsequent persecution of communists, Suharto also limited these forces, reducing the number of Islamic parties (as well as parties of other ideologies), identifying as the main force for the development of the state – the military and officials within the framework of the Pancha Sila.

At the same time, Indonesia's reaction to the 1973 oil crisis is indicative. At that time, the Indonesian authorities stated that Indonesia's support of Arab countries against Israel was based on justice (*dasar keadilan*), which is the principle of the country's foreign policy, and religious solidarity only complements this decision.

Indonesia supported the use of the oil embargo by Arab countries as an instrument of foreign policy, but at the same time hoped that the conflict would be resolved in the near future. The Indonesian authorities also stated that the use of oil as a weapon in the short term would harm the United States, Europe and Japan and help the struggle of the Arabs: "However, if the embargo is used for a long period of time, developing countries will suffer, because economic relations with developed countries are necessary for the growth of developing countries."¹³

Suharto's position on Palestine was also based on anti-colonial rhetoric. Thus, on November 30, 1987, Suharto again announced Indonesian support for Palestine in its struggle to achieve its inalienable rights. He also stated that "... as a nation proud of its heritage of struggle against colonial subjugation and for national independence, we in Indonesia have always considered the struggle of the Palestinians a sacred cause, as our own struggle as part of an irreversible global movement against colonial domination and foreigners."¹⁴

He also stated that the Middle East conflict can be resolved only if the Palestinian people are granted their own independent state, and Israel unconditionally withdraws from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem. Earlier in 1975, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Suharto Adam Malik (1966–1978) discussed the possibility of opening a PLO representative office in Jakarta, but faced opposition from the military. The latter feared two factors at the same time: the first was the PLO's ties with Islamic radical groups, the second was their good relations with the international communist movement and left-wing radicals. Fears were also caused by the general growth of Islamic discourse, since in the 1971 General Elections, the results of voting among Indonesians abroad showed a high level of support for the Indonesian Moslem Party and the Nahdatul Ulama organization.

Thus, even on the basis of this fact, we can speak about the growing at that time Islamic lobby, to which Suharto was increasingly forced to listen at the end of his reign, as evidenced by his uncertainty about the Yugoslav conflict and the issue of assistance to Moslems in Bosnia (1992), since Indonesia took a position of support for the Moslem population, while not in a hurry to use its potential and position in the OIC and in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Indonesia expressed solidarity over the plight of Bosnian Moslems, along with other Moslem countries, but Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (1988–1999) noted that “support does not necessarily mean sending Indonesian peacekeepers.”¹⁵

Thus, Suharto further codified permissible and unacceptable diplomatic actions related to those areas of foreign policy where Islam could serve as the basis for any argument.

The Reformation period and the growing influence of Islamic parties (1998–2004)

After the overthrow of Suharto in 1998, as a result of a nationwide crisis, previously suppressed elites from the

democratic (nationalist) and religious spectrum came to power. Having founded new political parties, they joined the process of democratization of the country, once again relying on the original principles and foundations of statehood. Democratization was carried out through the consistent introduction of new principles in domestic and foreign policy. They mainly concerned the response to the current needs of society in the framework of overcoming the Asian financial crisis of 1998 and the political power of the military regime, but at the same time they took into account the need to return to the old principles of the Sukarno times. The short term of the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), the religious leader of Nahdatul Ulam, who was noted for being the first to bring Islamic parties out of the shadows, is interesting for a thoughtful policy of appeasement and dialogue inside the country and an unusual style of diplomacy outside. A test of strength for the diplomatic system of the Wahid administration was the well-known rapprochement with Israel.

After Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres invited Wahid to witness the opening of the Peres Peace Center in 1994, he made several trips to Israel and became increasingly known for his defense of Israel. In August 2000, he met Peres again when he visited him incognito in Jakarta before the planned visit of Yasser Arafat.

He told both politicians about his vision of Jerusalem as the joint capital of Israel and an independent Palestinian state and publicly urged Arafat not to immediately reject the offer made by Ehud Barak at Camp David in July 2000.¹⁶ Wahid also called on Moslem communities to compromise with Israel, arguing, as a theologian, that from a religious point of view, both Jews and Moslems have no obstacles to peaceful life and the search for consensus.

However, the activities of Abdurrahman Wahid in the Israeli direction met with resistance from both the parliament and society. For example, numerous street demonstrations at the

civilian level and the threat of a parliamentary boycott by lawmakers forced Akbar Tanjung, the Speaker of Parliament, to announce that the Israeli delegation would not attend the conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Jakarta in 2000. Popular agitation was also fueled by Israeli-Palestinian tensions of that period.

Soon, Wahid's inconsistent policy, despite his many achievements, led to his removal, and the choice was made in favor of the leader of the Democratic Struggle Party of Indonesia – Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004).

Megawati's need to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, a series of terrorist attacks in Bali in 2002 and the growth of radical Islamism in the rebellious separatist province of Aceh influenced Megawati's desire to form Indonesia's position on issues of Islam and developing Islamophobia. The difficulty of Indonesia expressing its position was the President's fears of provoking a violent reaction from radical groups and giving them an additional resource for propaganda outside Indonesia. The growing influence of terrorist groups within the country, as well as the emergence of fundamentalist groups of independent (from the Ministry of Religious Affairs or large organizations) preachers also turned any statement of the authorities into a potential propaganda tool. Based on this situation, Indonesia has put forward the main thesis that terrorism is mainly related to economic and social reasons that radicals use for their own benefit. Indonesia also condemned the issue of Islamophobia, urging not to compare all Moslems with individual Islamists.¹⁷ At the same time, Megawati focused on bilateral cooperation and the role of international organizations in the fight against terrorism, without affecting the capabilities of religious forces and the potential of interfaith dialogue.

Despite the growing influence of Islamic political forces and parties, the reformation did not bring serious changes in the leadership's position on the use of Islamic discourse in foreign

policy. But the international situation and growth have led to a greater interest in this issue in the information space, as well as among the people and politicians.

The current state of the Islamic Trend in Indonesia's foreign policy (2014–2020)

Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), Indonesia's experience in economic development, political reforms and the fight against Islamist terrorism allowed the country to talk about the problems faced by the Moslem world. In his speech in Saudi Arabia, President Yudhoyono addressed many issues, among which was Islamophobia. He argued that Moslems should respond to the challenges of modernity by embracing "technology, modernity and culture of progressive experience."¹⁸ The President also noted that Islam is not only a religion of peace, but also of progress, thus calling, on the one hand, for the revival of Islam, on the other, he asked his Moslem brothers to accept globalization, turn to non-Moslems and cooperate in the fight against terrorism.¹⁹

This position of Yudhoyono was definitely no less innovative than the position of Gus Dura (honorary address to the president - *ed.*) on the recognition of Israel. For the first time, Indonesia started talking globally about Islam and approached the issue from a new perspective, more reflecting Indonesia's traditional syncretism. These actions can be viewed in different ways: Firstly, they were aimed at the world Moslem community in an attempt to influence its ideas and actions. Since that period, Indonesia has been promoting the idea that there are many interpretations of Islam, and it is necessary to combat the tendency to reduce the entire Islamic tradition to radical currents. According to Yudhoyono, Islam, modernity and democracy can coexist, which is important for the consolidation of political forces within their own country.²⁰

Secondly, such statements were certainly addressed to the internal audience in order to promote a modern, democratic, tolerant discourse in order to weaken the influence of extremists and radical groups.

Thirdly, such speeches are aimed at the Western audience, in particular, the term of President Yudhoyono's tenure coincided with the peak of American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East under President George W. Bush. President George W. Bush, as well as President Barack Obama's call for a new start in the USA relations with the Moslem world. The skillful diplomacy of the Yudhoyono period contributed to the perception of Indonesia as a Western-style democratic country. The factor of "moderate" Islam and the corresponding image of the country as the antipode of the "formidable" Middle East contributed to the growth of Indonesia's popularity in the West as an alternative for the development of the Islamic world.

Despite the decline in the USA interest in Indonesia, under D. Trump, the last visit of Secretary of State M. Pompeo (October 2020) made it clear that the USA has remembered the image of a moderate Indonesia and continues to evaluate the country within the framework set by Yudhoyono. President Joko Widodo's election campaign in 2014 again contained numerous references to the doctrine of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy, as well as the need to support the Palestinian people and calls for Indonesia to promote a "middle" version of Islam. Joko Widodo also mentioned interreligious dialogue as a platform for promoting Indonesian "soft power", but it has always been on the periphery of Indonesian politics. Hence, it is possible that the limitations of the principle of external balance in the Islamic direction will also impose their limits on the use of interreligious dialogue as a tool of foreign policy.

Public opinion on issues related to the problems of the Moslem world can restrain Indonesia's foreign policy. When the United States moved its Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, the square in front of the American Embassy in Indonesia became the site of

mass street protests.²¹ In addition, Indonesia appealed against Australia's statement in December 2018 about its plan to follow the example of the United States and postponed the signing of a free trade agreement with Australia until Canberra announced its support for a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Indonesia has traditionally supported the independence of Palestine, but in the era of Sukarno and Suharto, diplomats justified this position by anti-colonialism and secular values, not religion. Today, when Indonesian society is increasingly exposed to populist tendencies, Indonesia seeks to use Islamic rhetoric, but continues to do so with extreme caution. Indonesia has repeatedly offered its services to help resolve the differences between the PLO and HAMAS, but did not proceed from religious motives of solidarity, but from the old position that the main lesson of its own battle for independence is that unity is the main and necessary prerequisite for independence.²²

The Islamic factor thus manifests itself in Indonesia's modern foreign policy in two main forms. Firstly, this is expressed in the desire for closer relations with the Moslem world. This desire is primarily caused by the wish to strengthen economic ties with the rich states of the Persian Gulf, and partly by the wish to win the respect of the world Ummah as a non-Arab Moslem force. In any case, at this stage, greater interest in strengthening relations with Islamic countries is related more to the expected economic benefits than to the problem of Islam as a common faith and the problems it faces in today's globalizing world.

Secondly, the Islamic factor is reflected in the policy regarding conflicts in which Moslems become victims, since Islam prescribes solidarity between Moslems. Traditionally, this impulse has been manifested mainly in Indonesia's policy towards the Middle East, especially in support of Palestinian independence, opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, opposition to the 2003 Iraq war and condemnation of the use of force by Israel against Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip.

It also influenced Indonesia's policy regarding the persecution of the Rohingya and Uighurs in Myanmar and the PRC, respectively. At the same time, issues of support for co-religionists face political pragmatism – the need to preserve the unity of ASEAN and beneficial economic relations with China, necessary for the implementation of infrastructure projects. On the other hand, Indonesia's neutrality allows for the manifestation of a tough position where national interests or values important to the Indonesian people are affected, among which Islam occupies not the last place. For example, as Chairman of the UN Security Council in 2019–2020 Indonesia fundamentally sought to draw the organization's attention to the Rohingya problem and the Middle East settlement, identifying the UN as an important tool in solving the problems of the Ummah.²³

Another innovation of Indonesian diplomacy was the introduction of issues of the rights of Moslem workers from Southeast Asia in the Middle East to the platform of the UN Security Council and the OIC. Earlier, on October 29, 2018, an Indonesian citizen, Tuti Tursilavati, was executed in Saudi Arabia for murder as a result of self-defense during harassment.²⁴ The court did not take into account the attacks on the girl herself, and her execution was carried out without any notification to the Indonesian authorities, which was not the first case. Such a harsh policy of the KSA towards Indonesian migrants is directly related to the dispute between the two centers of Islam for leadership in the Ummah, which provokes the parties to such steps. Indonesia strives for wide coverage of such cases, often from the standpoint of “protecting Moslems in Moslem countries.”

Conclusion

Thus, we can conclude that the Islamic factor in Indonesia's foreign policy does not play such an obvious role as it may seem due to the large number of Moslem population and the attention

paid by the Government to these issues. A significant role in shaping the views of the people and the Indonesian elite is played by the prehistory of the development of Islam in the Malay Archipelago, the high role of Adat types of Islam and original approaches to understanding religion, among which there is syncretism. The national ideology – the philosophy of Pancha Sila – is also aimed at implementing the principle of equality, tolerance and balance in society, which keeps Indonesia's multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society from disintegrating, and imposes its own restrictions on the use of Islamic principles and foundations in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the world's largest Moslem organizations and the spiritual ties of Indonesian Moslems around the world have always helped Indonesia not only in solving problems of interreligious dialogue, but also in realizing important diplomatic goals, for example, during the War of Independence (1945–1949).

Political Islam in Indonesia has also passed a long way from supporting the Islamic way of development of the country at the initial stages of the formation of the Indonesian state to supporting the Pancha Sila and unity of Indonesia today. Since the beginning of the new century, the main task of the government has become the need for an almost instant response to the growth of radicalism and the appearance of terrorists on the territory of the country. At the same time, Indonesia could not but condemn both the growing Islamophobia and the actions of Western countries, partly based on this trend. As a result, this led to Indonesia's desire to conceptualize the Islamic space, to identify its positions based on the identity and ideology of tolerance, moderation and syncretism in relation to globalization. Indonesia could no longer rely on the secular or anti-colonial rhetoric of the Sukarno and Suharto periods.

Thus, Indonesia has declared itself as a center of non-Arab Moslems and a kind of "alternative" to Middle Eastern approaches and views on the development of the Ummah. It also manifested itself in the need to internationalize the "spiritual

resource” of Indonesia, the inclusion of organizations and theologians in international discourse. Indonesia is still cautiously approaching the implementation of the Islamic agenda due to concerns about the domestic political situation in terms of providing a platform for both conservative religious forces and radicals, with whom, however, a steady struggle is being waged, including by force. Indonesia also strongly advocates the suppression and destruction of terrorist groups and is one of the most successful countries in this area.

It is obvious that the stability of Indonesia's foreign policy and its moderation will continue in the future, even if military or religious-oriented forces come to power. Indonesia here resembles the competitive factional model of US decision-making, when all factions, regardless of their victory or defeat in the elections, retain a certain resource of influence on the general political vector of the country's development. Indonesia will also continue to conceptually approach the broadcasting of its views on the Ummah in the global field, using the crises and problems of modern society as motivators and factors for the effective work of its own soft power, as well as ways to increase authority among Moslems.

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ANDREI BELINSKY. "GAME OF THRONES". LEBANESE CLANS AND STATE IN GERMANY // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Lebanese clans, Mkhmalli, West Germany, organized crime.

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Abstract. In the article it is analyzed the process of criminalization of Lebanese clans arrived in Germany in the early 1980s. It is noted that it was caused by a number of reasons, including the marginal situation of Lebanese immigrants, the lack of attention of the authorities to integration problems, specifics of mentality, etc. Starting with petit thefts and street drug trafficking, the clans gradually began to create their own economic structures, which included both