
MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR DOBAEV. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ETHNO-
CONFESSIONAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE
EVE OF THE ENTRY OF SOVIET TROOPS (12.27.1979).*

*Keywords: Afghanistan, confession,
Islam, Islamism, tribes, Pashtuns, ethnic
groups.*

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Abstract. The article examines the internal political and ethno-confessional situation in Afghanistan on the eve of the entry of Soviet troops into this country on December 27, 1979. The dominant influence on the intra-Afghan processes of ethnicity, first of all, the Pashtun factor. This factor is based on traditional genus tribal relations, historically developed among the Pashtuns, who are the state-forming

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

people of Afghanistan. Ignoring ethnic features of Afghan Muslims, especially the synthesis of the Pashtun nationalism, their customary law (Pashtunwali) and traditional forms existence of Islam by external forces leads to negative for them consequences. It is not for nothing that Afghanistan is called the "graveyard of empires". Examples from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and now the United States convincingly confirm this thesis.

Being a country with an ancient history, Afghanistan for many centuries had been territorially part of other states. In the 18th century, the territory of Afghanistan was part of the Persian Empire, but after the tragic death of Nadir Shah Afshar in 1747, this empire collapsed. The most combat-ready units of the Persian army – the Afghans – returned to their homeland, where in the same year, on the initiative of the Pashtun leader Ahmad Shah, for the first time in history, an Afghan state proper, the Durranian state, arose. During its heyday, its southern shores were washed by the waters of the Indian Ocean. However, under the successors of Ahmad Shah, the huge Afghan state broke up into a number of independent territorial and political entities – Peshawar, Kabul, Kandahar and Herat.

In the 19th century, in the vast theater of the Eurasian Rimland, the geopolitical interests of the Russian and British empires came into conflict. This multifaceted struggle, which received the metaphorical name "Great Game" in the literature, provoked three Anglo-Afghan wars (two in the 19th century and one in the 20th century), but the British did not succeed in establishing colonial domination over Afghanistan, and as a result of the third war, the British were forced to recognize the independence of Afghanistan. At the same time, at the end of the second Anglo-Afghan war, the Pashtun super-ethnos was divided roughly in half, and a new border was drawn between British India and Afghanistan along the so-called. "Durand Line", named after the political adviser to the British Viceroy at that time.

After gaining independence in 1919, Amanullah became the first emir of Afghanistan, at the same time this state was the first to recognize the RSFSR, and diplomatic relations were established between them. In 1926, Emir Amanullah, getting down to the modernization of the country, abolished the emirate and declared himself king and the country a kingdom. At the end of 1928, a rebellion broke out in Afghanistan with the support of the British, and an adventurer closely associated with the British special services, an ethnic Tajik Bacha-i Sakao ("son of a water carrier"), came to power. However, he was soon overthrown and killed, and the Pashtun Nadir Shah became the king, after his death in 1933 his son Zahir Shah inherited the throne and in 1973 was overthrown by his uncle, Mohammed Daoud. He proclaimed the formation of a republic and began to implement the relevant reforms, but no obvious success was achieved. In the same period, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which was created in the mid-1960s and declared Marxist-Leninist principles, was gaining strength in the country. Soon after its creation, the party split along ethnic lines. The Khalq (people) wing was headed by the Pashtun Nur-Mohammed Taraki, and the Parcham (banner) wing was headed by the Tajik Babrak Karmal. However, by the spring of 1978, both wings united again, and on April 27, 1978, with the leading role of the PDPA, a military coup was carried out, during which Daoud Khan and his entourage were killed, and the PDPA came to power. The first leader of the proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was the Pashtun Nur-Mohammed Taraki, and in fact the second person in the state was the Pashtun Hafizullah Amin. The inner-party struggle within the PDPA flared up with renewed vigor, and soon H. Amin, having physically eliminated N.M. Taraki, became the new leader of the DRA. Carrying out reforms in the cruelest way, H. Amin turned against himself the population of Afghanistan, as a result, a struggle against the regime unfolded everywhere. The difficult situation caused Taraki, and then Amin, to repeatedly appeal to

the Soviet leadership to send troops into the country. On December 27, 1979, after two dozen appeals to Moscow by Taraki and Amin, after the overthrow and assassination of Taraki, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. The Khalqists were removed from power, and the leader of Parcham, the Tajik Babrak Karmal, became the head of Afghanistan.

In the context of the foregoing, it seems relevant to consider the ethno-confessional situation in Afghanistan on the eve of the introduction of Soviet troops, ignoring which by the Soviet leadership, led to extremely negative results for the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan has been a multi-ethnic state since its inception. In 1979, the population of the country totaled 15.5 million people, with the following ethnic composition: Pashtuns – 45 per cent of the total population (7 million people), Tajiks – 25 per cent (3.8 million people), Hazaras – 10 per cent (1.5 million people), Uzbeks – 8 per cent (1.2 million people), Charaymaks – 6 per cent (980 thousand people), Turkmens – 3 per cent (460 thousand people), Nuristani, Kyrgyz, Baloch, Indians, Kurds, Persians, etc. – 3 per cent (460 thousand people) [1, p. 4]. It should be emphasized that all Afghan peoples were characterized by the presence of stable tribal ties, adherence to ethnic solidarity, regardless of whether they led a sedentary (80 per cent of the population), nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, whether they lived in the city or in the countryside. This situation, in general, persists at the present time. To a greater extent, this is typical for the Pashtuns, the Hazaras, the Charaymaks, the Balochs, the Turkmens and the Kyrgyz. These peoples are divided into tribes, and they, in turn, into genera and families. There are also associations in tribal unions. An active role in the life of Afghan society is still played by such traditional forms as the institutions of tribal meetings (jirga) of tribal elders and religious authorities, while often the elders and mullahs act in one person.

Tribes have always strived for substantial autonomy and independence from central authorities. Many Afghan tribes,

especially nomadic and semi-nomadic, were distinguished by a pronounced military-tribal organization. The Afghans of the southern, southwestern and eastern provinces never part with cold, and often firearms, which has become their tradition since ancient times. Military training in the tribes, especially among the Pashtuns, is ongoing. They have their own armed detachments led by their leaders. If necessary, they are replenished by armed members of the tribes, including teenagers and even women. Strict discipline is established within the tribes, there is a reliable warning system. At the same time, there are contradictions between the various Afghan peoples and tribes, often leading to serious conflicts. They have always appeared between the Pashtuns, who traditionally dominated the country, and the non-Pashtuns. Contradictions in Afghan society took place and are still taking place on religious grounds, especially between Sunnis (they are the majority) and Shiites (they are less than 20 per cent of the population). The Pashtuns, being the state-forming people of Afghanistan, made up and make up almost half of the population of this country. However, it should be borne in mind that in Pakistan, as a result of the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century, at the end of the 70s of the 20th century, 9 million Pashtuns lived, from the areas bordering Afghanistan to India (tribes of Vazirs, Afridis, Mangals, Shinvari, Momands, Jaji, etc.).

Actually in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are settled mainly in the southern, southeastern and eastern parts of the country (the provinces of Herat, Farah, Gur, Kandahar, Zabol, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Parvan, Laghman, Kunar, and also in Kabul), that is, from southwestern borders (with Iran) to the eastern (with Pakistan), where their resettlement directly passes into Pakistani territory. The total number of Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1979 was 17 million people (at present – over 60 million people – I.D.), united in more than 60 tribes and clans. Artificially divided by the so-called “Durand line”, the Pashtun tribes continue to be connected by close tribal, family and other ties. In terms of composition, the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan

are classified into three main groups: the western Durrani tribal association (in 1979 – more than 3 million people), the eastern Ghilzai tribal association (more than 1.5 million people), the Karani tribal association (about 1.5 million people), as well as a number of individual large tribes that are not included in these tribal associations. Durrani tribes live mainly in the southwestern regions of Afghanistan, on a vast territory from Kandahar to Farah in the south and Herat in the west. The largest tribes of this union are the Barakzai, Popelzai, Alikozai, Acekzai, etc. The Durrani tribal union plays a leading role in the formation and subsequent formation of the Afghan state. All the ruling dynasties of the Afghan state came out of it. A special place in this regard was for a century and a half occupied by the Mohammedzai clan, whose representatives were the former king Zahir Shah and the former president M. Daoud. We also note that in this tribal association, the barakzai and popelzai tribes have historically been at enmity. Ghilzais live mainly in a number of southern and southeastern provinces – Zabol, Ghazni, Paktia and Paktika, as well as in Pakistan. The most authoritative Ghilzai tribes are Suleiman-Kheil, Ahmadzai, Ali-Kheil, Taraki, and others. The Ghilzai tribes, along with the Durrani, have occupied and continue to occupy a prominent place in Afghan history. There was a constant rivalry between the Ghilzais and the Durrani for predominant influence in the state. For example, the last pro-Soviet leader of Afghanistan, the Pashtun Najibullah, was from the Ahmadzai tribe. The Karani tribal association includes the tribes of Afridi, Mangals, Jajis, Momands, Wazirs, Shinvaris, Jadrans, etc. They are mainly settled in the southeastern regions of Afghanistan. A number of Karani tribes live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, and a large number of them live in Pakistan, their center is the city of Peshawar.

The relationship between the ruling circles of Afghanistan and the Pashtun tribes has always been complex and controversial. Pashtun nomadic tribes have traditionally enjoyed

significant privileges compared to other peoples. They were completely or partially exempted from taxes, military service, etc. However, not a single Afghan government has managed to establish any form of effective control over the nomads.

It should also be emphasized that, being the largest ethnic community and traditionally playing a dominant role in Afghan society, the Pashtuns often showed and still show arrogance and demonstrate their own superiority in relation to other peoples. The "code of honor" - "Pashtunvalai" has a great influence on the life of every Pashtun. It includes many moral values, among them - dignity, truthfulness, sincerity. The Pashtuns would rather give their lives than allow an attack on the honor of their women or the authority of their elders. The Code instructs them to be faithful to the truth, regardless of the consequences, to keep their word at any cost, to show firmness and perseverance, fearlessness and courage, to be hospitable and not to forgive an offense (a Pashtun can wait for years for an opportune moment to take revenge on the offender). Taking into account that Afghanistan almost always, with rare exceptions, was ruled by representatives of the Pashtuns, and the ruling circles of the state pursued a policy of assimilation for decades, the Pashtunvalai laws penetrated quite deeply into Afghan society, becoming a value guide for the rest of the peoples of the country. Among other ethnic groups of Afghanistan, the Tajiks should be singled out. They are not only the second largest ethnic group, but also the most economically developed part of the country's population. Tajiks have tribal relations, but they are expressed to a much lesser extent than among other peoples. Tajiks make up a significant stratum of the population of cities, and the percentage of literacy among them is higher than that of other peoples. In addition, like the Pashtuns, Tajiks consider themselves descendants of the legendary Aryans. However, being a national minority, they have never played such a role in the political life of the country as the Pashtuns.

The rest of the peoples of Afghanistan (Khazarians, Uzbeks, Charaymaks, Turkmens, etc.) are national minorities, their influence on the political processes in the country has always been hardly noticeable. However, already in the mid-60s 20th century the politicization of ethnicity and their certain consolidation was fixed. In this field, a demarcation takes place along the line of Pashtuns - non-Pashtuns. This applies not only to the "left" PDPA, which soon after its formation in 1965 split into two wings - "Khalk" (headed by the Pashtun N.M. Taraki) and "Parcham" (the Tajik B. Karmal), but also branch Islamist structures of the local Moslem Brotherhood. Among the latter, the formation of party groups along ethnic lines also took place. The Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) was headed by the Pashtun G. Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA) was headed by the Tajik B. Rabbani. In this regard, it seems important to consider the state of Islam at the time of the entry of Soviet troops.

Historically, Islam has played and continues to play an important role in Afghanistan. Since its spread in Afghanistan for centuries, Islam has reigned supreme among other religious cults, especially in rural areas. Under the flag of religion, the rulers carried out the unification of Afghan lands and the conquest of other territories. When the threat of colonial conquest by the British hung over Afghanistan, religion began to be used as a means of rallying the Afghan peoples in the struggle against the colonialists [2, p. 60–61].

Islam actively intervened in the development of social and political life, using various channels to influence people and their public opinion. Moreover, religion, represented by clergymen who participated in various parts of the state apparatus, directly influenced the formation of the state policy and the official ideology serving it.

The majority of the population of Afghanistan has always had a deep commitment to Islam and experienced the full influence of the clergy. The proportion of the clergy in Afghan

society was very significant. So, at the beginning of 1980, out of the nearly 16 million population of the country, there were more than 250,000 ministers of worship and theologians of various ranks. Over 15,000 mosques functioned in the country. In Kabul alone, there were 545 mosques [3, p. 7]. During the same period, approximately 80 per cent of the country's population was Sunni Moslem, 18 per cent Shiites, and about 2 per cent other religions. Moreover, a highly developed Sufism in the Sunni direction of Islam was characteristic of Afghanistan, as well as various Sufi tarikats and brotherhoods. In the west of Afghanistan, the Chishtiyya tariqat is widespread, its supporters mostly live in cities. In the east of the country, on the border with Pakistan, adherents of the Suhraverdiyya tariqat live. In the northern and central regions, the Naqshbandiyya tariqat is widespread. Among part of the Pashtuns there are supporters of another major tariqat – Qadiriyya. We emphasize that the last two Sufi tarikats (Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya) became widespread in the North-Eastern Caucasus (Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya), and on the basis of the ideological doctrine of the Naqshbandiyya tarikat in the 19th century, a powerful religious movement unfolded there, which became known as “Caucasian Muridism” [4, p. 21]. In connection with the widespread development of Sufism in Afghanistan, the cult of veneration of tombs (mazars) and “holy places” (ziyarats), of which there are more than eight thousand, is widespread. The most revered of them are the tomb of “Mazar of St. Ali” (Mazar-e-Sharif), the place of storage of the “rags” of the Prophet Muhammad (Kandahar), the Sahi Mosque (Kabul), the tomb of the religious thinker, Saint Akhund-zade (Jalalabad), as well as the central mosque in Herat [3, p. 5].

The Shiites in Afghanistan (the Khazars and a small part of some other peoples, including a number of Pashtun tribes) are represented by a group of trends and sects, among them the Imamis, Ismailis, Ali-illahs, Roshaniya, Ahmadiyyas, and others. The Imamis enjoy the support of Iran, especially after the

February Revolution of 1979 in this country, when the Islamic clergy came to power, and the state turned into the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). In the course of the historical development of Afghanistan, the clergy turned into an influential, privileged stratum. However, due to a number of circumstances, there has never been a recognized leader among the Moslem clergy of the country who has the right to act as the head of the religious community of all of Afghanistan. At the same time, in some regions of the country, sometimes covering large territories, various spiritual authorities acted. Among them are seids (who consider themselves descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), hazrats, sheikhs, pirs, ishans (heads of various sects and Sufi tarikats), who have numerous followers and unquestioned authority among the believers of their district. The most influential among them was the Mujaddedi family. During the period of the monarchy, its representatives occupied a dominant position in the highest governing body of the clergy – the Ulema Council (“Jamiyat-i-ulama”). The Gilani family, supplying confessors to the Afghan monarchs, also enjoyed significant influence. The large clergy were economically closely connected with the feudal landed aristocracy, and some part with the merchant bourgeoisie [3, p. 7–9].

Of course, the higher and middle clergy, adhering to extremely conservative views, and before the April 1978 coup, advocated the preservation of traditional orders, opposed the democratization of the country’s public life and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Already in the second half of the 60s, branch structures of the Islamist organization “Moslem Brotherhood” appeared in Afghanistan. It was created at the turn of 1928–1929 in the student environment of Egypt, headed by their leader, Hassan al-Banna [5, 18–19]. The breeding ground for the emergence of such organizations in Afghanistan was Kabul University, where the political party “Moslem Youth” was created. Among the founders of the movement were A. Sayaf, B. Rabbani, G. Hekmatyar, later they were joined by Ahmad Shah Masud.

The clerics conducted active political agitation among various segments of the population, especially among students, and their organization Moslem Youth acted under the slogan "Long live the struggle for the Quran throughout the world!" Religious extremists already at that time hatched plans to create a theocratic state in Afghanistan headed by a "righteous president" elected from among the clergy. After the 1973 coup d'état carried out by M. Daoud, the authorities in Afghanistan began to pursue a tough anti-Islamic policy, which caused the transition of local "brothers" from political to armed struggle against the regime [6, p. 141]. In 1975, they attempted an armed anti-government rebellion, which failed. As a result, the rebel leaders fled to Pakistan, where already in 1976 a split occurred in the leadership of the Moslem Youth. Two parties were formed - the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA), headed by the Tajik B. Rabbani and the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA), led by the Pashtun G. Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar's party consisted mainly of Pashtuns, while Rabbani's structure included, respectively, Tajiks. Subsequently, splits along ethnic lines became the rule in the formation of other Afghan religious and political parties and movements. After the April 1978 coup, his opponents continued to actively and skillfully manipulate the slogans of the defense of Islam, which were supported by some provisions of the Sharia, as well as quotations from the Quran and the Sunnah. At the same time, quite specific political goals were pursued - the overthrow of the "Marxist" leadership, the power of the PDPA and the restoration of the monarchy, or the establishment of an Islamic republic. These forces often grouped around mosques, trying to turn them into their strongholds. Turning to open armed struggle, they declared "jihad" against the Kabul regime. The armed struggle was led by various "Islamic" parties and organizations: the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, the Islamic Nationalist Revolutionary Party of Afghanistan, the Union of Islamic Warriors, etc., often led by

representatives of the large and middle clergy of the country. Among them are S. Mujaddedi, B. Rabbani, maulavi M. Nabi and others. Already in January 1980, under pressure from foreign "sponsors", the so-called "united national Islamic front" was organized, which later transformed into the so called "union of seven Islamic parties." Undoubtedly, all this was facilitated by the radical reforms, completely disastrous in the conditions of Afghanistan, carried out by the new leadership of the country. Starting under N.M. Taraki, such "reforms" under H. Amin acquired an unprecedented scope, accompanied by state terror against "dissidents". All this led to a full-scale deployment, in fact, of a civil war in the country.

Opponents of the regime, with massive outside support, began to create, train and arm sabotage and terrorist detachments. Some of them were formed in Afghanistan, others, having been trained in special camps and bases in Pakistan and China under the guidance of American, Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors, crossed the Afghan border. An important role in these detachments was played by the mullahs, who carried out propaganda activities against the Kabul regime. Using armed Basmachi and terrorist forms of struggle, moral and psychological pressure on the supporters of official Kabul, in order to undermine the new government, they sought to destabilize the internal and complicate the international position of the new state.

One of the main directions of anti-government propaganda was the idea of "defending Islam", accusing the regime of godlessness, militant atheism. Moslem clerics who joined the "mujahideen" accused the PDPA and its leaders of allegedly seeking to eliminate Islam in Afghanistan and that for this purpose mosques were burned, sacred books were destroyed, "holy places" (mazars and ziyarats) were desecrated, Moslems were forbidden to perform religious rites, children in schools were taught godlessness, that party members cultivated anti-religious morality, and so on. Trying to substantiate their

accusations with facts, Islamists often staged provocative arsons of mosques, desecration of "holy places", destroyed sacred books, scattering their pages in public places, and made provocative speeches to believers, allegedly on behalf of official authorities [2, p. 65]. For the same purposes, taking into account the illiteracy of the bulk of the population, colorful leaflets began to be actively used, on which "enemies of Islam" – prominent state and political figures of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan – were depicted in a caricature form, and, conversely, "fighters for the faith" and their leaders looked heroes. At the same stage, audio cassettes were actively distributed, the records on which presented Islam as a religion that brings social liberation, opposes inequality and exploitation. The guarantee of the creation of a just society, according to Islamic ideologists, should be the observance of such principles of Islam as the voluntary donation of the rich, and not the forcible seizure of their property in favor of the poor, which, according to the early Bolshevik model, was practiced by the Afghan authorities. In turn, the Shiite clergy and part of the Shiite population, living mainly in the western and central provinces of the country, enjoyed the support of the Iranian authorities, who provided them with ideological, moral and material assistance, sending money, equipment, propaganda and special literature with recommendations on issues conducting subversive activities against the new authorities, cassettes with recordings of the speeches of the "Rahbar" – Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Tehran radio broadcasts on religious topics with the aim of inciting hatred not only of the Shiites, but of all believers in Afghanistan towards the Kabul regime.

As a result of such a massive mobilizing ideological impact, the opponents of the PDPA managed to win over a significant part of the Afghan population, especially in rural areas. Propaganda agencies of Pakistan, Iran, as well as radio stations in the US, Great Britain, Germany and other Western countries, actively joined the ideological anti-government campaign, seeking to play the "Islamic card". The US plans were to draw the

Soviet Union into direct military participation in the internal Afghan conflict, and then to transfer the “holy war” to Soviet territory, primarily to Central Asia, where they had not yet forgotten about the armed struggle of the Bolsheviks with the local Basmachi. Of course, the implementation of such plans posed a serious threat to the Soviet state.

At the same time, as emphasized above, on the eve of the military coup in Afghanistan in 1978, the four Sufi Sunni *tarikats* were most widespread, there were also numerous sects, both in the Sunni and Shiite directions. The extreme ethnic, tribal and confessional (within Islam) disunity and heterogeneity of the Afghan society for a long time prevented the consolidation of resistance forces on any basis. The leader of each of the Islamic parties defended his independence in every possible way, there were frequent bloody skirmishes between militants, supporters of various religious and political movements. To a certain extent, the unifying religious factor in rallying the opposition, according to the Americans and their allies, could be the planting of Saudi Wahhabism in Afghanistan [7, p. 56–67], but for this it was necessary to ensure the direct involvement of the Soviet armed forces in the intra-Afghan conflict. The Americans have long been plotting about a kind of “Vietnam” for the Soviet Union, with the ensuing consequences. Such an opportunity finally presented itself: the civil war in Afghanistan was gaining momentum, and its leaders (Taraki and Amin) indeed repeatedly turned to the Soviet leadership with a request to send troops to this country. After much deliberation, the “Kremlin elders” decided to send a “limited military contingent” to Afghanistan. Most likely, geopolitical moments prevailed in this decision, especially since in February 1979 the Shah’s regime, a US ally in the region, was overthrown in neighboring Iran, which gave reason to talk about the weakening of American positions in the region. The Soviet leadership did not succeed in occupying them, since the Iranian mullocracy that came to power soon took not only an anti-American, but also an anti-Soviet position. In such a dynamically

changing environment, the Soviet leadership, apparently, considered it necessary to take active steps in the Afghan direction, intercepting the strategic initiative from the Americans [8, p. 31–33]. As a result, without thoroughly calculating all the risks and without taking into account historical, domestic political, ethno-confessional factors, without properly predicting the reaction of the international community, on December 27, 1979, a Soviet “limited military contingent” was brought into a neighboring, friendly country.

The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan that stretched for almost nine years (December 27, 1979 – February 15, 1989) had geopolitical consequences on a global scale, setting in motion negative domestic political processes in the Soviet Union, while simultaneously weakening it on the world stage. Party functionaries with “new thinking” who came to the leadership of the USSR in 1985 and initiated the notorious policy of “perestroika” soon led to the collapse of a great country.

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VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. PROBLEMS OF ADAPTATION AND INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA: THE ROLE OF RELIGION. Condensed abstract.

Keywords: socio-cultural adaptation, adaptation and integration of migrants in Russia, state migration policy, intercultural interaction, stereotypes, perception of cultural differences among youth, religious factor, transnationalism, diaspora.

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The article by Olga Kulbachevskaya, research associate, Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography RAS, [1] examines the relationship between migrants and Russian society, as well as its impact on integration processes. According to the Migration Policy Concept for 2019–2025, environment for adaptation of migrants is