

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

OLGA NOVIKOVA. MIGRATION AND TERRORISM: DYNAMIC
INTERACTION

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*Abstract. The paper addresses the issue of the migration-
terrorism intersection. Research indicates that immigration does not
unconditionally promote terrorism in European countries but the
article also draws our attention to the problem of radicalisation of
immigrants in receiving countries. At the same time, it is reported that
the fear over immigrants made them targets of terrorist attacks by far-
right natives. It is specially noted that the ‘securitization’ of migration
is potentially counterproductive. It is stressed that a balanced approach
to migration and counterterrorism migration policies is needed.*

The problem of mutual real or imaginary determinism of migration and terrorism in the 21st century has led to the formation of polemical knots in public discourse and scientific literature. The simple scheme of accusing migrants of terrorism, which exists in the public mind, has been subjected to careful analysis. The inconsistency of reducing complex things to a primitive has been proven. The problem of the connection between the phenomenon of migration and the phenomenon of terrorism began to be detailed and acquired a qualitatively new content. The migration crisis of 2015–2019 gave a new impetus to the study of this issue, and the problem has not lost its relevance today.

When various types of disasters occur, people react differently depending on whether the disaster is man-made or natural. If natural disasters occur that are not controlled in principle, and where there can be no culprits – earthquakes, floods, droughts – the society is mobilized, examples of mutual assistance are of a massive nature, despite social, national and religious barriers. When a man-made disaster occurs, the reaction of the community is different. People wonder why this happened and who is to blame, they are haunted by a sense of anxiety and danger. Fear does not go away for a very long time, vigilance grows, suspicion develops, a desire appears to find the guilty from among members of the community who are not similar to themselves, tension between groups of the population grows. In the context of the growing number of refugees and the presence of large ethnic diasporas, terrorist attacks in European cities resulted in the securitization of the problem of migrants.

Labor Migrants and Terrorism: Is the Danger Real?

Consider a group of labor migrants who come to their destination country not because of political violence, wars, or general instability in their home country, but because they want to achieve a higher income and standard of living. The number

of Moslem economic immigrants who came to Europe to work or study from 2010 to 2016 was 2.5 million [Hackett C.]. Very often these are skilled workers from developing countries or unskilled home service workers. As for the immigration of highly qualified specialists, their arrival not only does not contribute to the growth of the terrorist threat, but with a high degree of probability reduces it, since this group of immigrants is more likely to integrate into the societies of the destination country, thus they have less motivation to resort to violent actions. This position finds its confirmation when we study the difference between the American and European models of the original immigration policy. The US policy was aimed at accepting immigrants with a high level of education or students, while Europe mainly accepted immigrants who took the places of low-skilled workers [Bandyopadhyay S., Sandler T., p. 122]. At the same time, the ideological motives for protecting one's religious and cultural identity persist, so we observed that there are well-educated people among the members of Islamist terrorist organizations. There is another reason that some highly qualified specialists join terrorist organizations: they, as immigrants, do not always receive remuneration (or promotion) in the host country, corresponding to their level of education and skills. Such immigrants consider this discrimination.

The wealthy host states of Europe see migration as a tool to accelerate their economic development, i.e. their immigration policy is economically oriented. It also takes into account the low birth rate of the indigenous population, the lack of jobs in the low-wage service sector, and the high energy of incoming newcomers. But this is at the state level of assessing the benefits that a policy that encourages immigration provides. The question arises, and as for the local population, can labor immigrants annoy them, for example, because of competition in the labor market? After all, any migrants arriving in the country of destination create a serious burden on the social sphere, this somewhat changes the ethnic balance and intensifies

competition. However, studies have shown that, while contributing to an increase in labor productivity, immigration does not have a negative impact on the level of employment [Peri G.], and the impact of migrants on the level of wages within the country is extremely insignificant [Hijzen A., Wright P.]. Therefore, residents of European cities are afraid not so much of increased competition in the labor market and rising unemployment as the threat of terrorism.

More Migrants, more Danger?

In this regard, it is necessary to understand whether the increase in terrorist activity is really associated with migration, and if so, what kind of connection this is.

First, it would be necessary to determine whether there is a relationship between the number of migrants living in different countries and the number of terrorist attacks in these states. Such a study was conducted by German scientists and published in 2020. After collecting and analyzing data for thirty years – from 1980 to 2010 in 20 host countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and in 183 countries of origin, the researchers found that more migrants corresponds to more terrorist attacks. But at the same time, it was found that with an increase in the number of migrants, attacks carried out by both migrants and representatives of the indigenous population, directed against migrants, became more frequent, moreover, in comparable quantities. Thus, a cyclic interdependence of terror is formed. The study refutes allegations that terrorism appears in developed countries along with immigrants from countries with a Moslem majority or from those states where terrorist organizations operate. The authors of this work provided evidence that the increase in the number of terrorist attacks is due to an increase in the number of immigrants and does not depend on the country of origin [Dreher A., Gassebner M., Schaudt P., p. 1737].

Forced Migrants and the Threat of Terrorism

Since the fear of the indigenous population is caused not so much by labor migrants as by forced ones, we will dwell on them in more detail. At the end of 2020, there were 82.4 million forcibly displaced people worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, or events that seriously disrupt public order. 48.0 million internally displaced persons (source: IDMC). 26.4 million people are refugees. 4.1 million people are asylum seekers [UNHCR]. It was the forcibly displaced persons who found themselves at the center of discussions about the connection between migration processes and terrorism.

The topic of suspicion of refugees in terrorism began to be widely discussed after the events of September 11 in the United States, although not one of the 19 terrorists was a refugee [Zard M.]. During the migration crisis of 2014–2019, a whole series of terrorist attacks occurred in Europe. Public opinion in European countries unequivocally linked this not only with the activities of Moslem terrorist organizations or “lone wolves” radicalized under the influence of Islamist ideology, but also with migrants from Moslem countries in general. The majority of respondents in eight of the ten European countries where the research was conducted believed that the influx of refugees increased the risk of terrorism in their homeland [Wike R., Stokes B., Simmons K.]. A particularly negative attitude towards immigrants in general and towards refugees in particular is observed in homogeneous societies with a small number of immigrants [Nussio E., Bove V., Steele B.].

The danger associated with the flow of refugees from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq was also mentioned in works devoted to national security. There were suspicions that foreign terrorist fighters, mixed with refugees, would infiltrate the West [Changes in Modus ...]. It was feared that terrorist organizations such as ISIS would send their fighters to Western countries and

they would try to request the status of political asylum seekers. ISIS activity has been observed in refugee camps in Syria. Insufficient development and analysis of the activities of Syrian extremists compared to Iraqi and Afghan ones was noted [Jones. S.G., p. 5]. This vision of threats, shared by both American and European security agencies, has led to tougher legislative decisions in target states.

In the case of foreign terrorist fighters, who are by definition migrants, in 2015 EU law enforcement agencies noted only isolated cases of foreign terrorist fighters from the Middle East and North Africa returning via refugee routes. True, two of the suspects in the November 13, 2016 attacks in Paris entered the EU as illegal migrants [Migrant smuggling ..., p.12]. It would seem that these are isolated cases, but terrorist attacks in European capitals - Paris, Brussels and Berlin - contributed to the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment. Most of the criminals were born in Europe, but being Moslems, they were always perceived by the natives as outsiders. The rejection of the Euro-Moslem Ummah, alienation, its non-integration into the social fabric of European societies, along with other factors, contribute to its radicalization. However, European fears about the "Islamization of Europe" due to the influx of refugees seem unfounded. Even if all 5 million Syrian refugees came to Europe, this would increase the Moslem population of Europe by 1 percent, since it was 4%, and it would become 5%. Of the five million refugees from Syria, only 350,000 tried to get to Europe. Moreover, Turkey received 2.7 million people, Lebanon - 1.5 million Syrians, 1.3 million are in Jordan. Thus, the Middle Eastern states accepted 95% of Syrian refugees [Zunes S.]. After the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan received 780,000 and 1.5 million Afghan refugees, respectively [Mehra T.L.L.M., Wentworth M.]. And the United States, according to information from the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security, evacuated 65,000 Afghans [Afghan Refugees...].

But in general, it is no secret that the vast majority of refugees (86%) are taken in by developing countries and not by prosperous Western democracies [Figures at a glance ...]. Developing countries are less able to cope with all the problems associated with the flow of refugees, most often from neighboring countries. Their influx can cause tension within the host countries, while sharply limiting the avalanche of refugees can provoke an escalation of conflict and an increase in the terrorist threat in the country of origin, since the cornered person is known to either flee or resort to violence. European countries, having significant economic potential, have generally been able to establish a system for providing proper services to refugees. What is now clear is the need to direct significant funds to help developing country host states to increase their capacity and resilience. At the same time, sometimes states, even having certain resources, are not willing to spend them. Thus, the full capacity of the state implies a combination of the resources that are at the disposal of the state, with the desire to provide them. However, prosperous countries do not always express their readiness to show solidarity. Within the framework of the UN, documents were adopted that justified the refusal to grant refugee status to asylum seekers on the basis that they could have links with terrorists in other states. Moreover, these connections could be very distant or not proven at all [Zard M.]. In addition, it is known that the terrorist threat, as a rule, comes not from the refugees who have just arrived, but from the descendants of immigrants who were born in Europe and radicalized there.

Radicalization of Migrants

To reiterate, migrants going to Europe are only rarely radicalized (with the exception of foreign terrorist fighters who have been previously indoctrinated when returning to Europe from war zones). For the most part, migrants are radicalized

upon arrival in Europe, and even then not in the first generation, because first generation migrants are less prone to violence than second and third generation migrants. The fact is that first-generation migrants and refugees came to European countries, dreaming of a better life, believing in a wonderful future. They still remembered the hardships they had endured in their homeland. In addition, migrants faced great difficulties in finding work and settling in a new place. It took all the time and effort. Trying to identify the reasons for the radicalization of second and third generation migrants, some researchers suggested that they are people with a more distant cultural past, with an unstable cultural identity and therefore marginalized, which makes them vulnerable, susceptible to radicalization, and facilitates their recruitment into terrorist organizations [Lyons-Padilla S., Gelfand M.J.,...]. One can accept this argument, but it is far from exhaustive. Many migrants of the second and third generation, living in the West, began to realize rejection from the indigenous population, the impossibility for themselves to accept Western values and way of life, moreover, they were imbued with sympathy for their brethren suffering from “the modern crusades in the Middle East”, sharing their religious and cultural identity.

Thinking about the origins of forced migration in the last decade, one can state that one of the main reasons is the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, provoked by the interventions of Western countries, and the protest movements of the Arab Spring, short-sightedly supported by them. Supporters of terrorist organizations, in particular, Al-Qaeda, believe that the participation of European countries in interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the arrests of Islamists in Europe violated the terms of the security agreement between Europeans and Moslem immigrants [Nesser P.]. The passionarity of European Moslems – the growth of political self-consciousness and self-identification of a part of Moslems in the countries of the developing world – a phenomenon that was natural in itself, had

a negative side – it took on a power character. Thus, the acute sense of shared identity – along with deprivation – are the most important reasons for the radicalization of European Moslems. In addition, the lack of deep cultural, economic and social integration of migrants has become apparent, not to mention assimilation, which involves the elimination of cultural identity, which migrants tend to resist. Nevertheless, among Western researchers, the belief prevails that it is precisely assimilation that can hinder the radicalization of migrants and prevent them from joining terrorist organizations [Böhmelt T., Bove V.]. At the same time, there is evidence that immigrants from countries where the culture is close to the population of the host countries integrate faster, and their assimilation is more likely [Ibid.]. The fairness of this provision is obvious, although one cannot help but recall that the principle of cultural diversity is strongly supported by the UN, there is even a “World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development”, which is celebrated on May 21. In addition, it has long been known that cultural diversity is the most important factor in shaping economic growth. However, we see that in the case of migrants moving to European countries, the cultural distance between migrants and the indigenous population erects barriers to social and economic interaction between communities, creates tension in society when the local population sees migration as a threat to their own identity. And at the same time, this cultural disunity contributes to the radicalization of some migrants, we repeat, mainly in the second and third generation.

As for refugees, their behavior and propensity to radicalize are largely determined by the reason for their flight from their homeland. If they are fleeing natural and ecological disasters, then a feeling of depression and helplessness prevails. If armed confrontation takes place in the homeland of refugees, in countries of origin, and they do not feel connected to either side of the conflict, such refugees are not prone to violence. If they are persecuted in their homeland because of their religious or ethnic

affiliation, as well as for political reasons, and if they flee from conflict zones where the armed forces of foreign countries have invaded, then there may be a desire for revenge. They may be internally prepared for violent action. But such self-radicalization of refugees rarely leads them directly to the execution of terrorist attacks. What is important is the narrow social environment with which they interact in a foreign land. Initially, these are refugee camps, where they often become radicalized, especially if the camps are located near the war zone and, moreover, are overcrowded. In such camps, criminal activity often takes place and conflict situations are created that are fraught with violent manifestations. Further, the refugees enter the diaspora, which takes on a special significance, since the current refugees see Europe not as a temporary refuge, but as a new permanent place of residence. If in refugee camps it is about meeting the basic needs of immigrants, then when considering their life in the diaspora, there are questions of ensuring equality and opportunities for integration.

The Role of Diasporas

In the conditions of marginalization of incoming migrants and Moslems already permanently living in Europe, their isolation and the formation of closed communities, peculiar forbidden zones, are taking place. However, it should be noted that only representatives of the authorities, and not ordinary non-Moslem townspeople, can meet hostile attitude towards themselves in these enclaves. Nevertheless, the existence of such zones increases the social distancing of Moslems from other citizens, exacerbates intercultural contradictions and makes diasporas vulnerable to the penetration of the ideology of terrorism.

The role of diasporas in the radicalization of migrants is widely discussed. It is no secret that terrorists often turn to their relatives, members of the diaspora, for help.

And those bound by a common ethical and / or religious affiliation cannot refuse to support them, at least in providing asylum, transferring money. However, the influence of diasporas on their members who are potential terrorists is ambivalent. There are a number of studies by Western authors who, such as J. Piazza from the University of Pennsylvania and G. LaFree from the University of Maryland, USA, agree that diasporas, taking part in terrorist movements, at the same time restrain the criminal actions of Islamists, persuading them to carry out attacks with fewer victims, apparently fearing a response from the authorities [Piazza J.A., LaFree G.]. This last provision does not correlate with the conclusions of the leading Russian researchers L. Fituni and A. Abramova about the growth of radicalism among the Eastern diasporas. Of undoubted interest, explaining this trend, is the statement of these two authors about the "relative (in comparison with other ethnic and religious groups) deterioration in the situation of the Moslem diasporas in the EU and their increasing social alienation" [Fituni L., Abramova I., p. 13]. We should not forget that the explosive growth in the number of migrants leads to a sharp increase in the size of diasporas, which, in conditions of discrimination, leads to the spread of protest moods.

A special case is the support of terrorist organizations by *transnational* ethnic diasporas. It contributes to the survival of terrorist organizations and gives them stability [Piazza J.A., p. 632]. There is even an opinion, supported by statistical data, that neither the geographical proximity to the armed conflict, nor its intensity, nor even the flow of refugees play such a role in the spread of violent actions as ties with ethnic groups in conflict zones [Buhaug H., Gleditsch K.S.]. In the context of the transcontinental expansion of terrorism, it is important to determine what kind of support, other than material, can be provided by transnational ethnic diasporas to terrorist organizations. Among the relatives of terrorists in foreign diasporas there are people who can lobby for policies that benefit terrorist movements, build relationships

with sympathetic organizations, and try to build public support for terrorist activities. However, it should be taken into account that “while about 56% of terrorist organizations associated with transnational diasporas received material support from relatives abroad, only 17% of organizations were associated with related diasporas that provided political support” [Piazza J.A., p. 627]. However, it must be taken into account that political support, contributing to the growth of sympathy for the ideas of the radicals, is capable of increasing material flows of assistance to terrorists. In addition, the contribution of transnational ethnic diasporas to increasing the viability of terrorist organizations objectively hinders the involvement of these structures in the peace process. An example is the transnational diaspora of Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan (more than 2 million people). By supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, it helped stand up to strong-arm counterterrorism efforts and helped harden their negotiating position.

Victimization of Migrants and Tightening of Migration Legislation

Considering the problem of the connection between migrants and terrorism, it must be recognized that, while acting as a threat in the eyes of the European community, migrants at the same time often become victims of terrorist manifestations. The right-wing forces in Europe took an anti-immigrant stance, and their rhetoric was reflected in the formulation of the political programs of the right-wing parties, which laid the blame for the outbreak of violence on immigrants. At the same time, in just one year (from 2014 to 2015) in Germany, the number of crimes motivated by nationalistic, xenophobic beliefs, religious, cultural and ethnic intolerance increased by 117% [Implementation of Selected..., p. 13]. All these people are united by the idea that terrorism comes from immigrants. Anti-immigration sentiments

have spread in European society, which has led to a tightening of the states' migration policy.

When developing a more restrictive migration policy, legislators began to take into account the geographical proximity of countries that have become targets of terrorist manifestations. Caught under the pressure of public opinion, frightened by terrorist attacks in neighboring countries, the ruling elites prefer to restrict the rights of foreigners to a greater extent than the indigenous people – their voters. Often such policies are aimed at gaining support from right-wing voters. The leadership of almost every European country monitors changes in the immigration laws of neighboring countries, fearing to develop migration rules less stringent than neighboring states did, thus providing potential terrorists with more favorable conditions for exercising criminal activities in their countries.

What exactly is meant by tightening migration policy? First of all, these are restrictions. These restrictions can be, for example, quantitative, which reduce the number of people receiving migration rights. There are restrictions on the composition when criteria are developed for the entry and stay of a certain category of migrants. There are procedural restrictions, when complicated procedures are provided for certain groups of migrants. Sometimes measures are developed that limit the freedom of choice for migrants. And, finally, measures are being introduced to increase the level of control over immigrants when crossing the border and within the country [Bove V., Böhmelt T., Nussio E., p. 197]. The tightening of migration policy also includes the creation of a situation where the immigration policy of the host country strictly determines the dependence of economic incentives for immigrants on the degree of their integration into the host society. And this can cause the reaction reverse to the desired, up to manifestations of extremism and even terrorism.

There is another classification of measures to restrict migration [See: Choi S-W.]. The first category of restrictions

includes *border regulations*, on the basis of which the decision to enter the country of destination is made. Host states reduce the entry of migrants from countries with a high level of terrorism, increase the time for checking documents, impose a ban on the entry of migrants of a certain nationality¹, introduce selection criteria based on qualifications or wealth, suggesting that one of the reasons for radicalization is a low standard of living and lack of education, and therefore rich and highly skilled people are less prone to terrorism. There may be restrictions on entry under the family reunification program.

Another category of restrictions is of the legal nature. It includes the deprivation of citizenship, the reduction of opportunities to own land, conduct business, and limit access to the social security system. All of these measures, designed to protect the country of destination from terrorism, may, on the contrary, increase the vulnerability of migrants to radicalization and provoke their recruitment by terrorist organizations.

The third category is *law enforcement* policy. The main tool for enforcement of immigration laws is deportation. At the same time, sanctions are imposed on employers for violating the rules for hiring immigrants, on carriers of illegal immigrants. There are border patrols, sometimes border barriers are built, which, however, often leads to a tense situation on the border and embitters the refugees². The migration policy of the state is designed to ensure control over those immigrants who can allegedly become terrorists. However, the restrictive immigration policy applies only to first generation immigrants and does not apply to second and third generations who were born in Western countries and have citizenship.

How does the tightening of migration and integration policies and the tightening of laws regarding residents born abroad affect the increase in terrorist activity in the host country? Contrary to the expectations of politicians in the Western world, the restriction of rights does not, as they hope, result in increased security. The repressive policy towards migrants living in the

country leads to the alienation of significant groups of the population, which does not reduce, but increases the risk of terrorist manifestations [Dreher A., Gassebner M., Schaudt P., p. 1739]. This means that a sharp tightening of migration policy can carry a certain threat to the national security of the state.

Restrictive immigration policies reflect changes in human rights practices in host states due to the perception of immigrants as a threat to national security. The security forces are charged with monitoring the inclusion of migrants in the social life of the host society and providing protection against right-wing violent manifestations. Anti-immigrant sentiments, widespread in European societies, are fraught with unrest. The application of restrictive measures against migrants, as well as their protection, place an additional burden on the security forces and the police, who, not fully coping with the additional workload, may resort to excessive use of force, which ultimately inevitably affects the situation of human rights in the state. As for the public, for the sake of safety it is ready to give up its rights and freedoms [Avdan N., Bsisu N., Murdie A.].

Conclusion

In modern Europe, there is a widespread belief that immigration contributes to the growth of terrorism in the host countries. The term "Trojan horse of terrorism" has appeared in the scientific literature and the media, which refers to immigrants who arrived in Europe from conflict zones. We are seeing the virulence of the idea of a terrorist threat posed by refugees. The highly developed states, which control 60 percent of the world's wealth, accepted only 15 percent of the refugees. This disregard for human rights and asylum principles is justified by references to national security. In essence, the migration policy of Western countries speaks of the gulf that has formed between the proclaimed liberal values and impotence in the field of their implementation in the context of growing

nationalism and the general swing of European society to the right. As a result, governments are allocating an ever-increasing amount of resources not only to tighten measures to limit migration³, following the mood of the indigenous population, who are worried about their real or imagined security, but also to combat far-right violent extremism directed against immigrants. It is difficult for any state to resolve issues related to the risks of terrorism that arise in reality and in the minds of its citizens in connection with the massive displacement of the population. However, it turned out that the interdependence of terrorism and migration is non-linear. In addition, it turned out that restrictive anti-immigration measures do not automatically lead to the prevention of terrorist attacks, and the closure of borders is fraught with humanitarian consequences.

Notes

1. President D. Trump has banned citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the country.
2. For example, the situation on the border between Belarus and Poland in autumn 2021.
3. Especially if immigrants are carriers of other cultural and religious traditions – Author's note

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RAZIL GUZAEROV. RUSSIA AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: YOUTH COOPERATION

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Abstract. International youth cooperation is beginning to play an increasingly important role in the process of promoting the country's image in the international arena. The youth policy of Russia has a long and difficult path of formation and is still at the stage of transformation. However, this fact did not prevent gaining good experience in youth cooperation with other countries. The Republic of Tatarstan plays an active role in this process, which has been building international youth cooperation with the countries of the Islamic world for a long time. The experience of the Republic should be extended to other regions of Russia for the uniform development of the country.